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            Title Munroe v. Ashcroft

 

            Date 2003

            By Alito

            Subject Misc

                

 Contents

 

 

Page 1





LEXSEE 353 F3D 225


AUBREY MALCOLM MUNROE, Appellant v. JOHN ASHCROFT, AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES; JAMES ZIGLAR, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE; ANDREA J. QUARANTILLO, DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF THE IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE; LORELEI VALVERDE, ACTING ASSISTANT DISTRICT DIRECTOR-DETENTION AND REMOVAL


No. 03-1471


UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT



353 F.3d 225; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25287


September 15, 2003, Argued

December 16, 2003, Filed


PRIOR   HISTORY:             **1        ON   APPEAL   FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN   DISTRICT   OF   PENNSYLVANIA.   Dist. Court No. 02-cv--02256. District Court Judge: Hon. Mary A.  McLaughlin.    Munroe  v.  Ashcroft,  2003  U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 1274 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 16, 2003)


DISPOSITION: Affirmed.


LexisNexis(R) Headnotes



COUNSEL:  For  Appellant:   PETER  E.  TORRES  (ar- gued), New York, N.Y.


For   Appellees:    PATRICK   L.   MEEHAN,   LAURIE MAGID, VIRGINIA A. GIBSON, SUSAN R. BECKER

(Argued), Philadelphia, PA.


JUDGES: Before:  ALITO, AMBRO and CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges.


OPINIONBY: ALITO


OPINION:


*226   OPINION OF THE COURT


ALITO, Circuit Judge:


This is an appeal from the District Court's order deny- ing  Aubrey  Malcolm  Munroe's  petition  for  a  writ  of habeas corpus. Monroe's petition challenged a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals that he is deportable as an aggravated felon due to his conviction in state court in New Jersey for a fraud offense. In order to qualify as an aggravated felony conviction, this offense had to in-


volve a loss to a victim or victims that exceeded $10,000. Monroe argues that the New Jersey conviction does not qualify because the sentencing judge eventually reduced the amount of restitution that he was required to pay from

$11,522 to $9,999. Because the critical fact for present purposes is the amount of loss, not the amount of **2  restitution, we affirm.


I.


Munroe, a citizen and native of Guyana, was admit- ted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in

1980. In 1995, Munroe was charged in two indictments returned  in  the  Superior  Court,  Hudson  County,  New Jersey.  The  first  indictment  (No.  1228-07--95)  charged Munroe with one count of theft by deception,  in viola- tion of N.J.S.A. 2C: 20-4, and alleged that Munroe had unlawfully obtained $1,000 from the First Fidelity Bank in Union City, New Jersey, in August 1994, by deposit- ing  bad  checks  and  then  withdrawing  $1,000  from  his account.  The  second  indictment  (2227-12--95)  charged Munroe with two additional counts of violating the same statute. One count alleged that Munroe had unlawfully ob- tained $10,500 from the Bank of New York in Union City, and the other count alleged that Munroe had unlawfully obtained $1270 from that bank. In August 1999, Munroe pled guilty in the Superior Court, Hudson County, New Jersey, to two counts of violating N.J.S.A. 2C: 20-4. He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of five years' pro- bation and was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of

$1,022 on the first indictment and $10,500 on the second. Following   **3               this  conviction,  the  Immigration and Naturalization Service issued a Notice to Appear in Removal Proceedings, charging that Munroe was subject to removal on the ground that he had been convicted of two crimes that involved moral turpitude and that did not


353 F.3d 225, *226; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25287, **3

Page 2



arise  from  a  single  scheme  of  misconduct.  The  Notice was later amended to include the charge that Munroe was removable  as  an  aggravated  felon  pursuant  to  8  U.S.C.

§ 1127(a)(2)(A)(iii), based on his conviction for a crime involving fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim exceeded $10,000. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).


An Immigration Judge ordered Munroe removed to Guyana, holding that he had been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude and that the conviction under the Bank of New York indictment met the statutory definition of an aggravated felony. The BIA affirmed.


In  the  meantime,  Munroe  and  the  Hudson  County Prosecutor's Office jointly moved the Superior Court to reduce the total amount of restitution required to $9,999, and this motion was granted. It is apparent from the mo- tion and is not disputed here that the motion was not based

*227   on a redetermination of the amount **4   of loss caused by the crimes but was intended to alter the effect of the conviction for immigration purposes.


Munroe   moved   for   reconsideration   by   the   BIA, but  the  Board  refused.  The  Board  stated  that  Munroe had  pled  guilty  to  a  fraud  offense  involving  a  loss  of more than $10,000 and that it was therefore "irrelevant that   Munroe's   ordered  restitution  was  later  reduced." Munroe then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but the District Court agreed with the Board's reasoning, and this appeal followed.


II.


Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), "any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admis- sion is deportable." The term "aggravated felony" is now defined by statute to include "an offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). There is no dispute in the present case that Munroe's convic- tion under the Bank of New York indictment for fraud by deception was for an offense involving "fraud or deceit," and therefore that conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony  conviction  if  the  amount  of  "loss  to  the  victim"

**5   exceeded $10,000.


We agree with the BIA and the District Court that the amount  of  loss  involved  in  that  conviction  was  greater than  $10,000.  The  indictment  alleged  that  the  loss  ex- ceeded  this  amount,  and  Munroe  does  not  claim  that, when  he  pled  guilty,  he  admitted  to  only  a  lesser  loss.



Nor is there any suggestion that the Superior Court ever found that the amount of the loss was less than $10,000. As noted,  the Superior Court initially required Munroe to pay more than $10,000 in restitution, and it is abun- dantly clear that the Court later reduced the restitution to

$9,999 for the purpose of altering the consequences of the conviction for immigration law purposes, not because of a recalculation of the amount of the loss. Accordingly, the reduction in the amount of restitution was, as the BIA held, "irrelevant" for present purposes.


The amount of restitution ordered as a result of a con- viction may be helpful to a court's inquiry into the amount of loss to the victim if the plea agreement or the indictment is unclear as to the loss suffered. But when the amount of restitution ordered is not based on a finding as to the amount of the loss but is instead intended solely to affect

**6   the defendant's immigration status, the amount of restitution is not controlling.


Munroe argues that, in determining the amount of the loss involved in his state-court conviction, we are bound by the terms of the state-court judgment and that the re- duction in the amount of restitution changed the terms of that judgment. What we have said already,  however,  is sufficient to dispose of this argument. Even assuming for the sake of argument that an Immigration Judge or the BIA is bound by the terms of a state-court judgment that has been altered for the sole purpose of alleviating the im- migration law consequences of the conviction, that rule would not help Munroe. Here, as noted, the amendment of the judgment simply changed the amount of restitution; it did not involve a state-court finding as to the amount of loss.


Moreover, although we need not reach the question, we  note  that  there  is  authority  for  the  proposition  that

"when a court vacates an otherwise final and valid con- viction on equitable grounds merely to avoid the immi- gration-law  consequences  of  the  conviction,  it  usurps Congress's  plenary   *228    power  to  set  the  terms  and conditions  of  American  citizenship  and  the  executive's discretion   **7    to  administer  the  immigration  laws." Renteria-Gonzalez  v.  INS,  322  F.3d  804,  812  (5th  Cir.

2003) (citation omitted).


III.


For the reasons set out above, the District Court's de- nial of Munroe's petition for writ of habeas corpus relief is affirmed.


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