Chapter[ VIII. Information Obtained Regarding Other Players’ Possession or Use of
Steroids and Human Growth Hormone ]
Section[ A. Background - 3. Radomski’s Distribution of Performance Enhancing Substances to Major League Baseball Players ]
3. Radomski’s Distribution of Performance Enhancing Substances to Major League Baseball Players
Radomski said that his dealing in performance enhancing substances began in
response to inquiries from players. Radomski had many conversations with players in which he
discussed the pros and cons of various performance enhancing substances, as well as how to use
them, what their side effects were, and whether their use could be detected in drug tests. Many
players who contacted Radomski about these issues never bought any illegal substances from
him.
A number of players to whom Radomski supplied performance enhancing
substances confirmed that he never solicited them to purchase these substances. The former
players we spoke with confirmed that Radomski’s distribution network grew through word-ofmouth
referrals among major league players. On some occasions, players acted as intermediaries
to obtain steroids or human growth hormone from Radomski on behalf of their teammates or
friends.
Radomski met with a number of players while they were in New York. Most of
his business, however, was conducted by telephone and by mail or express delivery service. In
those instances, Radomski received payment through the mail (by check, money order, or cash)
and sent drugs by express mail or express delivery service to players at their homes, hotels or,
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occasionally, to their attention at their teams’ clubhouses. Radomski said that no player ever
expressed concern about having anabolic steroids or human growth hormone mailed to him at his
team’s clubhouse.
Even before drug testing began in Major League Baseball, Radomski observed
that players were moving away from oil-based anabolic steroids, such as Deca-Durabolin, that
stay in the body for a long time. Instead, the players increasingly requested water-based anabolic
steroids, such as Winstrol, and other drugs such as clenbuterol and human growth hormone, that
cleared the body faster and were less likely to be detected. That trend continued after drug
testing began. Radomski recalled that several players asked him whether human growth
hormone could be detected in urine tests. Chad Allen, a former player who was a customer of
Radomski, told us that human growth hormone is now the drug of choice for those players who
can afford it because it is not detectable. He believes that Major League Baseball will always
have a difficult time keeping up with drug developments because “there’s always someone ahead
of the curve who knows that he will make a quick buck.”
This is significant. Major League Baseball has sharply increased the penalties for
violation of its testing program (a 50-game suspension is now imposed for a first offense). Yet
Radomski’s experience shows that, even before testing had started, the players began to migrate
to illegal performance enhancing substances that are more difficult or impossible to detect. This
evidence helps inform my judgment that an approach that includes but is not limited to drug
testing is necessary to effectively combat performance enhancing substance use, as is set forth in
the Recommendations section of this report.
Radomski continued to make significant sales of steroids, human growth
hormone, and clenbuterol after drug testing was in place. In Radomski’s view, using human
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growth hormone will not make a player stronger but will decrease recovery time so that the
player can work out harder and more frequently to attain greater strength.367 Radomski also
stated that he felt that the side effects of human growth hormone were less severe than those of
anabolic steroids.
Radomski’s sources for anabolic steroids were mainly “people he knew at the
gyms,” who he could not further identify. He paid between $100 and $300 per bottle, depending
on the substance. For human growth hormone, Radomski approached patients as they were
leaving pharmacies and offered to purchase a portion of their just-filled prescriptions. According
to Radomski, a typical human growth hormone prescription included four boxes of human
growth hormone per month. As word spread that bodybuilders were interested in human growth
hormone, individuals who had just filled their prescriptions for the substance went to gyms
looking to sell the excess portions of their prescriptions.368
Radomski typically paid at least $1,000 or more for one “kit” of human growth
hormone, which included seven vials of distilled water and the same number of packages of
lypholized human growth hormone powder, but the price depended on availability. He generally
367 Radomski himself took human growth hormone from 2002 or 2003 until 2005.
368 This phenomenon has been reported on before. See Thomas Zambito, Pumped by
AIDS Drug; Some Bodybuilders Break the Law to Score Serostim, N.Y. Daily News, June 2,
2003, at 5; see also Tim Reiterman, Black Market in AIDS Drug Flourishes; Control of
Hormone is Laxer in California Than Elsewhere; Medi-Cal Says It has Stiffened Rules,
L.A. Times, Feb. 16, 2003, at 1. The office of the New York Attorney General estimated that
fraudulent sales of human growth hormone and other prescription drugs amounted to ten percent
of New York’s $3 billion in Medicaid drug expenses in 2002. Amy Klein, 5 Accused of Black
Market Drug Ring ; Police Find $4.5M in AIDS Medicines, The Record (Bergen County, N.J.),
Aug. 29, 2003, at A1. In his 2003 interview by federal law enforcement agents, Greg Anderson
reportedly said that he also “receive[d] the testosterone and human growth hormone that he
distribute[d] from AIDS patients in San Francisco who have prescriptions for them.”
Internal Revenue Service Memorandum of Interview of Greg Anderson, Sept. 3, 2003, at 3.
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resold kits for $1,600 each, but in some instances charged less depending on his relationship with the player.
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