Chapter Chapter 6
Section Managing the Interagency Process in Homeland Security Response
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Managing the Interagency Process in Homeland Security Response
In order to create robust homeland security response capabilities, we must also transform our Federal interagency processes. Most important, we must eliminate the extraordinary red tape and resulting delays in the process of requests for assistance in response efforts. Too often during the Hurricane Katrina response we found that the Federal government did not effectively use assets at the ready because the necessary requests were being “coordinated” somewhere in the bureaucracy. The solution is to enshrine in the Federal government one of the central tenets of the National Incident Management System—Unified Command. We must transform our approach for catastrophic incidents from one of bureaucratic coordination to proactive unified command that creates true unity of effort. As set forth in NIMS, “In a Unified Command structure, the individuals designated by their jurisdictional authorities . . . must jointly determine objectives, strategies, plans, and priorities and work together to execute integrated incident operations and maximize the use of assigned resources.”13
Advantages of Using Unified Command13
w A single set of objectives is developed for the entire incident.
w A collective approach is used to develop strategies to achieve incident objectives.
w Information flow and coordination is improved between all jurisdictions and agencies involved in the incident
w All agencies with responsibility for the incident have an understanding of joint priorities and restrictions.
w No agency’s legal authorities will be compromised or neglected.
w The combined efforts of all agencies are optimized as they perform their resrespective assignments under a single Incident Action Plan.
At the Federal level, the most urgent step in creating unity of effort will be to reinforce the Secretary of Homeland Security as the Federal government’s preparedness and incident manager. In order to create unity of effort at the Federal level, the Department should manage and orchestrate the specialized efforts of other Federal departments and agencies within their core competencies. Although DHS by Presidential directive has this mission,14 its internal structures and relationships across the Federal government do not position it to fully succeed. The current arrangements are an awkward mix of the traditional, FEMA-led, approach to interagency coordination and the Homeland Security Act’s creation of a powerful Department of Homeland Security.
One model for the command and control structure for the Federal response in the new National Preparedness System is our successful defense and national security statutory framework. In that framework, there is a clear line of authority that stretches from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the Combatant Commander in the field. When a contingency arises, the Combatant Commander in that region executes the missions assigned by the Secretary of Defense and the President. Although the Combatant Commander might not “own” or control forces on a day-to-day basis, during a military operation he controls all military forces in his theater: he exercises the command authority and has access to resources needed to affect outcomes on the ground.
Figure 6.1 portrays the structure for command and control of defense operations. Unity of command is established in a chain of command from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commander. The Combatant Commander possesses operational control over forces and resources provided by the armed services. The Intelligence Community additionally provides essential information—warning and situational awareness—to the commander in the field. The system makes a clear distinction between operations—in which the Combatant Commander is the center of activity—and the provision of operational resources. In the latter case, the Armed Services are responsible for the training and equipping of forces.
Figure 6.1: Command and Control of Defense Operations
The model somewhat parallels the original conception of the Federal homeland security response. In particular, the President directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, who coordinates interagency actions at the senior level while supervising the field commander for the Federal response—the Principal Federal Official (PFO). The PFO, in turn, is supported with resources provided by DHS and other interagency departments and agencies.
As described in HSPD-5, Cabinet members are to support the Secretary of Homeland Security as the President’s incident manager directing and coordinating the Federal response.15 At the PFO level, this can be accomplished by ensuring that the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)—who possesses authority over resources—works for the PFO.16
However, the comparison between the homeland security and defense operations models breaks down in two significant ways. First, the Federal commander only manages Federal resources in homeland security. In almost every circumstance, State and local governments maintain operational control over their own resources. Second, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the PFO must request Federal assets from other departments and agencies; they do not command the resources of other departments and agencies. HSPD-5 makes clear that one Cabinet member cannot alter or impede the ability to carry out the authorities of Federal departments and agencies to perform their responsibilities under law.17 Rather, HSPD-5 anticipates that future events will necessarily involve a joint approach given that several departments and agencies have distinct statutory authorities (e.g., the Attorney General for criminal investigation of terrorist acts, the Secretary of Defense for command over our military forces, and so forth).
In this vein, we must similarly transform the existing system of Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). A vestige of the 1992 Federal Response Plan,18 the precursor to the NRP, these capability-specific coordination mechanisms, at a minimum, must be reconciled to the NIMS as well as responsive to the orders of the Principal Federal Official. More fundamentally, we must examine whether we should reorganize and, in some cases, redefine the ESF structures, while building DHS command and control mechanisms.19
These interagency management changes recognize that Federal response to catastrophic events—potential or actual—must be both efficient and effective in meeting the needs of the victims. Without infringing upon the statutory responsibilities of the Cabinet departments and agencies, we must ensure that the President’s incident manager is able to call upon the full range of the Federal government’s response assets, and to aggressively orchestrate, lead, and coordinate their use in response operations.
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