Section[ PART II - Strategy in Detail
Title[ THE SECURITY TRACK IN DETAIL
THE SECURITY TRACK IN DETAIL
Strategic Summary: Clear, Hold, Build
-- The security track is based on six core assumptions:
- First, the terrorists, Saddamists, and rejectionists do not have the manpower or firepower to
achieve a military victory over the Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces. They can win only if
we surrender.
- Second, our own political will is steadfast and will allow America to keep troops in Iraq - to
fight terrorists while training and mentoring Iraqi forces - until the mission is done,
increasing or decreasing troop levels only as conditions warrant.
- Third, progress on the political front will improve the intelligence picture by helping
distinguish those who can be won over to support the new Iraqi state from the terrorists and
insurgents who must either be killed or captured, detained, and prosecuted.
- Fourth, the training, equipping, and mentoring of Iraqi Security Forces will produce an army
and police force capable of independently providing security and maintaining public order in
Iraq.
- Fifth, regional meddling and infiltrations can be contained and/or neutralized.
- Sixth, while we can help, assist, and train, Iraqis will ultimately be the ones to eliminate their
security threats over the long term.
STRATEGIC LOGIC BEHIND SECURITY TRACK
-- We are helping the Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi government take territory out of enemy
control (clear); keep and consolidate the influence of the Iraqi government afterwards (hold);
and establish new local institutions that advance civil society and the rule of law in areas
formerly under enemy influence and control (build).
- Efforts on the security track include offensive operations against the enemy, protection of
key communication and infrastructure nodes, post-conflict stabilization operations, and the
18
training, equipping, and mentoring of Iraqi Security Forces. Coalition transition teams are
embedded in all Iraqi Army battalions to provide assistance and guidance when needed.
-- The model that works is clear - it is resource intensive, requires commitment and resolve, and
involves tools across the civilian and military spectrum, including:
- The right balance of Coalition and Iraqi forces conducting offensive operations;
- Preparation for such operations through contact and negotiation between local and federal
Iraqi government officials;
- Adequate Iraqi forces to provide security for the population and guard against future
intimidation;
- Cooperation with and support for local institutions to govern after Coalition forces leave;
- Prompt disbursal of aid for quick and visible reconstruction;
- Central government authorities who pay attention to local needs.
-- How will this help the Iraqis - with Coalition support - defeat the enemy and achieve our larger
goals?
- Offensive operations disrupt enemy networks and deprive enemy elements of safe havens
from which they can rest, train, rearm, and plan attacks against the Coalition, the Iraqi
government, and Iraqi civilians.
- Localized post-conflict operations - providing security, economic assistance, and support to
civilian institutions in newly cleared areas - further isolate enemy elements from the rest of
the population and give Iraqis space to participate in a peaceful political process.
- Infrastructure protection helps ensure that the Iraqi government can collect revenues and
provide basic services to the people, which is critical to building confidence in the
government and weaning support away from insurgents.
- Putting capable Iraqis forward in the fight increases the overall effectiveness of U.S.-Iraqi
operations, as Iraqis are better able to collect intelligence and identify threats in their
neighborhoods.
- As Iraqi forces become more and more capable, our military posture will shift, leaving
Coalition forces increasingly focused on specialized counter-terrorism missions to hunt,
capture, and kill terrorist leaders and break up their funding and resource networks.
1>
PROGRESS ON THE SECURITY TRACK
-- Our clear, hold, and build strategy is working:
- Significant progress has been made in wresting territory from enemy control. During much
of 2004, major parts of Iraq and important urban centers were no-go areas for Iraqi and
Coalition forces. Fallujah, Najaf, and Samara were under enemy control. Today, these cities
are under Iraqi government control, and the political process is taking hold. Outside of major
urban areas, Iraqi and Coalition forces are clearing out hard core enemy elements, maintaining
a security presence, and building local institutions to advance local reconstruction and civil
society.
- Actionable intelligence is improving. Due to greater confidence in the Iraqi state and
growing frustration with the terrorists, Saddamists, and rejectionists, Iraqi citizens are
providing more intelligence to Iraqis and Coalition forces. In March 2005, Iraqi and
Coalition forces received more than 400 intelligence tips from Iraqi citizens; in August, they
received 3,300, and in September more than 4,700.
- Iraqi forces are growing in number. As of November 2005, there were more than 212,000
trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces, compared with >6,000 in September of last year.
In August 2004, there were five Iraqi army battalions in the fight; now more than 120 Iraqi
army and police battalions are in the fight. Of these battalions, more than 80 are fighting
side-by-side with Coalition forces and more than 40 others are taking the lead in the fight.
More battalions are being recruited, trained, and fielded. In July 2004 there were no
operational Iraqi brigade or division headquarters; now there are seven division and more
than 30 brigade headquarters in the Iraqi army. In June 2004, there were no Iraqi combat
support or service support battalions; now there are a half dozen operational battalions
supporting fielded Iraqi units.
- Iraqi forces are growing in capability. In June 2004, no Iraqi Security Force unit controlled
territory. The Coalition provided most of the security in Iraq. Today, much of Baghdad
province is under the control of Iraqi forces, the cities of Najaf and Karbala are controlled by
Iraqi forces, and other Iraqi battalions and brigades control hundreds of square miles of
territory in other Iraqi provinces. A year ago, the Iraqi Air Force had no aircraft; today its
three operational squadrons provide airlift and reconnaissance support and Iraqi pilots are
training on newly arrived helicopters. A year ago during the operation to liberate Fallujah,
five Iraqi battalions took part in the fight. For the most part, they fell in behind Coalition
forces to help control territory already seized by Coalition units. No Iraqi units controlled
their own battle space. In September 2005, during Operation Restoring Rights in Tal Afar,
eleven Iraqi battalions participated, controlling their own battle space, and outnumbering
Coalition forces for the first time in a major offensive operation. Over the last six months,
the number of patrols being conducted independently by Iraqi forces has doubled, bringing
the overall percentage to nearly a quarter of all patrols in theater.
- Iraqis are committed to building up their security establishment. Despite repeated and
brutal attacks against Iraqi Security Forces, volunteers continue to outpace an already
20
substantial demand. In the past several months alone, nearly 5,000 recruits have joined from
Sunni areas. In the recently cleared Tal Afar, more than 200 local volunteers have begun
police training before returning to help protect their city. In Anbar, Sunnis have lined up to
join the Iraqi army and police, planning to return to their home province and help protect it
from terrorists.
- Iraqis are taking on specialized missions central to overall success. Four Strategic
Infrastructure Battalions, with more than 3,000 personnel, have completed training and will
soon assume the specific mission of guarding vital infrastructure nodes from terrorist attack.
A Special Police Unit highly trained for hostage rescue has almost 200 operators and is
conducting operations almost every week in Baghdad and Mosul. In the past several months,
hundreds of Iraqi soldiers have undergone intensive special operations training and are now
in the fight, hunting, killing, and capturing the most-wanted terrorist leaders.
- Iraq is building an officer corps that will be loyal to the Iraqi government, not a particular
group or tribe. The Iraqi army now has three officer academies training the next generation
of junior officers for its army. In September, NATO inaugurated a new military staff college
in Baghdad that will eventually train more than 1,000 senior Iraqi officers each year. Today,
however, the vast majority of Iraqi police and army recruits are being taught by Iraqi
instructors. By training the trainers, we are creating an institutional capability that will allow
the Iraqi forces to continue to develop and grow long after Coalition forces have left Iraq.
CONTINUED CHALLENGES IN THE SECURITY SPHERE
-- Even with this progress, we and our Iraqi partners continue to face multiple challenges in the
security sphere, including:
- Countering the intimidation and brutality of enemies whose tactics are not constrained by
law or moral norms;
- Building representative Iraqi security forces and institutions while guarding against
infiltration by elements whose first loyalties are to persons or institutions other than the Iraqi
government;
- Neutralizing the actions of countries like Syria and Iran, which provide comfort and/or
support to terrorists and the enemies of democracy in Iraq;
- Refining our understanding of the constantly changing nature of, and relationships between,
terrorist groups, other enemy elements, and their networks;
- Addressing the militias and armed groups that are outside the formal security sector and
central government command;
- Ensuring that the security ministries - as well as the fighting forces - have the capacity to
sustain Iraq's new army;
21
- Integrating political, economic, and security tools - and synchronizing them with Iraqi
government efforts - to provide the best post-conflict operations possible.
"My aim is 100 percent clear: all the terrorists living here, they go now.
Saddam . . . it's finished. He's broken. Now is the new Iraq."
-Gen. Muhammad al-Sumraa, Iraq 303rd Battalion,
Haifa Street, Baghdad, August 14, 2005
Contents
Prev
Next
Last
