Title Rodriguez v. Reading Housing Authority
Date 1993
By Alito
Subject Misc
Contents
Page 1
LEXSEE 8 F3D 961
JINETTE RODRIGUEZ; MILAGROS MUNOZ; CARMEN RIVERA, Appellants v. READING HOUSING AUTHORITY; DANIEL F. LUCKEY, in his official capacity as Acting Executive Director of Reading Housing Authority, Appellees
No. 93-1188
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
8 F.3d 961; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28969
August 26, 1993, Argued
November 9, 1993, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: **1 ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA. D.C. Civil No. 91-07899.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant minor sought review of the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which granted summary judgment in favor of appellees, housing author- ity and its executive director, on her claims that appellee's policy regarding public housing applications by minors violated various provisions of federal law.
OVERVIEW: Appellant minor, age 16, filed with ap- pellee housing authority, a written application for public housing. Appellee requested that she obtain a judicial de- cree of emancipation in accordance with public housing policy requiring applicants under 18 to obtain such a de- cree. She objected to the requirement, alleging that under state law, minors could enter into binding contracts for necessaries. Appellee denied her application. On appeal, the court affirmed the denial because appellee's policy concerning such applications did not violate the regu- lations as interpreted by federal housing law. Appellee's policy did not require a public housing agency to create an additional exception for unemancipated minors for whom housing was necessary. Further, the interpretations in ap- pellee's handbook were not plainly erroneous or incon- sistent with federal regulations. The court rejected appel- lant's arguments that the policy was improper, untested, or contrary to compelling social policy because appellee was allowed some measure of discretion to select the pro- cedure that limited its financial risk, and because there was a nonstatutory procedure by which a minor could petition for emancipation.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the denial of appellant minor's application for public housing because appellee housing authority's policy concerning such applications did not violate the regulations as interpreted by federal housing law. Appellee's policy did not require a public housing agency to create an additional exception for un- emancipated minors for whom housing was necessary.
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
Public Health & Welfare Law > Public Housing & Public Buildings > Low-Income Housing
HN1 Pursuant to the United States Housing Act of
1937, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1437 et. seq., the Reading Housing Authority (RHA) enters into annual contribution contracts with the secretary of the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and these contracts re- quire the RHA to comply with the Housing Act and HUD regulations.
Family Law > Parental Duties & Rights > Emancipation of Minors
Public Health & Welfare Law > Public Housing & Public Buildings > Low-Income Housing
HN2 The revised admissions and occupancy policy of the Reading Housing Authority provides that an emanci- pated minor is a minor under the age of 18 who has been determined by the judicial system to be an emancipated minor by judicial decree. No housing unit under the ju- risdiction of the authority shall be rented to any applicant who has not attained the age of 18 years, unless said ap- plicant has been determined to be an emancipated minor by the courts and is entitled to contract for necessities. Administrative Law > Agency Rulemaking > Rule Application & Interpretation
Public Health & Welfare Law > Public Housing & Public Buildings > Low-Income Housing
8 F.3d 961, *; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28969, **1
Page 2
HN3 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(c)(1) provides that the tenant selection policy of a public housing agency may not auto- matically deny admission to a particular group or category of otherwise eligible applicants. 24 C.F.R. § 960.205(a) provides that the criteria to be established and information to be considered shall be reasonably related to individual attributes and behavior of an applicant and shall not be related to those which may be imputed to a particular group or category of persons of which an applicant may be a member. 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(c).
Administrative Law > Agency Rulemaking > Rule
Application & Interpretation
Public Health & Welfare Law > Public Housing & Public Buildings > Low-Income Housing
HN4 See 24 C.F.R. § 960.205(a).
Administrative Law > Agency Rulemaking > Rule
Application & Interpretation
Public Health & Welfare Law > Public Housing & Public Buildings > Low-Income Housing
HN5 Section 4-2 of the Public Housing Occupancy Handbook, a publication issued by HUD to assist lo- cal housing authorities in complying with HUD regula- tions and contribution contracts, provides in relevant part that the public housing authority (PHA) must determine whether each applicant is old enough to sign a lease and abide by its terms. The PHA may set a minimum age for admission to avoid entering into leases which would not be valid or enforceable under the applicable law.
Family Law > Parental Duties & Rights > Emancipation of Minors
Contracts Law > Formation > Capacity of Parties
HN6 Many states allow persons who have not reached the age of majority to sign a lease if they have been de- clared an "emancipated minor." An emancipated minor is often a teenager with a child or a married couple where both husband and wife are under age 18.
Family Law > Parental Duties & Rights > Emancipation of Minors
Contracts Law > Formation > Capacity of Parties
HN7 While the law varies from state to state, the pre- dominant rule is that a minor's contracts are generally voidable but that contracts for what are known as "neces- saries" are enforceable.
Family Law > Parental Duties & Rights > Emancipation of Minors
Public Health & Welfare Law > Public Housing & Public Buildings > Low-Income Housing
HN8 Section 4.2 of the Public Housing Occupancy Handbook permits a public housing authority to set a minimum age for admission that corresponds with the age of majority under state law and to reject all applicants
below that age with the possible exception of those who have been decreed by a court to be emancipated. Section
4.2 does not require a public housing agency to create an additional exception for unemancipated minors for whom housing is a "necessary."
COUNSEL: PETER ZURFLIEH, ESQ. (Argued), GEOFFREY M. BIRINGER, ESQ., Central Pennsylvania Legal Services, 213-A North Front Street, Harrisburg, PA
17101, Attorneys for Appellant.
Carmen Rivera, EDWIN L. STOCK, ESQ. (Argued), MARGARET K. COLLINS, ESQ., ANDREW F. FICK, ESQ., Roland & Schlegel, 627 North Fourth Street, Post Office Box 902, Reading, PA 19603-0902, Attorneys for Appellees.
JUDGES: Before: BECKER, NYGAARD, and ALITO, Circuit Judges.
OPINIONBY: ALITO
OPINION: *962 OPINION OF THE COURT
ALITO, Circuit Judge:
Carmen Rivera appeals from a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of the Reading Housing Authority ("RHA") and its executive director on her claims that the RHA's policy regarding public housing applications by minors violated various provisions of fed- eral law. On appeal, Rivera contends that the RHA policy contravenes certain regulations of the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). We hold that the RHA policy does not violate those regulations as currently interpreted by HUD, and we therefore affirm the order of the district court.
I.
The factual background **2 of this case is set out in some detail in the published opinion of the district court. Rivera v. Reading Housing Authority, 819 F. Supp.
1323, 1326-28 (E.D. Pa. 1993). In brief, the relevant background is as follows.
The RHA is a Pennsylvania public housing author- ity. HN1 Pursuant to the United States Housing Act of
1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et. seq., the RHA has entered into annual contribution contracts with the Secretary of HUD, and these contracts have required the RHA to comply with the Housing Act and HUD regulations.
Before July 1991, the RHA's Admission and
Occupancy Policy contained the following provision: No housing unit under the jurisdiction
8 F.3d 961, *962; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28969, **2
Page 3
of the RHA shall be rented to any applicant who has not attained the age of eighteen (18) years, unless said person be determined to be an "emancipated minor" entitled to contract for necessities, or other person, under said age, able to establish that he is legally able to execute for himself and members of his family, to be housed by the RHA, a binding and enforceable contract for necessities.
See 819 F. Supp. at 1327 n.4. The RHA **3 interpreted this policy to require a minor applicant to obtain a judicial decree of emancipation. See id.
In about March 1991, the RHA revised its Admissions and Occupancy Policy, and HUD approved the revision in July of that year. The revision, which took effect on July
23, expressly states that minor applicants must obtain a judicial decree of emancipation in order to be eligible to rent RHA-administered public housing. n1
n1 HN2 The revised policy provides:
Emancipated Minor - An
"Emancipated Minor" is a minor under the age of eighteen (18) who has been determined by the judicial system to be an emancipated minor by judicial decree.
No housing unit under the jurisdiction of the Authority shall be rented to any applicant who has not attained the age of eighteen (18) years, unless said ap- plicant has been determined to be an emancipated minor by the courts and is entitled to contract for necessities.
denied Rivera's application for failure to comply with its policy.
In December 1991, Rivera and two other named plain- tiffs filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that the RHA's policy regarding minor tenants violated, among other provisions of federal law, the Housing Act, HUD implementing regulations, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Their complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as dam- ages. After the plaintiffs' motion for class certification was denied and two of the named plaintiffs were volun- tarily dismissed without prejudice, the district **5 court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and against Rivera. The court held that the RHA policy did not violate any of the provisions of federal law on which Rivera relied. She then took the present appeal. n2
n2 Although Rivera is now no longer a minor, this appeal is not moot because she is seeking to recover the damages that she claims she suffered as a result of having to pay higher rent than that charged for an RHA unit.
II.
A. On appeal, Rivera has abandoned the argument that the RHA policy violates the Housing Act itself or the Due Process Clause. She maintains, however, that the policy violates two HUD regulations. The first of these,
HN3 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(c)(1), provides that the tenant selection policy of a public housing agency may not "auto- matically deny admission to a particular group or category of otherwise eligible applicants (e.g., unwed mothers or families with children born out of wedlock)." The other regulation, HN4 24 C.F.R. § 960.205(a), provides:
The criteria to be established and **6 information to be
See 819 F. Supp. at 1326 n.3.
In May 1991, prior to the date when **4 the revised policy took effect, Rivera and David Gonzalez, the man with whom she was living, filed with the RHA a written application for public housing. At that time, Rivera was
16 years old. The RHA responded to this application by sending Rivera a letter stating that she would have to ob- tain a judicial decree of *963 emancipation. Rivera did not seek such a decree. Instead, her attorney wrote to the RHA objecting to that requirement and explaining that under Pennsylvania law minors may enter into bind- ing contracts for "necessaries." In September, the RHA
considered shall be reasonably related to in- dividual attributes and behavior of an appli- cant and shall not be related to those which may be imputed to a particular group or cat- egory of persons of which an applicant may be a member. See, e.g., Section 960.204(c).
"Read together," Rivera maintains, "these two provi- sions prohibit public housing agency admissions re- quirements that deny public housing automatically to a category of applicants on the basis of imputed character- istics." Appellants' Br. at 26 (footnote omitted). Rivera argues that the RHA policy violates these regulations be- cause it "imputes an inability to contract to all minors who fail to meet its judicial decree of emancipation require-
8 F.3d 961, *963; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28969, **6
Page 4
ment." Id. at 29.
Rivera does not dispute that these regulations permit a public housing agency to refuse to enter into a lease with a minor who cannot execute a binding contract un- der state law. Moreover, all of the parties agree with the district court that under Pennsylvania law a minor can enter into an enforceable contract for "necessaries" and that whether housing is a "necessary" for a particular mi- nor depends upon whether a parent or guardian of the
**7 minor is able and willing to furnish the minor with housing. See 819 F. Supp. at 1331-33. Rivera argues, however, that the HUD regulations require the RHA itself to determine whether housing represents a "necessary" for each minor applicant. Rivera maintains that the RHA policy violates the HUD regulations because it makes an exception for only those minors who have been decreed to be emancipated and not for unemancipated minors for whom housing is a "necessary." We disagree with Rivera's argument.
III.
In explaining why we cannot accept that argument, we will proceed in two steps. First, we will explain why we believe that the RHA policy is expressly autho- rized by a provision in HUD's Public Housing Occupancy
**9
(1) PHAs should be aware that HN6 many states allow persons who have not reached the age of majority to sign a lease if they have been declared an "emancipated minor." An emancipated minor is often a teenager with a child or a married couple where both husband and wife are under age 18. n3
n3 The district court noted that when Section
4.2 of the Handbook was revised in July 1991, the above-quoted language concerning minors with omitted. See 819 F. Supp. at 1331 n.10. HUD has explained, however, that this omission was inad- vertent and that it "intends to continue to apply" the omitted language. See Letter from Michael H. Reardon, Assistant General Counsel, HUD, to Geoffrey M. Biringer, Esq., Central Pa. Legal Servs. (Apr. 9, 1992), App. at 337. The district court therefore concluded, and all parties in this case agree, that the omitted language is still opera- tive. See Appellant's Br. at 19; Appellees' Br. at 41. We will proceed on the same premise.
Handbook, a publication issued by HUD to assist local housing authorities in complying with HUD regulations and contribution contracts. Second, we will explain why we believe that this Handbook is entitled to deference
*964 and why it represents a permissible interpretation of the regulations.
A. HN5 Section 4-2 of the Handbook provides in relevant part as follows:
Policy
(1) The PHA must determine whether each applicant. . . .
(b) **8 Would be old enough . . . to sign a lease and abide by its terms.
. . . .
(4) The PHA may set a minimum age for ad- mission to avoid entering into leases which would not be valid or enforceable under the applicable law. . . .
. . . .
Discussion
These provisions of the Handbook must be read against the backdrop of the generally prevailing rules governing the enforceability of contracts against minors.
HN7 While the law on this subject varies from state to state, the predominant rule is that a minor's contracts are generally voidable but that contracts for what are known as "necessaries" are enforceable. See e.g., 1 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 4.4 at 379, § 4.5 at 385 (1990); 5 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts
§§ 9:5, 9:18 (4th ed. 1993); Restatement (Second) of Contract, § 14 (1981). These rules are of ancient origin. As stated in Williston on Contracts: "By the 15th cen- tury, it seems to have been well settled that an infant's bargain was in general void at his election, that is void- able, and also that he was liable for necessaries." 5 Lord, supra, § 9:2 at 5-6 (footnote omitted). The term "neces- saries" means "goods that are necessary, considering the minor's position and station in life." Id. § 9:18 at 149. Shelter may constitute a "necessary" if a minor's parents or guardian cannot or will not provide it. Id. §§ 9:19, 9:20;
1 Farnsworth, supra, § 4.5 at 385-86. Moreover, **10
"in most states, it is provided that by decree of court the disabilities of an infant may be removed." 5 Lord, supra,
§ 9:4 at 21-22. Such statutes typically provide for, among other things, "emancipation for contractual capacity pur- poses." Id. § 9:4 at 22.
In light of this background, the meaning of Section
4.2 of the Handbook seems clear. HN8 Section 4.2 per-
8 F.3d 961, *964; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28969, **10
Page 5
mits a public housing authority to set a minimum age for admission that corresponds with the age of majority un- der state law and to reject all applicants below that age with the possible exception of those who have been de- creed by a court to be emancipated. Section 4.2 does not require a public housing agency to create an additional exception for unemancipated minors for whom housing is a "necessary." As noted, the rule regarding the enforce- ability of a minor's contract for a "necessary" is very old and well known, and we must therefore assume that the Handbook's failure to mention an exception based on this rule was not accidental. B. We now turn to the question whether the rule set out in Section 4.2 of the Handbook represents a correct interpretation of the HUD regulations on which Rivera relies. An agency's interpretation **11 of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 116 L. Ed. 2d 546, 112 S. Ct. 551, 60 U.S.L.W. 4052, 4054 (1991); Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1, 16-17, 13 L. Ed. 2d 616, 85 S. Ct. 792 (1965); Commonwealth of Pa. Office of *965 the Budget v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 996 F.2d 1505,
1511 (3d Cir. 1993). Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that such an interpretation is "of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872, 53 L. Ed.
2d 48, 97 S. Ct. 2150 (1977) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole
Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 89 L. Ed. 1700, 65 S. Ct.
1215 (1945)).
Under this standard, the interpretation set out in Section 4.2 of the Handbook must be sustained. The first of the pertinent regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(c)(1), states, as previously noted, that a public housing agency may not "automatically deny admission to a particu- lar group or category of otherwise eligible applicants."
(Emphasis added). Section 4.2, however, appears **12 to take the position that a minor who retains the gen- eral ability to disaffirm his or her contracts need not be regarded as an "eligible" applicant within the meaning of this regulation. The second regulation, 24 C.F.R. §
960.205(a), provides that a public housing agency's ad- mission criteria must be "reasonably related to individual attributes and behavior," but Section 4.2 seems to embody the view that a minor's retention of the general ability to disaffirm contracts is an "individual attribute" within this regulation. Whether or not these interpretations are the ones that we would adopt if called upon to construe the HUD regulations de novo, these interpretations are not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations, and accordingly we accept them. Moreover, since the RHA policy at issue here does precisely what Section 4.2 allows -- bars minors except for those who have obtained a decree of emancipation -- that policy must be sustained.
Rivera argues that the RHA's rule is contrary to "com- pelling social policy considerations." Appellants' Br. at
24 n.15. She contends that it is difficult, burdensome, and inhibiting for minors to seek a judicial decree of emanci- pation **13 and that such a decree may have deleterious consequences with respect to matters other than housing. She also maintains that the RHA could easily determine for itself in a simple administrative proceeding whether housing constitutes a necessary for each minor applicant n4 and that leasing units to minors for whom housing is found to be a necessary after such a proceeding would not expose the RHA to any substantial financial risk. The RHA responds that it should be allowed some measure of discretion to select the procedure that it believes is best. The RHA also contends that the procedure suggested by Rivera would expose it to financial risk because, as the district court observed, "in the absence of an emancipa- tion decree and determination, RHA would not be certain whether a lease agreement will be enforceable and would run the risk of entering into unenforceable contracts with minors." 819 F. Supp. at 1334. We have not been given the authority to decide freestanding public policy disputes of this nature. That authority rests with Congress and HUD, the federal agency with expertise in this field.
n4 Rivera argues that language in Section 4.2 of the Handbook requires each public housing agency to determine for itself whether a minor has the abil- ity to enter into a binding contract for housing and that a public housing agency may not avoid this obligation by requiring that a minor obtain a de- cree of emancipation. In support of this argument, Rivera relies on, among other things, the statement in Section 4.2(a)(1) of the Handbook that "the PHA must determine whether each applicant
. . . would be old enough to sign a lease." We can- not accept this argument, however, in light of the fact that the "Discussion" that follows Section 4.2 refers expressly to minors who "have been declared
'emancipated minors.'" See page 7, supra. As noted in text, we believe that this language specifically ap- proves the type of policy that the RHA has adopted.
**14 IV.
Rivera's final argument is that the RHA policy is im- proper because "there is neither statutory nor common law authority for a Pennsylvania court to issue a decree of emancipation for the purpose of declaring a minor's ability to contract." Appellants' Br. at 24. She further ar- gues that the procedure required by the RHA policy is
"uncertain and untested." Id. at 23. The RHA, however,
8 F.3d 961, *965; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28969, **14
Page 6
submitted the affidavit of the Honorable Arthur Grim of the Court of Common Pleas, *966 Berks County. Judge Grim, who is the Administrative Head of Orphan's Court and Juvenile Court, stated in his affidavit:
4. Though perhaps not commonly pursued, there is a nonstatutory procedure by which a minor may petition the Court of Common Pleas for an adjudication that the minor is emancipated from his or her parent or guardian for purposes of determining the minor's ability to contract for, among other things, housing.
5. The aforementioned emancipation pro- ceeding may be commenced by petition filed with the Clerk of Court, docketed as a Miscellaneous Action, and would involve a hearing in which factual evidence is pre-
sented concerning the minor's status.
6. A petition for emancipation would **15 be assigned to a Judge presiding over juvenile and/or family matters and would be heard in Miscellaneous Court.
In light of this uncontroverted affidavit, we must reject Rivera's argument. If the Pennsylvania courts should sub- sequently refuse to entertain such emancipation petitions, a challenge to the RHA policy may be renewed at that time.
III.
In conclusion, we hold that the RHA policy concern- ing public housing applications by minors does not violate current HUD regulations as interpreted by that depart- ment. Consequently, we affirm the order of the district court.
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