Chapter[ Summary & Recommendations ]
Section[ F. Evidence Obtained of Other Players’ Possession or Use ]
F. Evidence Obtained of Other Players’ Possession or Use
Through the efforts of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern
District of California and federal law enforcement agencies, we obtained the cooperation of
former New York Mets clubhouse employee Kirk Radomski. Radomski was interviewed by me
and members of my investigative staff on four occasions, with federal law enforcement
representatives participating in all interviews and his lawyer participating in three of them.
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Radomski identified a large number of current or former major league players to whom he said
he illegally sold steroids, human growth hormone, or other substances.
Radomski also provided me with a number of documents relating to his
transactions with players in Major League Baseball, including copies of deposited checks that he
retrieved from his banks, copies of some shipping labels or receipts, his telephone records for
two years, and a copy of his address book in the form in which it was seized by federal agents
when they executed a search warrant at his home.
We also obtained information from sources other than Radomski about players’
possession or use of performance enhancing substances. These included several former major
league players and two former strength and conditioning coaches, some of whom met with us
voluntarily; others did so at the request of federal law enforcement officials.
As a result, we gathered sufficient evidence about their alleged illegal possession
or use of performance enhancing substances to identify in this report dozens of current or former
players in Major League Baseball. Each of the players was invited to meet with me to provide
him with information about the allegations against him and give him an opportunity to respond.
Both pitchers and position players are named in this report. Some of those named
are prominent, including winners of significant post-season awards. Many played in the World
Series or in All-Star games. Others are less well known, and some had only brief careers at the
major league level. The players were with clubs spread throughout Major League Baseball, as
Radomski’s customers referred their friends and teammates to him as they moved from club to
club.
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I carefully reviewed and considered all of the information we received about the
purchase, possession, or use of performance enhancing substances by Major League Baseball
players.
1. Kirk Radomski provided substantial information about the distribution of
performance enhancing substances, and in many cases his statements were corroborated by other
evidence. He did not, however, observe or participate in the use of performance enhancing
substances by any player named in this report, with one exception that is described below.
The corroboration took many forms, including: (a) the admission by eleven
players that Radomski had supplied them with performance enhancing substances, as he had said
in our interviews of him;10 (b) checks or money orders written to Radomski by some players in
appropriate amounts; (c) mailing receipts for shipments of performance enhancing substances by
Radomski to some players; (d) statements by other witnesses supporting the allegations of use by
some players; (e) the names, addresses, and/or telephone numbers of many players were found in
Radomski’s seized address book; (f) telephone records showing calls between Radomski and
some players; and (g) a positive drug test.
I did not include in this report the names of three players to whom Radomski said
he sold performance enhancing substances: two of them because the players had retired from
Major League Baseball by the time of the alleged sales; and one of them because the player
admitted that he had purchased and possessed the substances but denied that he had used them
and his version of events was corroborated by other credible evidence.
I interviewed Radomski four times (in June, July, October, and November 2007),
three times in person, once by telephone. His personal lawyer participated in three of the
10 Two players admitted receipt and possession of illegal performance enhancing
substances sold by Radomski but denied they ever used them.
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interviews. Federal law enforcement officials and members of my staff participated with me in
all of the interviews. No one from the Commissioner’s Office, any club, or the Players
Association participated in these interviews.
During each of the interviews, the law enforcement officials warned Radomski
that if he made any false statements he would forfeit their commitment to recommend a more
lenient sentence and he would face further criminal jeopardy. Before the interviews, Radomski
had been debriefed extensively by federal prosecutors and agents. They subsequently confirmed
that the information he provided to us in his interviews was consistent with the information he
had previously provided to them.
2. Six players are named based on information obtained from persons other
than Radomski or former major league strength and conditioning coach Brian McNamee. In
each case, these allegations are supported by one or more of the following: (a) checks; (b) prior
consistent statements; (c) a statement made about a player’s use where the witness was a friend
of the player identified and under circumstances in which the witness faced criminal exposure for
making a false statement; (d) statements reporting a witness’s direct observation of the player
using a performance enhancing substance; (e) the player’s own admission of his use.
3. Brian McNamee said that he was a direct eyewitness and participant in
alleged illegal use by three players who he served as a personal trainer. I interviewed him three
times (in July, October, and December 2007), once in person and twice by telephone.11 His
personal lawyer participated in each interview. Federal law enforcement officials and members
of my staff participated with me in all of the interviews. No one from the Commissioner’s
Office, any club, or the Players Association participated in these interviews.
11 In addition, a member of my investigative staff interviewed him by telephone on a
fourth occasion in December 2007; his personal lawyer also participated.
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During each of the interviews, the law enforcement officials warned him that he
faced criminal jeopardy if he made any false statements. With respect to two of the players,
McNamee was acting against his financial interest in disclosing this information. Before the
interviews, McNamee had been debriefed extensively by federal prosecutors and agents. They
subsequently confirmed that the information he provided to us in his interviews was consistent
with the information he had previously provided to them.
In some cases, I include statements by club personnel in emails or other
documents commenting on a player’s alleged drug use. Those statements are cited as
corroboration of other evidence that a player possessed or used performance enhancing
substances; they did not serve as the primary basis for any of the decisions I made. No player is
identified in this report on the basis of mere suspicion or speculation.
Radomski met with many players while they were in New York, where he lives.
Most of his business, however, was conducted by telephone and mail or overnight delivery. He
sent drugs to their homes, to hotels, and in some cases to major league clubhouses. He was paid
by check, by money order, or in cash.
Even before mandatory random drug testing began in Major League Baseball,
Radomski observed players moving away from oil-based steroids that stay in the body for a long
time, to water-based steroids that clear the body faster. Because human growth hormone cannot
be detected in a urine test, as mandatory random drug testing was implemented many players
switched to it even when they concluded that it was less effective than steroids.
A detailed discussion of Radomski’s network of customers, and other players for
whom evidence has been obtained of their alleged possession or use of performance enhancing
substances, is provided in Chapter VIII of the report.
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