Section[ PART I - Strategic Overview
Title[ VICTORY WILL TAKE TIME
VICTORY WILL TAKE TIME
-- Our Strategy Is Working. Much has been accomplished in Iraq, including the removal of
Saddam's tyranny, negotiation of an interim constitution, restoration of full sovereignty, holding
of free national elections, formation of an elected government, drafting of a permanent
constitution, ratification of that constitution, introduction of a sound currency, gradual
restoration of Iraq's neglected infrastructure, and the ongoing training and equipping of Iraq's
security forces.
- Yet many challenges remain:
- Iraq is overcoming decades of a vicious tyranny, under which governmental authority
stemmed solely from fear, terror, and brutality. Saddam Hussein devastated Iraq, wrecked
its economy, ruined its infrastructure, and destroyed its human capital. It is not realistic to
expect a fully functioning democracy, able to defeat its enemies and peacefully reconcile
generational grievances, to be in place less than three years after Saddam was finally
removed from power.
- We and the Iraqi people are fighting a ruthless enemy, which is multi-headed, with
competing ambitions and differing networks. Getting an accurate picture of this enemy,
understanding its makeup and weaknesses, and defeating it, requires patience, persistence,
and determined effort along all three strategic tracks.
- Terrorism and insurgencies historically take many years to defeat, through a combination of
political, economic, and military tools. Iraq's violence is different from other such conflicts,
where insurgents often had unified command and control or mounted a successful campaign
to win the hearts and minds of the population. Nonetheless, Iraq is likely to struggle with
some level of violence for many years to come.
- The neighborhood is inhospitable. Iran and Syria have failed to provide support to Iraq's
new government and have in many ways actively undermined it. The region, while
including some cooperative actors, has only recently mobilized to support the emergence
of a democratic and stable Iraq.
- The Sunni community is still searching for strong, reliable leadership. Although many Sunnis
also suffered under Saddam, leaders from their community generally associated with the
Ba'ath Party, not the opposition to the regime. The Sunni religious community, moreover, is
less hierarchical and more dispersed, which is reflected in Sunni politics. As a result of these
realities, few Sunni leaders have spoken for the larger Sunni community in Iraq. Elections in
December will produce elected Sunni leaders who can represent their community with
legitimate authority.
- Many Sunnis are also coming to terms with the reality that their community no longer
monopolizes power in Iraq. They are grappling with their role in a democratic country in
which they are a minority, albeit with constitutional protections for minority rights and
interests.
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- Many of Iraq's communities remain skeptical of the central government and nervous about
the creation of an Iraqi state where power is concentrated in Baghdad. Their allegiance to a
united Iraqi government will depend upon the central government demonstrating the will
and capability to govern effectively and fairly on behalf of all Iraqis.
- Earlier efforts to correct past wrongs have sometimes alienated Sunnis who were not
complicit with Saddam's crimes. Iraq's leaders need to find a middle ground - between
pursuing justice for every past wrong and leaving the past unexamined.
- With democratization has come the emergence of new groups, not all of whom have
shared the goal of a free, pluralistic, and democratic Iraq. Some groups - like members of
the Mahdi Militia - have sought to maximize discontent with the Coalition presence and
have at times clashed violently with other parties.
- The continued existence and influence of militias and armed groups, often affiliated with
political parties, hamper the rule of law in some parts of Iraq. These groups have also
infiltrated the police forces and sparked violent exchanges in areas of the country that are
otherwise peaceful.
- Iraq's economy is still shackled with many vestiges of a highly centralized economy and
stagnant and corrupt institutions. Creating new institutions, reforming old ones, and
developing new policies will be necessary to encourage economic growth. The prosperity
of average Iraqis will be enhanced only if Iraq reduces the massive subsidy programs that
burden its economy.
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