Title Shane v. Fauver
Date 2000
By Alito
Subject Misc
Contents
Page 1
101 of 238 DOCUMENTS
STANFORD SHANE; OTIS TERRELL; ROBERT STEWART, Appellants v. WILLIAM FAUVER, Commissioner; JAMES BARBO, Administrator; ROGERS, Chief; DIRECTOR OF CUSTODY
No. 98-6205
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
213 F.3d 113; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11082; 46 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 957
November 16, 1999, Argued
May 19, 2000, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: **1 ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY. (Dist. Court No. 97-cv--
03401). District Court Judge: Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr. DISPOSITION: Order of dismissal vacated and re- manded for further proceedings.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 complaint by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, without leave to amend.
OVERVIEW: Plaintiff inmates sued defendant state cor- rectional officials under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 based on violations of U.S. Const. amend. I, VIII, and XIV and under state law. Defendants moved to dismiss the com- plaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court entered an order granting defen- dants' motion and dismissing the complaint. Because the order did not specify that the dismissal was without prej- udice, the dismissal operated as an adjudication upon the merits. On appeal plaintiffs contended the district court erred in dismissing without giving leave to amend and in dismissing with prejudice. The court held the district court abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs' claims without either granting leave to amend or concluding that amendment would have been futile since leave generally is freely given when justice so requires and the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act did not alter this rule.
OUTCOME: Order of dismissal vacated because the dis- trict court should not have dismissed plaintiffs' claims without either granting leave to amend or concluding that any amendment would have been futile; remanded for further proceedings.
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings > Amended Pleadings
HN1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) permits a party to amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Defenses, Objections & Demurrers > Motions to Dismiss
HN2 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings > Amended Pleadings
HN3 In the typical case in which a defendant asserts the defense of failure to state a claim by motion, the plain- tiff may amend the complaint once as a matter of course without leave of court. After amending once or after an answer has been filed, the plaintiff may amend only with leave of court or the written consent of the opposing party, but leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Abuse of Discretion
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings > Amended Pleadings
HN4 Although the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the district court, outright refusal to grant leave to amend without any jus- tifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely an abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings > Amended Pleadings
HN5 Among the grounds that could justify a denial of
213 F.3d 113, *; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11082, **1;
46 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 957
Page 2
leave to amend are undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, and futility. "Futility" means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In assessing "futility," the district court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, if a claim is vulnerable to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), but the plaintiff moves to amend, leave to amend generally must be granted unless the amendment would not cure the deficiency.
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Defenses, Objections & Demurrers > Motions to Dismiss
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings > Amended Pleadings
HN6 When an individual has filed a complaint under 42
U.S.C.S. § 1983 which is subject to dismissal for lack of factual specificity, he should be given a reasonable oppor- tunity to cure the defect, if he can, by amendment of the complaint and denial of an application for leave to amend under these circumstances is an abuse of discretion.
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Defenses, Objections & Demurrers > Motions to Dismiss
HN7 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1997e(c)(1).
COUNSEL: Jon Hogue (argued), Hogue & Lannis, Pittsburgh, PA., Attorneys for Appellants.
John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, Mary C. Jacobson, Assistant Attorney General of Counsel, Larry R. Etzweiler, Senior Deputy, Attorney General (ar- gued), Trenton, New Jersey, Attorneys for Appellees.
JUDGES: Before: ALITO and STAPLETON, Circuit
Judges, and FEIKENS, * Senior District Judge.
* The Honorable John Feikens, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
OPINIONBY: ALITO
OPINION:
*114 OPINION OF THE COURT ALITO, Circuit Judge:
Stanford Shane, Otis Terrell, and Robert Stewart, pris- oners at New Jersey's Northern State Prison, appeal the dismissal of their complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with- out leave to amend. We hold that, under the circumstances present here, Section 803(d) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C.S 1997e(c)(1), did not
change **2 the procedures that our court previously adopted regarding the dismissal of a complaint without granting leave to amend. We *115 therefore vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
I.
The plaintiffs' complaint in this case asserted claims against three state correctional officials under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as well as under the New Jersey Constitution. Although proceeding pro se, the plaintiffs paid the full filing fee. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The plaintiffs responded, and the District Court entered an order granting the motion and dismissing the complaint. Because the order did not specify that the dismissal was without prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) the dis- missal "operates as an adjudication upon the merits." The plaintiffs appealed.
When the appeal was first considered by a panel of this court, that panel entered an order directing that coun- sel be appointed to represent the plaintiffs on appeal and instructing counsel to brief the issue whether the PLRA mandated **3 the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims without leave to amend. New briefs were then filed by both sides, and the appeal was argued before this panel. Plaintiffs' counsel contends that the District Court should not have dismissed without giving leave to amend and, in any event, should not have dismissed with prej- udice. The defendants respond that the manner in which the District Court disposed of the case was required by the PLRA. According to the defendants, if a complaint falling within the PLRA fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the District Court must dismiss
without leave to amend and with prejudice. II.
HN1 Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to amend a pleading "once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive plead- ing is served." HN2 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be made "before pleading if a further pleading is permitted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). HN3 Thus, in the typical case in which a defendant asserts the de- fense of failure to state a claim by motion, the plaintiff may amend the complaint once "as a matter of course" without leave of court. See 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice **4 S 12.34 5 , at 12-76 (3d ed. 1999) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). After amending once or after an answer has been filed, the plaintiff may amend only with leave of court or the written consent of the opposing party, but "leave shall be freely given when
213 F.3d 113, *115; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11082, **4;
46 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 957
Page 3
justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). HN4 The Supreme Court has instructed that although "the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, . . . outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely an abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 9 L. Ed. 2d
222, 83 S. Ct. 227 (1962).
HN5 "Among the grounds that could justify a de- nial of leave to amend are undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, and futility." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)
("Burlington"); Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413-
14 (3d Cir. 1993). "Futility" means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which re- lief could be granted. Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1434.
**5 In assessing "futility," the District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6). Id.; 3 Moore's Federal Practice, supra S
15.15 3 , at 15-47 to-48 (3d ed. 2000). Accordingly, if a claim is vulnerable to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), but the plaintiff moves to amend, leave to amend gen- erally must be granted unless the amendment would not cure the deficiency. *116 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not address the situation in which a defi- ciency in a complaint could be cured by amendment but leave to amend is not sought. Circuit case law, however, holds that leave to amend must be given in this situation as well. In Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1976), this court stated that a district court should use the following procedure in dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim:
We suggest that district judges expressly state, where appropriate, that the plaintiff has leave to amend within a specified period of time, and that application for dismissal of the action may be made if a timely amendment is not forthcoming within that time. If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate **6 notice with the dis- trict court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.
Borelli, 532 F.2d at 951 n.1. In Darr v. Wolfe, 767 F.2d
79 (3d Cir. 1985), we stated:
This court has consistently held that HN6
when an individual has filed a complaint un-
der § 1983 which is dismissable sic for lack of factual specificity, he should be given a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect, if he can, by amendment of the complaint and that denial of an application for leave to amend under these circumstances is an abuse of discretion.
Darr, 767 F.2d at 81.
These cases were followed by District Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1986), in which the court held that, if the complaint in that case was deficient, the District Court should have followed the procedure out- lined in Borelli and granted leave to amend even though the plaintiff, which was represented by experienced coun- sel, n1 had never sought leave to amend. District Council
47, 795 F.2d at 316. The court observed that "we have never required plaintiffs to request **7 leave to amend following a district court's dismissal of a complaint." Id. If the rules set forth above are applied to this case, it is apparent that the District Court should not have dis- missed the plaintiffs' claims without either granting leave to amend or concluding that any amendment would be futile.
n1 See District Council 47, 795 F.2d at 317
(Aldisert, J., dissenting).
The defendants maintain, however, that the enactment of the PLRA altered these rules. The PLRA contains sev- eral provisions that address the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, n2 but because the plaintiffs here did not proceed in forma pauperis and because their complaint was dismissed on motion by the defendants and not sua sponte by the court, only one of those provisions is applicable. We therefore focus our analysis on the effect of this provision and do not reach the other provisions that apply to sua sponte dismissals and in forma pauperis cases.
n2 Section 805(a) of the PLRA requires a District Court to "screen" prisoner complaints "be- fore docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing," and provides that the Court "shall . . . dismiss" any portion of a com- plaint that, among other things, "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a)-(b). This provision does not apply to the present case because the complaint was not dis- missed pursuant to court "screening" but on motion by the defendants.
213 F.3d 113, *116; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11082, **7;
46 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 957
Page 4
**8
Section 804(a)(5) of the PLRA provides that in an in forma pauperis case, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (emphasis added). This is not an in forma pauperis case.
We are not aware of anything in the legislative history of the PLRA that weighs significantly against the conclu- sion that we reach. There is no doubt that the provisions of the PLRA on which the defendants rely were meant to curb the substantively meritless prisoner claims that have swamped the federal courts. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S7526 (remarks of Sen. Kyl). But we are not aware of any specific support in the legislative history for the
The provision that applies here, PLRA § 803(d) pro- vides in pertinent part as follows:
The court shall . . . on the motion of a party dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions under section *117 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the action . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
HN7
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (emphasis added).
We think that the most natural reading of this language is that it simply restates the proposition that is implicit in Rule 12(b)(6), i.e., if a claim is based on facts that provide no basis for the granting of relief by the court, the claim must be dismissed. We acknowledge that the words of the statute do not foreclose the following, more expan- sive reading: if a complaint fails to state a claim for any reason, including a pleading error that could be cured by amendment, the court "shall . . . dismiss" forthwith and without permitting a curative amendment. But we believe that this reading is more strained and would produce re- sults that we doubt Congress wanted. If **9 "shall . . . dismiss" were interpreted to mean "shall dismiss forthwith and without permitting a curative amendment," it would seem that a court would be required to grant a motion to dismiss a technically defective claim even if a request for leave to amend to cure the defect were pending. We doubt that Congress wanted to require such a harsh, and seem- ingly pointless, result. We are also hesitant to conclude that Congress meant to change established procedures without a clearer indication than we have here.
proposition that Congress also wanted the courts to dis- miss claims that may have substantive merit but were inartfully pled.
In sum, we hold that, under the circumstances pre- sented here, a District Court must continue to follow the procedures **10 mandated by our pre-PLRA cases. We note that the result we reach is consistent with deci- sions of the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir.
1999); Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corrections, 165 F.3d
803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999). n3 But see Benson v. O'Brian,
179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999). Unlike those cir- cuits, however, we limit our holding to the dismissal on motion of a complaint in a non-in--forma-pauperis case.
n3 See also Davis v. District of Columbia, 332
U.S. App. D.C. 436, 158 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (dictum); Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053,
1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (dictum).
III.
The District Court in this case dismissed the plain- tiffs' claims with prejudice and without leave to amend. In doing so, the court may have understandably thought that this procedure was mandated by the PLRA. We hold, however, **11 that it is not and that now, as before, in the situation presented here, dismissal without leave to amend is justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility. The District Court did not test the plaintiffs' various claims against this standard, and we therefore vacate the order dismissing those claims and remand for the District Court to rule in the first instance on whether this standard is met.
Contents
Prev
Next
Last
