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            Title Abramson v. William Paterson College of New Jersey

 

            Date 2001

            By

            Subject Other\Concurring

                

 Contents

 

 

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11 of 52 DOCUMENTS

GERTRUDE W. ABRAMSON, Appellant v. WILLIAM PATERSON COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY

NO. 00-5026

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

260 F.3d 265; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17614; 86 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 668; 81 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P40,678

January 25, 2001, Argued

August 3, 2001, Filed

PRIOR HISTORY:   **1   On Appeal from the United

States  District  Court  for  the  District  of  New  Jersey.

(D.C. Civil No. 95-cv--04353). District Judge: Honorable

Katharine S. Hayden.

DISPOSITION: REVERSED and REMANDED.

CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff former employee sued  defendant  former  employer,  alleging  hostile  work environment,  religious discrimination,  and unlawful re- taliation  claims  under  Title  VII  and  the  New  Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD). The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted the employer summary judgment. The employee appealed.

OVERVIEW: The employee, a former tenure-track as- sociate professor, claimed that she was subjected to ha- rassment and ultimately terminated, both because of her Orthodox Jewish beliefs and practices, and because she complained  of  the  employer's  religious  discrimination against her. The district court granted the employer sum- mary judgment. The appellate court reversed because the employee  established  a  prima  facie  case  for  all  three causes of action. Regarding the hostile work environment claim, a reasonable factfinder could view the evidence as showing  that  the  employee's  treatment  was  attributable to her religious faith and practice. The employee estab- lished a prima facie case of religious discrimination and demonstrated that the employer's proffered reason for the adverse employment decision was pretextual. Regarding the retaliation claim, the employee showed that she en- gaged in a protected activity based on letters she wrote to the employer and that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.

OUTCOME: Summary judgment for the employer was

reversed.

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Civil  Procedure  >  Summary  Judgment  >  Summary

Judgment Standard

HN1  The appellate court exercises plenary review over the district court's grant of summary judgment, and the appellate court applies the same standard that the district court should have applied.

Civil  Procedure  >  Summary  Judgment  >  Summary

Judgment Standard

HN2   A  court  should  grant  summary  judgment  if  the pleadings,  depositions,  answers  to  interrogatories,  and admissions  on  file,  together  with  the  affidavits,  if  any, show  that  there  is  no  genuine  issue  as  to  any  material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In evaluating the evidence, a court must view the facts in the light most fa- vorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor. While the individual pieces of evidence alone may not suffice to make out the claims asserted, the court must view the record as a whole picture.

Labor   &   Employment   Law   >   Discrimination   > Actionable Discrimination

HN3  A play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire performance, and sim- ilarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents, but on the overall scenario.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Religious

Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions

HN4  To make out a prima facie case for a religiously hostile work environment under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate five elements: (1) the employee suffered in- tentional discrimination because of religion; (2) the dis- crimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimina- tion detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimi-

260 F.3d 265, *; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17614, **1;

86 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 668; 81 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P40,678

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nation would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same religion in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Religious

Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions

HN5        Under                      the           New          Jersey    Law                          Against Discrimination, a plaintiff states a claim for a religiously hostile                 work        environment          by            showing that          the complained-of  conduct  (1)  would  not  have  occurred but  for  the  employee's  religion;  and  it  was  (2)  severe or  pervasive  enough  to  make  a  (3)  reasonable  person of  the  same  religion  believe  that  (4)  the  conditions  of employment were altered and the working environment was hostile or abusive.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Religious

Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions

HN6  When determining whether the plaintiff made out a  prima  facie  case  for  a  religiously  hostile  work  envi- ronment under Title VII, the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable factfinder could view the evidence as show- ing  that  the  plaintiff's  treatment  was  attributable  to  her religious faith and practice.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Religious

Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions

HN7  A trier of fact might reasonably find sex discrimi- nation, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hos- tility to the presence of women in the workplace. A same- sex harassment plaintiff may also offer direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace. A plaintiff is not required to demonstrate direct proof that her harasser's in- tent was to create a discriminatory environment. Instead, with respect to certain conduct, the intent to discriminate can be inferred. Because discrimination is often simply masked in more subtle forms, it is often difficult to dis- cern discriminatory animus. Thus, even the use of "code words" such as "all of you" and "one of them" could be sufficient evidence from which a jury could find an intent to discriminate.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Religious

Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions

HN8  The first prong of the Andrews test is not designed to protect harassers who fail to recognize the hostile or abusive nature of their comments and actions. The first prong does not require a factfinder to peer inside the ha- rasser's mind. Rather, it merely requires a showing that the offender's behavior was, as required by both Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, based on a protected category.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Religious

Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions

HN9  Regardless of what a harasser's intention is, if a plaintiff  presents  sufficient  evidence  to  give  rise  to  an inference  of  discrimination  by  offering  proof  that  her workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and cre- ate an abusive working environment, and the conduct is based on one of the categories protected under Title VII, a hostile work environment claim will survive summary judgment.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Religious

Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions

HN10  Where the evidence tends to show that the ha- rasser's  conduct  was  intentionally  directed  toward  the plaintiff  because  of  her  religion,  the  first  prong  of  the prima facie case is met.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Religious

Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions

HN11  It is settled law that courts should not consider each incident of harassment in isolation. Rather, a court must evaluate the sum total of abuse over time.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Religious

Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions

HN12  In determining whether the fourth prong, the ob- jective test, of the test for a religiously hostile work en- vironment under Title VII, is met, the court must look at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Title VII is not violated by the mere utterance of an epithet which engenders offen- sive feelings in an employee or by mere "discourtesy or rudeness," unless so severe or pervasive as to constitute an objective change in the conditions of employment. Simple teasing, offhand comments, and non-serious isolated in- cidents would not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Religious

Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions

HN13   Under  the  standard  for  employer  liability,  re- ferred  to  as  the  "aided  by  the  agency  relation  test,"  an employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively) higher authority over the employee. When no tangible employ- ment action is taken, a defending employee may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages. No affirma- tive defense is available, however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action,

260 F.3d 265, *; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17614, **1;

86 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 668; 81 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P40,678

Page 3

such as discharge.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Title VII

HN14  Title VII explicitly protects employees from ad- verse employment actions on the basis of religion: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ- ual,  or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,  terms,  conditions,  or privileges  of  employment,  because  of  such  individual's religion.  42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a). Employees may as- sert two theories of religious discrimination:  "disparate treatment" and "failure to accommodate."

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disparate

Treatment

HN15  To prove a claim under the "disparate treatment" theory,  the  prima  facie  case  and  evidentiary  burdens of  an  employee  alleging  religious  discrimination  mir- ror  those  of  an  employee  alleging  race  or  sex  discrim- ination.  Accordingly,  the  McDonnell  Douglas  burden- shifting framework is applied. The plaintiff must demon- strate that she (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was  qualified  and  rejected  for  the  position  she  sought, and (3) nonmembers of the protected class were treated more favorably. After the plaintiff establishes a prima fa- cie  case,  the  employer  must  proffer  a  legitimate,  non- discriminatory  reason  for  the  adverse  employment  de- cision.  Once  the  employer  does  so,  the  plaintiff  must demonstrate that the proffered reason was pretextual. Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disparate Treatment

HN16  In cases alleging disparate treatment, New Jersey courts have adopted a three-step test that mirrors the Title VII inquiry: (1) the complainant must come forward with sufficient  evidence  to  constitute  a  prima  facie  case  of discrimination; (2) the employer must then show a legit- imate non-discriminatory reason for its decision; and (3) the complainant must be given the opportunity to show that the employer's stated reason was merely a pretext or discriminatory in its application.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disparate

Treatment

HN17  Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the employee has to point to some evidence, direct  or  circumstantial,  from  which  a  factfinder  could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons;  or (2) believe that an invidious dis- criminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disparate

Treatment

HN18  To avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff's evi-

dence rebutting the employer's proffered legitimate rea- sons must allow a factfinder reasonably to infer that each of the employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons was either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not ac- tually motivate the employment action (that is, the prof- fered reason is a pretext). Importantly, this statement is qualified with the following footnote:  The plaintiff need not cast doubt on each proffered reason in a vacuum. If the defendant proffers a bagful of legitimate reasons, and the plaintiff manages to cast substantial doubt on a fair number of them, the plaintiff may not need to discredit the remainder. That is because the factfinder's rejection of  some  of  the  defendant's  proffered  reasons  may  im- pede the employer's credibility seriously enough so that a factfinder may rationally disbelieve the remaining prof- fered  reasons,  even  if  no  evidence  undermining  those remaining rationales in particular is available.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disparate

Treatment

HN19  It is not enough for a plaintiff to show that the em- ployer's decision was wrong or mistaken, because the is- sue is whether the employer acted with discriminatory an- imus. Hence, to make a sufficient showing of pretext, the plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibil- ities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's reasons that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them "unworthy of credence." And if the plaintiff can successfully demonstrate pretext, she need not present affirmative evidence of discrimination beyond her prima facie showing if a rational factfinder could con- clude  from  the  evidence  of  pretext  that  the  employer's actions were discriminatory.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disparate

Treatment

HN20  If a plaintiff demonstrates that the reasons given for her termination did not remain consistent, beginning at the time they were proffered and continuing throughout the proceedings, this may be viewed as evidence tending to show pretext, though of course it should be considered in light of the entire record.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disparate

Treatment

HN21   In  appropriate  circumstances,  the  trier  of  fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discrimi- natory purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general  principle  of  evidence  law  that  the  factfinder  is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material fact as affirmative evidence of guilt. Moreover, once the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimina- tion may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially  since  the  employer is in  the  best  position  to

260 F.3d 265, *; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17614, **1;

86 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 668; 81 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P40,678

Page 4

put forth the actual reason for its decision. Thus, a plain- tiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.

Civil  Procedure  >  Summary  Judgment  >  Summary

Judgment Standard

HN22  In determining the appropriateness of summary judgment, the court should not consider the record solely in piecemeal fashion, giving credence to innocent expla- nations for individual strands of evidence, for a jury would be entitled to view the evidence as a whole.

Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disparate

Treatment

HN23  It is sufficient if those exhibiting discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the decision to ter- minate.  It  is  plainly  permissible  for  a  jury  to  conclude that an evaluation at any level, if based on discrimination, influenced the decisionmaking process and thus allowed discrimination to infect the ultimate decision.

Labor   &   Employment   Law   >   Discrimination   > Retaliation

HN24  To advance a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the employee engaged in a protected employee activity; (2) the employer took an ad- verse employment action after or contemporaneous with the employee's protected activity;  and (3) a causal link exists between the employee's protected activity and the employer's adverse action.

Labor   &   Employment   Law   >   Discrimination   > Retaliation

HN25   In  the  ADEA  context,  courts  do  not  require  a formal letter of complaint to an employer or the Equal Employment  Opportunity  Commission  as  the  only  ac- ceptable  indicia  of  the  requisite  "protected  conduct." Acceptable forms of protected activity under Title VII's analogous  opposition  clause  include  formal  charges  of discrimination  as  well  as  informal  protests  of  discrim- inatory  employment  practices,  including  making  com- plaints  to  management,  writing  critical  letters  to  cus- tomers, protesting against discrimination by industry or society in general, and expressing support of co-workers who have filed formal charges.

Labor   &   Employment   Law   >   Discrimination   > Retaliation

HN26  Case law focuses on two main factors in find- ing the causal link necessary for retaliation:  timing and evidence of ongoing antagonism.

Labor   &   Employment   Law   >   Discrimination   > Retaliation

HN27  A plaintiff may rely upon a broad array of evi- dence to illustrate a causal link required for retaliation. A plaintiff may show that her employer gave inconsistent reasons  for  terminating  her.  Revealing  discrepancies  in the proffered reasons can also constitute evidence of the causal link.

Labor   &   Employment   Law   >   Discrimination   > Actionable Discrimination

Civil  Procedure  >  Summary  Judgment  >  Summary

Judgment Standard

HN28  On summary judgment,  when viewing the suf- ficiency  of  the  prima  facie  case,  the  court's  role  is  not to act as fact finder. Instead, the court must consider the evidence  taken  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  non- movant and determine whether the plaintiff can show the causation required.

COUNSEL:   Phyllis   Gelman,   Lindsay   N.   Feinberg

ARGUED ,   Gelman   &   Feinberg,   New   York,   NY, Counsel for Appellant Gertrude W. Abramson.

Nathan Lewin ARGUED , Miller,  Cassidy,  Larroca & Lewis, Washington, DC, Counsel for Amicus-Appellant National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs

("COLPA").

Bruce   J.   Solomon   ARGUED ,   Office   of   Attorney General  of  New  Jersey,  Division  of  Law,  Trenton,  NJ, Counsel for Appellee William Paterson College of New Jersey.

JUDGES:               Before:    NYGAARD,           ALITO,   and RENDELL,   Circuit   Judges.   ALITO,   Circuit   Judge, concurring.

OPINIONBY: RENDELL

OPINION:   *267

OPINION OF THE COURT RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Gertrude Abramson appeals the summary judgment granted to her former employer, William Paterson College

("WPC"), n1 against whom she filed hostile work envi- ronment,  religious  discrimination,  and  unlawful  retali- ation  claims  under  Title  VII  and  the  New  Jersey  Law Against  Discrimination  ("NJLAD").  Abramson,  former tenure-track  Associate  Professor  in  the  Department  of Curriculum & Instruction **2    ("C&I") of the School of Education at WPC, claimed she was subjected to ha- rassment and ultimately terminated, both because of her Orthodox Jewish beliefs and practices, and because she complained  of  WPC's  religious  discrimination  against

260 F.3d 265, *267; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17614, **2;

86 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 668; 81 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P40,678

Page 5

her.  The  District  Court  granted  summary  judgment  in favor of WPC on all claims, and Abramson now appeals. We  conclude  that  Abramson  established  a  prima  facie case for all three causes of action, and that the District Court erred in the way that it considered the evidence and applied certain legal principles. We will therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

n1 WPC, now the William Paterson University of New Jersey, is an undergraduate and graduate ed- ucational institution, and is a state college of New

Jersey.

I.

A. Facts

Most of the underlying facts are undisputed. Where there is a dispute, we view the facts in the light most favor- able to the plaintiff.  Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp.,

904 F.2d 853, 854 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990). **3   WPC hired Abramson,  an Orthodox Jew,  for one year as a tenure- track Associate Professor, effective September 1, 1990.

260 F.3d 265, *268; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17614, **3;

86 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 668; 81 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P40,678

Page 6

*268     Abramson  has  a  Doctor  of  Education  degree in  Communications,  Computing  and  Technology  from Columbia University, and New York State teacher certifi- cations in elementary education and early childhood edu- cation. In 1990, she had been teaching for ten years at the college level, had published in peer-reviewed academic publications, and had a national reputation in education technology. At the time WPC hired her until her termina- tion, Abramson was the only Orthodox Jew employed in the School of Education at WPC.

At the start of her first year at WPC, Abramson in- formed her Department Chair, Jim Peer, that she would not  be  able  to  teach  on  Jewish  holidays.  He  suggested that she work out her schedule with her students, which she did,  and the days she missed on account of Jewish holidays were not counted as sick days. App. at 134-35.

The Review Process

As part of WPC's written policies and procedures re- garding  retention  and  tenure,  an  untenured  professor's academic performance was to be reviewed on an annual basis. New Jersey state law does not allow a state college to offer **4   tenure to a faculty member upon appoint- ment, but does permit it to offer tenure to a professor after two years of employment upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:60-9 (West 1993). Barring exceptional circumstances, an untenured faculty member must serve five years before being considered in the fifth year for an award of tenure made effective in his or her sixth year of employment. Id. at § 18A:60-8.

Retention  and  tenure  decisions  in  Abramson's  de- partment  are  first  considered  by  the  Curriculum  and Instruction Retention Committee ("the Committee"). The criteria used to determine retention and tenure, as set forth

in WPC's written retention policy, are as follows: (1) pro- fessional performance; (2) professional growth; and (3) potential contributions to the academic department and the University in terms of present and future programs. The  Department  Chair  is  an  ex-officio  member  of  the Committee. Though not a voting member, the Chair does choose whether or not to sign the Committee's recommen- dation. App. at 707. By not signing a recommendation, the Chair indicates a lack of support for the Committee's evaluation. App. at 708. The Dean then makes a recom- mendation   **5    to  the  Provost.  Finally,  the  President of  WPC  makes  a  determination  whether  or  not  to  rec- ommend  retention  (or  tenure,  where  applicable)  to  the Board of Trustees. The WPC Board of Trustees then de- cides whether to retain and/or grant tenure based on the recommendation of the President.

Abramson's First Two Years at WPC

Abramson's first "annual" review occurred shortly af- ter  she  began  teaching  at  WPC,  and  on  November  7,

1990, the Committee "strongly" recommended the reten- tion of Abramson for the 1991-92 academic year. App. at 203. The Committee applauded her teaching, scholarly achievement and service,  and noted Abramson's ability to teach many C&I courses, opining that "this flexibility makes her most valuable for future planning." Id. It went on to say that the C&I Department "has long been in need of just such expertise as Professor Abramson brings . . .

WPC  stands to benefit from her work as a teacher and scholar." Id.

In the fall of 1991,  during Abramson's second year at  WPC,  Nancy  Seminoff  became  the  Dean  of  WPC's School of Education, and in October 1991, she appointed Shelley Wepner to chair the C&I Department.

260 F.3d 265, *269; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17614, **5;

86 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 668; 81 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P40,678

Page 7

*269    On  October  29,  1991,  the  Committee  recom- mended the retention **6   of Abramson for the 1992-

93  academic  year,  and  Dean  Seminoff  concurred.  The Committee  noted  Abramson's  significant  service,  top teaching ratings by her peer evaluators,  and exemplary scholarship. It stated that "Professor Abramson exempli- fies WPC's direction for the future." App. at 207. Once again, it strongly recommended her retention, and Wepner signed  the  recommendation.  President  Speert  then  rec- ommended  Abramson's  reappointment  to  the  Board  of Trustees. App. at 204.

Abramson's Third Year at WPC

During Abramson's third year,  she began to experi- ence difficulties. First,  Abramson was charged for sick days for each day of work she missed due to Jewish hol- idays,  despite the fact that WPC was closed on several Christian holidays. App. at 13, 135, 159. In June 1992, af- ter Abramson submitted routine forms in connection with a professional conference she would be attending during that summer, Seminoff required Abramson to meet with her to account for the number of conferences and absences in the prior year. Linda Dye, the head of the faculty union, stated that this was "unprecedented" in a situation where a professor's absences had not exceeded the standards set by Human Resources. App.   **7   at 157-58.

In  addition,  Abramson  was  charged  a  day  of  sick leave for a Jewish holiday on October 20,  1992,  when she was not even scheduled to teach. App. at 250, 677. After protesting orally and in writing, this error was cor- rected six months later. App. at 685. Then, in November

1992, during a C&I Department meeting called to plan the 1993-94 class schedules, Abramson stated her inten- tion to schedule her classes so that they did not conflict with  the  fall  Jewish  holidays.  According  to  Abramson,

"Wepner started to scream that she was tired of hearing about Abramson  and her  holidays; when Abramson  quietly tried to explain herself, Chair Wepner yelled that

Abramson's  holidays were . . . personal private issues and that she did not want them mentioned at the schedul- ing meetings." App. at 137.

During the fall of 1992, at a Technology Committee meeting  chaired  by  Seminoff,  Wepner  suggested  that Abramson,  along  with  others,  come  in  on  a  Saturday to  prepare  a  technology  room.  Wepner,  who  is  Jewish herself,  made  this  suggestion  while  fully  aware  that Abramson does not work on Saturdays. Abramson told the group that she could not attend because of the Jewish Sabbath. n2 Thereafter,   **8   Wepner continually ques- tioned Abramson about her lack of availability on Friday nights and Saturdays. App. at 137-38.

n2  In  conformity  with  her  religious  beliefs, Abramson does not work, use the telephone or drive a car from sundown on Friday until approximately one hour after sundown on Saturday.

On  October  12,  1992,  the  Committee  once  again recommended  Abramson  for  retention  for  the  1993-94 school  year.  The  evaluation  highlighted  the  "dynamic" nature of Abramson's discipline, described her as a "car- ing educator" and "reflective teacher," noted she engaged in a "wide range of scholarly activity" and was "active in several national conferences in her field." App. at 225-

28. This time, however, the Committee's evaluation noted some "minor concern about her teaching performance and her contribution to department activities . . . ." App. at 231. However, it also "recognized her numerous scholarly pur- suits and professional contributions" and recommended her retention "in light

260 F.3d 265, *270; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17614, **8;

86 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 668; 81 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P40,678

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*270     of  the  department's  present  and  future   **9  needs  for  a  technology  educator."  Id.  Wepner  signed the  recommendation.  Seminoff,  noting  "an  imbalance in  productivity"  due  to  Abramson's  focus  on  schol- arly  activity,  expressed  that  she  had  "serious  concerns about Dr. Abramson's reappointment," and recommended Abramson "with some reservation." App. at 929-30.

On October 22, 1992, Abramson wrote a seven-page letter  to  President  Speert,  stating  that  she  took  "strong exception to the negative tenor and substance of the rec- ommendations made for her  retention by her department and Dean Seminoff." App. at 1253. She went on to write,

"I have lived as an Orthodox Jew all my life . . . . The non-discrimination  policy  of  William  Paterson  College precludes the need to defend either religious observances or pursuit of career goals." Id. Abramson attached the July

12,1992 letter she had sent to Seminoff in response to the Dean's request for an explanation of her absences. App. at 1261. She received no response from Speert, and she has asserted that his demeanor toward her changed dra- matically after that. Instead of being friendly as he was previously, he "stopped speaking to her  and would turn on his heel and walk away from her  if **10     they  happened to meet on campus." App. at 140. On October

30,  1992,  President Speert informed Abramson that he intended to recommend her for retention for a fourth year. App. at 931.

In a March 1993 meeting, Wepner scheduled an an- nual C&I Department lunch for May on a Jewish holiday, even after Abramson informed her she could not attend. App. at 137. On April 1, 1993, Wepner's secretary com- mented  to  Abramson,  in  the  presence  of  Wepner,  that

"other faculty members are complaining about the way your  religious  absences  inconvenience  them";  Wepner

did not comment. Id.

On April 27, 1993, Abramson sent a letter to Speert, the  Provost,  her  union  representative,  the  Chair  of  the Faculty Senate, and the entire Board of Trustees. App. at

939. She attached the letter she had written to Seminoff after  their  meeting  on  March  23,  1993,  a  meeting  that Abramson  said  was  another  event  in  a  series  of  "con- tinued and unwarranted negativism toward her ." App. at 940. The attached letter refuted Seminoff's suggestions and criticisms regarding Abramson's teaching, leadership, professionalism, and collegiality, and said it was written to  "counter  the  negative  'facts'   Seminoff   continued  to disseminate **11   about her ." App. at 939. The letter accused Seminoff of having "ill-concealed hostility" to- ward Abramson and of having a management style that

"stifles collegiality, deprives the departments and the col- lege of faculty creativity . . . and reduces innovative and effective  teaching."  App.  at  947.  Abramson  testified  in her deposition that this letter was sent to "challenge the judgment of the Dean." App. at 1070.

On April 28,  1993,  Provost Smith wrote a letter to Abramson  stating  that  it  was  highly  unprofessional  for her to circulate such a letter so widely. App. at 1072-73. Abramson,  however,  continued  to  circulate  letters  that were harshly critical of Dean Seminoff. On June 7, 1993, she wrote a letter to Seminoff attacking her for "applying an administrative style that is autocratic and confronta- tional and is based upon an outmoded,  discredited,  pa- ternalistic, approach to management." App. at 1076-77. Abramson's letter added,  "I have not seen any substan- tive evidence that you are a constructive administrator." App. at 1077. Abramson sent copies to Speert and Provost Smith.

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*271

On May 6, 1993, at a Technology Committee meeting, Seminoff suggested holding a technology conference on

**12  a Saturday. Abramson explained that she could not participate due to the Sabbath. According to Abramson, Seminoff screamed at her, saying that if Abramson would not run a conference for her on Friday night and Saturday, nothing Abramson did would have any value. App. at 137-

38, 157. And during the 1993-94 academic year, Wepner suggested that faculty meetings be moved from Tuesdays, the day when they had been held for many years, to Friday afternoons, which would conflict with Abramson's obser- vance of the Sabbath. App. at 163-64.

Final Review for Retention

On September 20, 1993, five out of seven members of the Committee voted to recommend Abramson's retention for a fifth year, and for her early tenure. The Committee's report stated the following:

Dr.  Abramson  is  a  skilled  teacher  and  in- structional designer in the interactive class- room setting. . . . Students also recognize Dr. Abramson's excellence as a teacher/educator.

. . . She encourages students to listen, think, and communicate and to develop their intel- lectual skills. . . . Dr. Abramson's working relationships with faculty are flavored with respect.  She  is  genuinely  considerate  and thoughtful  of  others  and  is  willing   **13  to assist in any way possible. . . . She  does her share to further educational and profes- sional meetings. . . . She is a well rounded professional . . . who represents the college admirably . . . . On campus, Dr. Abramson has distinguished herself in a variety of roles.

. . . Not only is she a fine scholar, but she is a valued colleague as well.

App.  at  234-38.  The  Committee  also  noted  that Abramson had an outstanding publication and speaking record,  and  served  on  many  university  committees.  It stated that she had "restructured and expanded the grad- uate concentration in technology education . . . ." App. at 239. It also discussed the future goals of the institu- tion  with  respect  to  her  field  of  expertise,  finding  that she was in a position to help WPC attain those goals. It stressed Abramson's networking abilities and her status as a "nationally recognized leader in her field," calling her

"a valuable resource and an asset to the College." Id.

The  two  other  voting  members  of  the  committee, Aitken  and  Coletta,   were  not  present  at  the  meet- ing.  Wepner  was  also  absent.  On  September  23,  1993, Aitken, Coletta and Wepner appended comments to the Committee's recommendation. Aitken **14   wrote that she had "reservations regarding the Committee's recom- mendation," while Coletta and Wepner noted that they did

"not agree with the Committee's recommendation." App. at 974.

Seminoff then wrote a memorandum to the Provost, stating that she did not recommend Abramson's retention. She cited concerns with three of the four applicable crite- ria for retention and tenure -- teaching, research/scholarly activity and service. App. at 975. Speert then undertook an analysis of Abramson's retention folder.

On September 22, 1993, Abramson wrote a letter to Robie Cagnina, WPC's Affirmative Action Officer, stating in part: "This is the . . . third year  in which religious dis- crimination has been directed at me. I am being subjected to bias, discriminatory treatment, harrassment sic , and outright hatred because I live as an Orthodox Jew." App. at  311.  At  the  bottom  of  the  letter,  Cagnina  wrote  the following: "September 22, 1993 Met with Dr. Abramson regarding this issue; discussed options for the filing of a complaint. Choice was to file with the Division of Civil Rights. RSC" Id.

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*272

On   October   13,   1993,   Wepner   complained   to Abramson,  during  a  lengthy attack  on  her  professional contribution **15   during a graduate curriculum meet- ing:  "The trouble with you is that it doesn't show that you  are  Orthodox."  App.  at  138.  During  the  following week,  Abramson sent a letter to Speert,  asking that,  in light  of  Seminoff's  negative  recommendation,  he  read her retention materials carefully. She wrote:  "It appears that   Seminoff's   bias  against  me  as  an  Orthodox  Jew overwhelms her professional judgment." App. at 377. On October 25, 1993, nearly two weeks later, Speert wrote Abramson a letter informing her that he did not intend to recommend her reappointment. App. at 977. He later expressed  the  reasons  for  his  decision  in  a  memoran- dum, sent to her on November 12, 1993. It appears clear from  the  memorandum  that  his  reasons  differed  from Seminoff's.  In  Speert's  opinion,  Abramson's  "potential contribution to her Department, Program and the College

. . . did  not justify reappointment." App. at 979. Abramson then went through an appeals process, but

Speert  reached  the  same  conclusion  once  again.  In  his deposition,  he  explained  his  reasons  for  not  retaining Abramson. Speert said that the main reason was that the retention folder presented to him contained evidence of her  inability  to  take   **16     leadership  and  guidance. App. at 1098. He clarified that the referred-to evidence involved issues related both to grants and to the accredita- tion visit by the National Council on the Accreditation of Teachers of Education ("NCATE"). n3 He also noted that Abramson had failed to create a concentration in technol- ogy and refused to work with administrators to create an Apple computer lab.

n3   Speert   testified   in   his   deposition   that Abramson dealt with a grant for Merck and a pro- gram with the Stevens Institute of Technology in a way that  was "not  consonant  with college pro- cesses."  App.  at  1102.  He  stated  that  "her  view with respect to the Merck  grant was limiting and did  not  take  into  account  either  circumstances  at

the school level or college level or any level." App. at 1101. With respect to a proposed program with Stevens, he said that "Dr. Abramson's response to the  issue  was  centered  about  individuals  and  not centered about the program, the program gains with respect to the college and the college's cost bene- fit analysis with respect to that program." App. at

1107. Regarding the NCATE accreditation, Speert testified that he was referring to Abramson's com- plaints about not being placed on the steering com- mittee, and her refusal to participate in the prepara- tion for the accreditation visit after being excluded from the steering committee. App. at 1107-09.

**17

Other Evidence Offered

Abramson also offered affidavits from several WPC faculty members. The affidavit of Linda Dye, WPC pro- fessor and president of the faculty union from 1993-94, supported many of Abramson's allegations. She stated that Speert had refused to say at Abramson's appeal meeting why she was terminated, App. at 159, and also that the reasons given by WPC could all be refuted, App. at 160-

61. She declared the following:

All but three or four faculty members in the School  of  Education  had  difficulties  with Dean  Seminoff.  Even  within  that  context, Dean  Seminoff's  conduct  toward  Professor Abramson stood out for its personal hostility. In contrast to her treatment of other faculty members, Dean Seminoff required Professor Abramson  to  justify  every  one  of  her  ac- tions  in  each  and  every  area  of  Professor Abramson's work . . . . Dean Seminoff's criti- cisms of Professor Abramson's performance were without basis . . . . Especially notable was her insistence that Professor Abramson be  excluded  from  the  committee  preparing the School of

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*273    Education for an accreditation visit by  a  team  from   NCATE ,  since  Professor Abramson had special expertise as she was a member of NCATE **18   . . . . Seminoff's unfair criticism of Professor Abramson's per- formance  and  her  hostile  conduct  toward Professor Abramson were motivated by her disapproval  of  Professor  Abramson's  strict adherence to Jewish religious laws . . . .

App. at 156-57.

The affidavit of Stanley Wollock, a tenured professor in Abramson's department,  noted that Friday afternoon meetings were changed because "Wepner was aware that Professor  Abramson  was  unable  to  attend  .  .  .  because of her observance of the Jewish Sabbath." App. at 163. He also recounted that Wepner had stated that Abramson

"would not be fulfilling her duties" if she did not attend the faculty meetings. App. at 164. In addition, he noted that Dean Seminoff said "you people" to Abramson more than once and treated her "much more harshly than she treated other faculty members." Id. According to his ob- servations,  he believed the Dean's dislike of Abramson was based on her religion. App. at 165.

Doris White, a tenured professor in Abramson's de- partment who was a member of the Retention and Tenure Committee in the Fall of 1993, stated, "Dean Seminoff was prejudiced against Jews," assigning both Abramson and another untenured Jewish faculty member **19   to work  on  many  Friday  nights,  though  White  was  never asked to teach on a Friday night. App. at 168. She also declared  that  faculty  meetings  were  only  scheduled  on Fridays while Abramson was in the C&I Department. Id. Additionally, White stated that Abramson had more tech- nological expertise and had published more than the rest of the faculty in the C&I Department. App. at 167.

Finally,  Abramson  submitted  the  declaration  of  her former   colleague,   Cordelia   Towney.   Abramson   and Towney had both been on the faculty at a different col- lege earlier in their careers, and had worked on a book together while Abramson worked at WPC. WPC had also employed Towney for one semester. Towney stated that

"the religious harassment which Abramson  suffered at WPC  made  her  feel  like  a  beaten  puppy.  She  became sallow, stooped, and  she looked broken." App. at 174.

In addition to these declarations and her own affidavit, Abramson  submitted  a  Post-It  note  written  by  Wepner that was contained in Abramson's file. App. at 445. The note said, "If you are dealing with grad program teach- ers -- work all day -- Logical for any working class col- lege to have conferences on Saturday --  needs of insti- tution conflict **20   with her practicing religion -- go. Conferences on Saturday to deal." Id. Abramson also in- troduced into evidence extremely positive student evalua- tions she had received during the 1992-93 academic year, faculty evaluation forms completed between April 1992 and May 1993 praising her work, n4 as well as ten letters written to Speert by students and faculty members who strongly supported her retention. App. at 183-85,  347-

62, 380-93.

n4  One  peer  review  was  much  more  critical of Abramson than the others;  this was written by Wepner.

B. Procedural History

On  November  3,   1993,   Abramson  filed  a  com- plaint of employment discrimination with both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the New

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*274   Jersey Division on Civil Rights ("NJDCR"). App. at 141. After filing a grievance with her union that was eventually  denied,  Abramson  filed  a  complaint  of  reli- gious discrimination and retaliation with the NJDCR and the EEOC on September 2, 1994. After receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC, Abramson commenced **21  this  action  in  the  United  States  District  Court  for  the District of New Jersey on August 17, 1995.

The District Court delivered its summary judgment ruling from the bench on December 10, 1999, disposing of the issues raised in a lengthy oral opinion that was in- terspersed with dialogue between the Court and counsel. The Court entered its order on December 14, 1999, grant- ing summary judgment in favor of WPC on all claims. In its oral opinion, the District Court briefly considered Abramson's hostile work environment claim, rejecting it because it found that Abramson did not present evidence that would satisfy the prima facie case. The Court focused primarily on Abramson's failure to make out the first el- ement of the prima facie case: intentional discrimination on the basis of religion. In its view, there were too many other explanations for Wepner's conduct, making the re- ligious  animus  explanation  unreasonable.  Dist.  Ct.  Op. at 78-79. Furthermore, it stated that the "same evidence works for both" discrimination and hostile work environ- ment claims, and indicated it was considering Abramson's inability to prove pretext in its analysis of her hostile work environment claim. Id. at 77-78. Overall,   **22   it found that "at best, Abramson  raises a scintilla of evidence." Id. at 83.

The  vast  majority  of  the  District  Court  opinion  ad- dressed Abramson's religious discrimination claim. The District Court was unpersuaded by the evidence relied on by Abramson to support her claim, though it did not refer

at all to the declarations submitted by Abramson's fellow professors. It stated that because the Committee voted to grant Abramson tenure, the focus of the inquiry should be on whether President Speert failed to make a tenure decision because of discriminatory animus. It found that there was no evidence of such animus. Id. at 81-82. The Court held that "at best Abramson  raises a scintilla of ev- idence in the overall inquiry, by virtue of what the record reveals concerning the mind of Shelly Wepner." Id. at 83. In  addition,  the  Court  found  that  Abramson  had  failed to establish that WPC's reasons for terminating her were pretextual. Id.

The  District  Court  dismissed  the  comments  made about Abramson's religion as "stray remarks." Id. at 30. The Court opined that there was a lack of evidence that people acted negatively toward Abramson because of her religious absences. Id. at 58-59. The **23    Court ex- pressed its belief that Wepner was "hotheaded" and that her bad treatment of Abramson was unrelated to religion. Id. at 59-60, 78.

The District Court then examined Wepner's statement to  Abramson  ("The  trouble  with  you  is  that  it  doesn't show that you are Orthodox.") at length, acknowledging that it sounded "angry" and "confrontative" sic . Id. at 52. However,  after  reading  Wepner's  deposition,  the  Court

"gleaned from that a position that Wepner  as a Jew has, which is that she felt that her own religious practices were down-played sic  and low-keyed by her, as a matter of her  dealing  with  the  issue  of  possible  Antisemitism  .  .

.  ."  Id.  at  53.  The  District  Court  asked  whether  or  not Wepner's remark, "standing alone . . . establishes a reli- gious bias," and found that "there's just no way I find for someone to hear Shelly Wepner's remark and draw

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*275   any kind of an inference that that per se remark is evidence of discriminatory animus towards Abramson . .

. ." Id. at 53-55. Instead, it determined that it only showed a "clear difference of opinion with respect to Abramson's open acknowledgment and requests for acknowledgment of her Orthodoxy . . . ." Id. at 55.

The District **24    Court then addressed Wepner's Post-It  as  a  "stand-alone  document  to  give  us  a  vi- sion  of  Shelly  Wepner's  mind-set   sic   with  respect  to Abramson." Id. The Court was persuaded that the note

"establishes even more strongly that Wepner moved from a difference of opinion with plaintiff regarding the prac- tice  of  her  religion  and  broadened  that  in  her  mind  to a conclusion  that . . .  Abramson  was not  . . . going  to meet the needs of the institution." Id. at 56. However, the Court found that Abramson had failed to show the requi- site nexus between Wepner's Post-It and WPC's decision not to retain her because it was "not contextually estab- lished where, when and how this Post-It played a role in anything other than Wepner's own dossier regarding the plaintiff." Id. Although the Court noted that it was possi- ble that Wepner somehow influenced Speert, it found that a possibility was insufficient:  "there has to be proof of a determinative factor, i.e. factor of discrimination. Not the possibility." Id. at 57.

The  District  Court  was  similarly  unconvinced  that Abramson's  absence  from  Friday  faculty  meetings  af- fected her job performance,  and it also rejected the ar- gument that the rescheduling of **25   faculty meetings was done in an effort to harass Abramson or to discrim- inate against her. Furthermore, the Court did not believe that  Seminoff's  request  that  Abramson  account  for  her absences  was  related  to  religion.  It  ascribed  her  being charged with a sick day on a Jewish holiday when she was not scheduled to teach, and the six-month delay in

correcting  it,  to  "administrative  and  bureaucratic  bum- bling." Id. at 69. The Court stated that it was considering the  record  as  a  whole,  and  in  doing  so,  it  found  that Abramson did not disprove the legitimate nondiscrimina- tory reason WPC gave for not retaining Abramson. Id. at

83.

In rejecting Abramson's retaliation claim, the District Court  held  Abramson  did  not  give  "a  clear  enough  in- dication that she was raising religious discrimination as an issue." Id. at 76. The Court considered only Speert's alleged change in demeanor when evaluating the adverse employment action prong of the retaliatory inquiry, and held that "whatever Speert did or didn't do with respect to friendliness would call for rank speculation on the part of the jury, if that jury was asked to say or to find that there was retaliation." Id. The District Court did not consider

**26    Abramson's ultimate termination as an adverse employment action.

Abramson  appeals,  arguing  that  the  District  Court erred in dismissing her Title VII and NJLAD religious discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims. She argues that she established a prima facie case for each of her claims. First, she argues that she has re- counted sufficient proof of all elements of the prima facie case required for a hostile work environment claim. With respect to her religious discrimination claim, Abramson stresses that she submitted ample evidence that her su- pervisors were motivated by discriminatory animus stem- ming from her insistence that she be allowed to practice her Orthodox Jewish beliefs. She also argues that she pre- sented credible evidence that WPC's reasons for termi- nating her were pretextual. With regard to her retaliation claim, Abramson contends that the record clearly reflects that she made her

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*276    supervisors aware that she was complaining of discrimination, and that her termination was motivated by those complaints. We will consider each of Abramson's claims in the order raised by appellant,  beginning with her hostile work environment claim.

II.

The District Court **27    had subject matter juris- diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and supplemental  jurisdiction  under  28  U.S.C.  §  1367.  We have appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291. HN1  We exercise plenary review over the District Court's grant of summary judgment to WPC, and we apply the same standard that the District Court should have applied.  Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d

271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). HN2  A court should grant sum- mary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In evaluating the evidence, "a court must view the facts in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor." Farrell, 206 F.3d at

278. While the individual pieces of evidence alone may not suffice to make out the claims asserted, we must view the record as a whole picture.   **28   Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 921 (3d Cir. 1997). As we stated in Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484

(3d Cir. 1990), HN3  "A play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire per- formance, and similarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents, but on the overall scenario."

A. Hostile Work Environment

Abramson's first claim is that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her religion. HN4  To make out a prima facie case for a religiously hostile work  environment  n5  under  Title  VII,  a  plaintiff  must demonstrate five elements:  "(1) the employee  suffered intentional discrimination because of religion ;  (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; n6 (3) the dis- crimination detrimentally

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*277  affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same reli- gion  in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior  liability."  Kunin  v.  Sears  Roebuck  &  Co.,  175

F.3d 289, 293 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Andrews, 895 F.2d at

1482).

n5 We have yet to address a hostile work en- vironment claim based on religion. However, Title VII has been construed under our case law to sup- port claims of a hostile work environment with re- spect  to  other  categories  (i.e.,  sex,  race,  national origin). We see no reason to treat Abramson's hos- tile work environment claim any differently, given Title VII's language. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)

(prohibiting employers from discriminating against an individual because of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."). Therefore, we apply the well- established  framework  for  hostile  work  environ- ment claims with respect to other protected cate- gories  to  our  analysis  of  a  hostile  work  environ- ment claim made on account of religion. We also note that there is at least one reported decision from a court of appeals that has held that a claim for a hostile work environment based on religion exists, and applied the same prima facie case we use here. See Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 514 (6th Cir.

1999) (holding that plaintiff "did not demonstrate a triable issue over whether he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on religion.").

We also note that a New Jersey court has also recognized  that  hostile  work  environment  claims based on religion are cognizable under the NJLAD. See Heitzman v. Monmouth County, 321 N.J. Super.

133, 728 A.2d 297, 303 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

1999) (discussing plaintiff's claim that he was sub- jected to hostile work environment because he was Jewish and noting that New Jersey courts have re- lied upon federal court decisions construing Title VII hostile work environment claims when review- ing such claims under NJLAD).

**29

n6  We  note,  as  we  did  in  Bouton  v.  BMW  of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994), and Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 449 n.14 (3d Cir.  1994),  that  the  Andrews  formulation  of  this prong differs from the Supreme Court's. In Harris v. Forklift Sys.,  Inc.,  510 U.S. 17,  21,  126 L. Ed.

2d 295, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993), and most recently in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523

U.S.  75,  78,  140  L.  Ed.  2d  201,  118  S.  Ct.  998

(1998), the Supreme Court articulated the standard for  hostile  work  environment  claims.  It  required that the plaintiff demonstrate that the harassment was "severe or pervasive." Id. On at least one previ- ous occasion, we have also referred to the standard as severe or pervasive. See Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of Southeastern Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Title VII hostile work environ- ment  test  to  ADA  harassment  claim  and  holding that plaintiff failed to "demonstrate  that the as- serted harassment was pervasive or severe enough to meet the Harris standard."). In the instant case, Abramson asserts a claim that the discrimination was "pervasive and regular," thus fulfilling both the Andrews and the Harris tests. Therefore, we adopt the  approach  taken  in  Bouton.  We  note  that  the distinction between "severe or pervasive" and "per- vasive and regular" may be important, but "do not find it necessary to resolve whether the difference in language  was inadvertent." Bouton, 29 F.3d at

106 n.2.

**30   HN5

Under the NJLAD, a plaintiff states a claim for a re- ligiously hostile work environment by showing that the

"complained-of conduct (1) would not have occurred but for  the  employee's   religion ;  and  it  was  (2)  severe  or pervasive  enough  to  make  a  (3)  reasonable   Orthodox Jew  believe that (4) the conditions of employment were altered and the working environment was hostile or abu- sive." Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95,

114 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1074, 145 L. Ed. 2d 663, 120 S. Ct. 786 (2000) (quoting Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 626 A.2d 445, 453 (N.J.

1993)). n7

n7 New Jersey courts have placed a less oner- ous  burden  on  the  plaintiff  by  omitting  the  final prong of the analysis. Therefore, any plaintiff who has fulfilled the Title VII prima facie case will have also shown the elements required by the NJLAD. Because  we  find  that  Abramson  has  fulfilled  the Title VII prima facie case, we will not discuss the NJLAD specifically, but note here that Abramson's claims under the NJLAD are intact based on her showing under Title VII.

**31

The  District  Court  rejected  Abramson's  religiously hostile work environment claims under both statutes, find- ing that the conduct alleged did not meet the requirements of  the  prima  facie  case.  Dist.  Ct.  Op.  at  78.  Though  it

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referred  to  all  of  the  first  four  prongs  of  the  test,  the Court seemed to base its holding almost exclusively on Abramson's failure to meet the first prong, viewing that prong as involving the perception of a "reasonable person of  the  protected  status"  and  requiring  a  discriminatory

"animus." We disagree with this approach.

HN6  The proper inquiry at this stage was whether a reasonable factfinder could view the evidence as showing that  Abramson's  treatment  was  attributable  to  her  reli- gious faith and practice. Further, by asking whether a rea-

sonable person would "necessarily construe" the conduct in question as being improperly motivated,  the District Court appears to have viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the party making, not the party oppos- ing, the summary judgment motion. See Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2000) ("It is not the province of the court itself to decide what inferences should be drawn.").

By   requiring   **32          that   Wepner's   conduct   be

"linked" to a "discriminatory animus,"

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*278   Dist. Ct. Op. at 79, and stating that the record did not sufficiently "reveal   what was in the  mind of Shelley Wepner," id. at 83, the District Court seemingly required Abramson to introduce direct evidence of Wepner's inten- tional discrimination against her based on her religious beliefs. However, Supreme Court precedent does not sup- port the need for a plaintiff to demonstrate direct evidence of her harasser's motivation for discrimination against her. In Oncale, the Court discussed a hostile work environment claim on the basis of sex, and stated the following:

HN7

A trier of fact might reasonably find sex  dis- crimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and deroga- tory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by gen- eral hostility to the presence of women in the workplace. A same-sex harassment plaintiff may also . . . offer direct comparative evi- dence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex work- place.

523 U.S. at 80-81. Similarly, we have never required a plaintiff to demonstrate direct **33   proof that her ha- rasser's intent was to create a discriminatory environment. Instead, we have held that, with respect to certain con- duct, the intent to discriminate can be inferred.  Andrews,

895  F.2d  at  1482  n.3  (referring  to  sexual  misconduct). We have also noted that because discrimination is "often simply masked in more subtle forms," it is often difficult to discern discriminatory animus. Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1082 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1999)

("The  Supreme  Court  has  recognized  that  an  employer who discriminates will almost never announce a discrim- inatory animus or provide employees or courts with direct

evidence of discriminatory intent."). Thus, we have held that even the use of "code words" such as "all of you" and

"one of them" could be sufficient evidence from which a  jury  could  find  an  intent  to  discriminate.  See  Aman,

85 F.3d at 1083 ("The words themselves are only rele- vant for what they reveal --  the intent of the speaker."); see  also  Howley,  217  F.3d  at  145,  148,  154-55  (find- ing hostile work environment claim on basis of sex viable

**34   where conduct at issue, though lacking any sexual component or reference to plaintiff's sex, could, in con- text, reasonably be interpreted as having been directed at plaintiff because of sex).

HN8  The first prong of the Andrews test was not designed  to protect  harassers who fail to recognize the hostile or abusive nature of their comments and actions. Our case law does not indicate that the first prong requires a factfinder to peer inside the harasser's mind. Rather, it merely  requires  a  showing  that  the  offender's  behavior was, as required by both Title VII and the LAD, based on a protected category. See Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439,

447-48 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that though facts before us did not include evidence of "blatantly sexist behavior," plaintiff made out the first element "by showing that gen- der was a substantial factor in the discrimination" and that plaintiff would not have been treated in the same manner if she were male) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);  Drinkwater,  904 F.2d at 862 ("Evidence of a sufficiently oppressive environment could, in theory, give courts enough evidence to infer that the intentional dis- crimination prong **35   of the Andrews test can be met even absent evidence of the harasser's subjective intent to discriminate.")

HN9  Regardless of what a harasser's intention is, if a plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to give rise to an inference of

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*279   discrimination by offering proof that her "work- place  is  permeated  with  discriminatory  intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and cre- ate an abusive working environment," Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295, 114 S. Ct.

367 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omit- ted),  and the conduct is based on one of the categories protected  under  Title  VII,  a  hostile  work  environment claim will survive summary judgment. Here, almost all of the incidents alleged centered around Abramson's in- sistence that she not work during the Sabbath. Therefore, we hold that HN10  where, as here, the evidence tends to show that the harasser's conduct was intentionally di- rected toward the plaintiff because of her religion, the first prong of the prima facie case is met.

Turning to the remaining elements of the prima facie case for hostile work environment, **36    we find that the evidence Abramson presented was sufficient to sat- isfy her burden on the other prongs as well. We conclude that the many incidents recounted by Abramson, coupled with the declarations of other WPC professors, are rele- vant and probative as to prongs two through four of the prima facie case for hostile work environment claims. n8

Though we will address each prong individually, first, we briefly note the evidence that the District Court should have considered when ruling on Abramson's hostile work environment  claim:  n9 (1)  Seminoff's  "unprecedented" monitoring of Abramson's conferences and absences; (2) WPC  charging  Abramson  with  a  sick  day  on  a  Jewish holiday when she was not scheduled to teach;  (3) both Wepner and Seminoff, on separate occasions, criticizing and raising their voices at Abramson regarding her lack of availability during the Sabbath;  (4) Wepner schedul- ing meetings on Jewish holidays and refusing to change them  so  Abramson  could  attend;  (5)  Wepner's  pointed statement to Abramson regarding her faith and behavior

("The trouble with you is that it doesn't show that you are

Orthodox.").

n8 We note that the parties disagree as to the District Court's treatment of the declarations, and we found the record quite vague in this regard. The District Court clearly did not allude to them in its oral opinion, but did make a general statement dur- ing oral argument on the summary judgment mo- tion, offering the view that "some of the affidavits .

. . would be truly inadmissible." Tr. of Oral Arg. at

100. It then stated that "we might have an   in  lim- ine battle about that . . . when we are dealing with whether or not it is admissible." Id. at 101. Because we have not been referred to a motion contesting their admissibility or an order ruling them inadmis- sible, we assume for our purposes that they are to be considered. However, we note that their admis- sibility is a matter for the District Court to decide. See  United  States  Sec.  and  Exchange Comm'n  v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 198 (3d Cir. 2000)

(reviewing the exclusion of lay opinion testimony under  Rule  701  for  abuse  of  discretion);  United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1991)

(stating that admission under Rule 403 is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard).

**37

n9 This list is not exhaustive. There are addi- tional examples in the record.

First, a jury could find that the harassment was per- vasive. The events alleged occurred over a period of two years  and  could  be  found  to  have  infected  Abramson's work experience; even other faculty members mentioned it to Speert prior to Abramson's filing suit. App. at 390-

91, 513, 540-41. No one event alone stands out from the rest, but all of the events could be found to aggregate to create an environment hostile to a person of Abramson's religion. See Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139,

155 (3d Cir. 1999) ( HN11  "It is settled law that courts

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*280   should not consider each incident of harassment in isolation. Rather, a court must evaluate the sum total of abuse over time.") (internal citation omitted). Taken as a whole, all the events alleged indicate that the harassment rose to the level of pervasiveness required to withstand summary judgment.

A jury could also reasonably conclude that Abramson was detrimentally affected by the environment,  thereby fulfilling the third prong. Abramson's declarations **38  amply support such a finding, as do the three affidavits of her fellow WPC faculty members. In addition, the decla- ration of Cordelia Towney stated that "the religious ha- rassment which Abramson  suffered at WPC made her feel  like  a  beaten  puppy.  She  became  sallow,  stooped,

and  she looked broken." App. at 174.

HN12  In determining whether the fourth prong, the objective  test,  is  met,  n10  we  must  "look   at  all  the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physi- cally threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive ut- terance;  and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. The  Supreme  Court  has  stated  that  Title  VII  is  not  vi- olated  by  the  "mere  utterance  of  an  .  .  .  epithet  which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" or by mere

"discourtesy or rudeness," unless so severe or pervasive as to constitute an objective change in the conditions of em- ployment.  Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,

787, 141 L. Ed. 2d 662, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The conduct in the instant case could be **39   said to go beyond "simple teasing, offhand comments, and non-serious  isolated in- cidents," which the Supreme Court has cautioned would

"not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment." Id. at 788 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We find that Abramson has made a sufficient showing, based upon the facts set forth

above,  that  a  jury  could  find  that  a  reasonable  person of her religion would find the conduct alleged to be so harmful that it altered her working conditions.

n10 We also note that the District Court ana- lyzed whether a reasonable Orthodox Jew would find the behavior to be religiously motivated,  but in assessing whether the fourth prong of the prima facie  case  is  met,  a  court  must  consider  whether or not a person in the protected category would be detrimentally affected by the conduct at issue.

With  respect  to  the  fifth  prong  of  the  hostile  work environment claim, the existence of respondeat superior liability, a jury could also find that **40   this prong has been met. HN13  The Supreme Court crafted the stan- dard for employer liability in Faragher, referred to as the

"aided by the agency relation test":

An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively) higher au- thority over the employee. When no tangi- ble employment action is taken, a defending employee may  raise  an  affirmative  defense to liability or damages . . . . No affirmative defense is available, however, when the su- pervisor's harassment culminates in a tangi- ble employment action, such as discharge . .

. .

524 U.S. at 807. Here, it is undisputed that Abramson was terminated. Hence, WPC cannot assert an affirmative defense,  and  the  evidence  of  liability  is  clear.  Because Abramson presented evidence sufficient to meet all five elements

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*281   of the prima case, we reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment on Abramson's hostile work environment claim. n11

n11 We also note that the Court erred by conflat- ing two of Abramson's legal claims, stating that the exact  same  evidence  applied  to  both  Abramson's religious discrimination claim and her hostile work environment claim:  "If I do not find that . . . the reason advanced were sic  pretextual plaintiff has a difficult time establishing hostile work environ- ment . . . the same evidence works for both." Dist. Ct. Op. at 77. The two claims have entirely differ- ent prima facie cases and often courts may consider evidence for one claim and not the other. For exam- ple, here, even if WPC could demonstrate that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to terminate Abramson, she would still have a hostile work envi- ronment claim if she could establish the five prongs of the Andrews test, none of which are precluded by a failure to establish disparate treatment.

**41

B. Religious Discrimination Claim

Abramson  claims  that  she  was  terminated  because her  supervisors  were  motivated  by  discriminatory  ani- mus stemming from her insistence that she be allowed to observe her religious holy days. She alleges that WPC's various, allegedly non-discriminatory reasons for termi- nating her employment were false and pretextual.

HN14  Title VII explicitly protects employees from adverse employment actions on the basis of religion: "(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em- ployer--(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,  or otherwise to discriminate against any in- dividual  with  respect  to  his  compensation,  terms,  con- ditions,  or  privileges  of  employment,  because  of  such individual's . . . religion . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). As  recognized  by  our  sister  circuits,  though  never  ex- plicitly recognized in our own jurisprudence, employees may assert two theories of religious discrimination:  n12

"disparate treatment," as alleged here, and "failure to ac-

commodate." E.g., Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond,

101 F.3d 1012, 1017 (4th Cir. 1996); Mann v. Frank, 7

F.3d 1365, 1368-70 (8th Cir. 1993). **42   Because the cases in our court dealing with religious discrimination have routinely been of the "failure to accommodate" vari- ety, we utilize a prima facie case here that differs from the one employed in our other religious discrimination cases. See,  e.g.,  Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J.,

223 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2000).

n12 The reason for the two different types of claims is that although Title VII lists religion in the same list of protected categories as race and sex, the definition of "religion" in 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) creates the "failure to accommodate" theory by including

"all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an em- ployee's . . . religious observance or practice with- out undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." The prima facie case, considered as part of the same framework known as the McDonnell Douglas test,  consists of three elements:  "(1) he or  she  has  a  bona  fide  religious  belief  that  con- flicts with an employment requirement;  (2) he or she  informed  the  employer  of  this  belief;  (3)  he or she was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement." Protos v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1986).

**43   HN15

To prove a claim under the "disparate treatment" the- ory, the prima facie case and evidentiary burdens of an em- ployee alleging religious discrimination mirror those of an employee alleging race or sex discrimination.  Chalmers,

101 F.3d at 1017. Accordingly, we apply the familiar bur- den-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803-805, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). The plaintiff must demonstrate that she

(1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified and rejected for the position she sought, and (3) nonmembers of the protected

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*282    class  were  treated  more  favorably.   Goosby  v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 318-319

(3d  Cir.  2000)  (citing  Ezold  v.  Wolf,  Block,  Schorr  & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 522 (3d Cir. 1992)). After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer must proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the ad- verse employment decision. Once the employer does so, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the proffered reason was pretextual.  Goosby, 228 F.3d at 319; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143,

147 L. Ed. 2d 105, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000). **44

Abramson also asserts a claim of religious discrimina- tion under the NJLAD. HN16  In cases alleging disparate treatment, New Jersey courts have adopted a three-step test that mirrors the Title VII inquiry:

(1) the complainant must come forward with sufficient evidence to constitute a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the employer must then  show  a  legitimate  non-discriminatory reason  for  its  decision;  and  (3)  the  com- plainant  must  be  given  the  opportunity  to show that the employer's stated reason was merely a pretext or discriminatory in its ap- plication.

Chou v. Rutgers, the State Univ., 283 N.J. Super. 524,

662 A.2d 986, 993 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (citing

Dixon v. Rutgers, the State Univ. of N.J., 110 N.J. 432,

541 A.2d 1046, 1051 (N.J. 1988)). n13

n13 Under the NJLAD and Title VII, the analy- sis is essentially the same. Therefore, we will limit our discussion to Title VII. In doing so,  we note that because Abramson's Title VII claim survives summary judgment, her NJLAD claim does as well.

**45

Here, the District Court assumed, and the parties did not dispute on appeal,  that Abramson met all three re- quirements  of  the  prima  facie  case:   (1)  religion  is  a protected category under Title VII and Abramson is an Orthodox  Jew,  (2)  she  was  qualified  for  the  position; and  (3)  she  was  terminated  while  other  non-Orthodox Jewish professors were retained. The burden then shifted to WPC to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory rea- son for Abramson's termination. Goosby, 228 F.3d at 319. WPC offered many reasons for its decision. In fact, the reasons presented were ever-changing.

Seminoff wrote that after reviewing Abramson's re- tention file, she did not recommend Professor Abramson for  retention  due  to  concern  "regarding  the  quality  of accomplishment in teaching,  research,  scholarly activ- ity and service , with particular concern for the area of service."  App.  at  364.  In  Speert's  memo  to  Abramson explaining his decision not to recommend her for reap- pointment, he wrote that her "overall record of contribu- tion  to  the  College  and  Community  and  potential  con- tribution to the Department, Program and the College in terms of present and future programs do not justify reap- pointment.   **46    "  App.  at  979.  Later,  in  response to Abramson's discrimination complaint to the NJDCR, WPC claimed she was deficient in the following areas: scholarship and teaching, interpersonal skills during small group discussions, professional service on campus-wide and department committees/activities, and her scholarly record. App. at 404.

Finally, in Speert's deposition, he gave other reasons never previously mentioned, among them that Abramson failed to create a concentration in technology and refused to work with administrators to create an Apple computer lab. When pressed, Speert asserted that the main reason he did not retain Abramson was that the folder that had been presented to him contained evidence of her inability to take leadership and guidance. App. at

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*283     1098.  Upon  further  inquiry,  he  said  that  this was based on Abramson's failure to follow proper pro- cedures in securing grants, and her failure to be involved in the NCATE accreditation process. App. at 1099-110. Because WPC's burden at this stage is merely a burden of production, we agree with the District Court that WPC met its burden at this stage. See Ezold, 983 F.2d at 523

(referring to defendant's burden as burden **47   of pro- duction).

The burden shifted to Abramson, HN17  who had to

"point to some evidence,  direct or circumstantial,  from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons;  or (2) be- lieve  that  an  invidious  discriminatory  reason  was  more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764

(3d Cir. 1994).

In Fuentes, we addressed just how much evidence of pretext a plaintiff needs to avert summary judgment. We held that HN18  "to avoid summary judgment, the plain- tiff's evidence rebutting the employer's proffered legiti- mate reasons must allow a factfinder reasonably to infer that each of the employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons was either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action (that is, the proffered reason is a pretext)." Id. (internal citations and emphasis omitted). Importantly, we qualified that state- ment with the following footnote:

The plaintiff need not  cast doubt on each proffered reason in a vacuum. If the defen- dant proffers a bagful of legitimate reasons, and the plaintiff manages to cast **48   sub- stantial doubt on a fair number of them, the plaintiff  may  not  need  to  discredit  the  re- mainder. That is because the factfinder's re- jection of some of the defendant's proffered

reasons  may  impede  the  employer's  credi- bility  seriously  enough  so  that  a  factfinder may rationally disbelieve the remaining prof- fered reasons, even if no evidence undermin- ing those remaining rationales in particular is available.

Id., n.7. We then noted that HN19  it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that the employer's decision was wrong or mistaken, because the issue is whether the em- ployer acted with discriminatory animus. Hence, to make a sufficient showing of pretext, Abramson must "demon- strate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions" in WPC's reasons that

"a  reasonable  factfinder  could  rationally  find  them  'un- worthy of credence.' " Id. at 765 (citation omitted). And if Abramson can successfully demonstrate pretext, she need not present affirmative evidence of discrimination beyond her prima facie showing if a rational factfinder could con- clude  from  the  evidence  of  pretext  that  WPC's  actions were discriminatory. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147. **49

WPC's reasons can be grouped into two categories:

(1) overall deficiencies in Abramson's scholarship, teach- ing and service -- the explanations given to the NJDCR, which  are  the  same  reasons  Seminoff  cited  as  the  ba- sis for not recommending retention; and (2) Abramson's failure to get along with supervisors and follow instruc- tions, which were the main (though not exclusive) reasons Speert listed at his deposition.

Abramson refutes the first set of reasons by noting that Speert admitted in his deposition that these reasons were unfounded, saying that her folder gave evidence of "very good performance in both areas" of teaching and scholar- ship, App. at 468, and that her level of service "would not have raised a concern," App. at 498. In addition,  WPC admitted at oral argument that these reasons were not the actual

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*284    basis  for  Abramson's  termination.  This  admis- sion  alone  might  suffice  to  satisfy  Abramson's  burden, but we need not decide based solely on that admission, because Abramson's evidence also refutes the second set of reasons given later by Speert.

With respect to Abramson's alleged failure to follow instructions insofar as she purportedly did not use proper protocols for proposed **50   grants and programs, she argues  that  she  was  unaware  of  any  protocols.  App.  at

147. She points to Speert's inability to identify at his de- position where the protocols were outlined in either the policy manual or the faculty handbook. App. at 478-79. Abramson presented testimony of the president of the fac- ulty union stating there were not any protocols, App. at

160, and noted WPC's failure to include in the record any documents setting forth such protocols.

Abramson also attacked the legitimacy of WPC's re- liance on the fact that she failed to accept leadership from Seminoff and Wepner as grounds for her termination. She argues that because these two women were her alleged ha- rassers, and because her poor relationship with them was directly related to their hostility toward her religion, her difficulty working with them should not be credited as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. She also submitted evidence of her positive contributions in  teaching  and  scholarship  (glowing  teaching  evalua- tions, letters to Speert praising her, a fellow professor's declaration), including evidence that she was well-versed in the use of Apple computers and did in fact teach her

**51   students how to use them. App. at 132, 174. With respect to her alleged failure to develop the concentration in technology, Abramson points to the specific reference by  the  Committee  to  the  contrary,  presenting  evidence that the Committee praised her work in this area. App. at

239. In addition, Abramson focuses on the timing of the

reasons,  stressing that two technology-related concerns were not mentioned until Speert's deposition.

Abramson also argues that the ever-changing nature of the proffered reasons can be considered as detracting from  their  legitimacy.  We  agree.   HN20   If  a  plaintiff demonstrates that the reasons given for her termination did  not  remain  consistent,  beginning  at  the  time  they were proffered and continuing throughout the proceed- ings,  this  may  be  viewed  as  evidence  tending  to  show pretext, though of course it should be considered in light of the entire record. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (listing

"inconsistencies" and "contradictions" in employer's rea- sons among ways plaintiff could show pretext); see also Waddell v. Small Tube Prods., Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that district court could "appropriately" have taken employer's **52    inconsistent explanations for termination into account in finding causation neces- sary to satisfy prima facie case of retaliatory discharge). We find that based on the record as a whole, Abramson has  successfully  "demonstrated  such  weaknesses,  im- plausibilities,  inconsistencies,  incoherencies,  or  contra- dictions"  such  that  "a  factfinder  could  reasonably  .  .  . disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons." Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765. And as the Supreme Court re- cently stated in Reeves, this alone could support the in-

ference that WPC's motivation was discriminatory:

HN21

In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an  inference  is  consistent  with  the  general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty

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*285     about  a  material  fact  as  "affirma- tive evidence of guilt." Moreover,  once the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the  actual  reason  for  its  decision.     **53  Thus, a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the em- ployer's  asserted  justification  is  false,  may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.

530 U.S. at 147-48 (internal citations omitted). However, the factfinder does not need to rely on that

evidence  alone.  Abramson  has  also  presented  evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that "an invidious  discriminatory  reason  was  more  likely  than not a motivating or determinative cause of WPC 's ac- tion." Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. The confrontations with Seminoff and Wepner, the very probative declarations of Abramson's fellow professors, the laudatory faculty eval- uations and Committee report, and Wepner's Post-it note all provide strong evidence to support Abramson's claim. We note that the District Court appears to have viewed the  evidence  as  a  factfinder,  n14  which  contributed  to the ruling. In addition, the District Court seems to have viewed each piece of independently, rather than in its en- tirety. n15 HN22  "In determining the appropriateness of summary judgment, the court should not consider the record solely in piecemeal **54    fashion,  giving cre- dence to innocent explanations for individual strands of evidence,  for  a  jury  .  .  .  would  be  entitled  to  view  the evidence as a whole." Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217

F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,  as is required when a defendant moves for summary judg- ment, and viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that Abramson's proof is sufficient to require that this claim be permitted to proceed to trial.

n14  For  example,  with  respect  to  Abramson being charged for a sick day on a Jewish holiday when she was not scheduled to teach, and then hav- ing to complain for six months to have the error rectified,  the  District  Court  "ascribed  that  to  ad- ministrative and bureaucratic bumbling." Dist. Ct. Op. at 69. And when discussing Seminoff's review of Abramson's absences and attendance at confer- ences  in  July  1992,  the  District  Court  concluded that such conduct was not motivated by discrim- inatory animus, but rather, Seminoff's "leadership and part of doing the right thing as a manager." Id. at 63.

n15  For  instance,  with  respect  to  the  Court's finding as to Wepner's comment to Abramson that

"The trouble with you is that it doesn't show that you are Orthodox," the Court noted:  "We are talk- ing about whether this standing alone, per se with- out any tortured reasoning one way or another es- tablishes a religious bias." Dist. Ct. Op. at 52-53

(emphasis added); see also id. at 55 (stating with re- spect to Wepner's Post-It note: "This is offered as a stand-alone document to give us a vision of Shelly Wepner's mind-set with respect to Abramson.").

**55

We  note,  also,  that  while  the  District  Court  relied heavily on the fact that it found no evidence in the record demonstrating that Speert himself possessed discrimina- tory animus toward Abramson, a rational jury could find that Speert did not make his decision in a vacuum. A rea- sonable inference that could be drawn from the record is that Speert was influenced by both Seminoff and Wepner. In fact,  Speert even stated in his deposition that before making his decision not to retain Abramson,  he sought Seminoff's counsel. App. at 487. Moreover,  there is an additional piece of evidence not mentioned in the District Court opinion that supports our view of the record on this point. The

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*286     record  contains  a  memo  sent  on  October  21,

1993,  from  Seminoff  to  Speert  with  a  subject  line  that read:    "Request  for  information  -  Professor  Gertrude Abramson,"  thus  supporting  the  conclusion  that  Speert had sought input on the decision to retain Abramson. n16

App. at 378. Under our case law, HN23  it is sufficient if those exhibiting discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the decision to terminate. See Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1995) (stat- ing  in  ADEA  case  that   **56    if  plaintiff's  supervisor participated  in  decision  to  terminate  him,  even  though president of company formally terminated him, evidence of supervisor's age-related animus would be relevant in determining  if  discriminatory  motive  at  play);  see  also Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture,  235 F.3d 219,  226

(5th  Cir.  2000) ("If  the  employee can  demonstrate  that others  had  influence  or  leverage  over  the  official  deci- sionmaker . . . it is proper to impute their discriminatory attitudes to the formal decisionmaker."); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir.

2000) (stating that "discriminatory comments . . . made by

. . . those in a position to influence the decisionmaker" can be evidence of pretext); Griffin v. Washington Convention Ctr., 330 U.S. App. D.C. 81, 142 F.3d 1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Evidence of a subordinate's bias is relevant where the ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the subordinate's influence."). As we noted in Roebuck v. Drexel University, 852 F.2d 715, 727 (3d Cir. 1988), "it is plainly permissible for a jury to conclude that an eval- uation at any level,  if based on discrimination,   **57  influenced the decisionmaking process and thus allowed discrimination  to infect  the  ultimate  decision."  Clearly, Wepner and Seminoff played a role in the ultimate deci- sion to terminate Abramson, and their involvement thus makes their conduct toward her relevant and probative of discriminatory animus.

n16 In this memo, Seminoff explained certain aspects of Abramson's retention file, including why

Seminoff  believed  the  committee  vote  was  split, and a recitation of what Wepner's concerns were. At the end of the memo, Seminoff addresses "the allegation of religious bias." App. at 379.

Considering the record before us, we find ample ev- idence  to  support  Abramson's  religious  discrimination claim.

C. Retaliation Claim

Abramson's  third  and  final  claim  is  for  retaliation.

HN24  To advance a prima facie case of retaliation un- der Title VII and the NJLAD, a plaintiff must show that:

(1) the employee engaged in a protected employee activ- ity;  n17 (2) the employer took an adverse employment action  after  or  contemporaneous  with  the   **58    em- ployee's protected  activity;  and  (3)  a  causal  link  exists between  the  employee's  protected  activity  and  the  em- ployer's  adverse  action.  See,  e.g.,  Farrell,  206  F.3d  at

278; see also Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494,

500 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing the third requirement as a "causal connection");  Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc.,  140 N.J. 623,  660 A.2d 505,  508 (N.J. 1995). We conclude  that  there  is  ample  evidence  of  all  three  ele- ments in the record, and disagree with the District Court's determination that Abramson did not make out a prima facie case.

n17 The actual language used by the New Jersey courts,  with  respect  to  the  first  prong,  is  that  an employee  must  show  that  he  or  she  engaged  in protected activity known by the employer.   Craig v. Suburban Cablevision,  Inc.,  140 N.J. 623,  660

A.2d 505, 508 (N.J. 1995) (emphasis added).

1) Abramson engaged in protected activity.

On Oct. 22, 1992, Abramson wrote a letter to Speert, stating:

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*287

I **59   have lived as an Orthodox Jew all my life . . . . The non-discrimination policy of  William  Paterson  College  precludes  the need to defend either religious observances or  pursuit  of  career  goals.  Nevertheless,  .

.  .  it  has  been  necessary  for  me  to  justify my lifestyle. See, for example, the attached memo sent to Dean Seminoff in response to her request for an explanation of my "con- ferences/absences" when I submitted a pro- forma  travel  request  for  an  August  confer- ence.

App. at 932. On October 12, 1993, Abramson once again  wrote  to  Speert  after  Seminoff  gave  a  negative recommendation to the Committee regarding her future employment  with  WPC.  App.  at  377.  This  letter  com- plained that "Dean Seminoff's bias against Abramson  as an Orthodox Jew overwhelms her professional judg- ment." Id. In addition to making her complaints known to   President   Speert,   Abramson   also   complained   to WPC's  Affirmative  Action  Officer,  Robie  Cagnina.  On September 22, 1993, Abramson filed a written complaint of religious discrimination with Cagnina, stating:  "I am being  subjected  to  bias,  discriminatory  treatment,  har- rassment sic ,  and outright hatred because I live as an Orthodox Jew." App. at 311.

The District **60   Court determined that Abramson failed to make out the first element, holding that she "did not articulate clearly and in a formal manner a religious discrimination  complaint  .  .  .  "  and  that  her" October  n18 1992 letter was not  a clear enough indication that she was raising religious discrimination as an issue. She was adverting  to it, but she was not flat out saying it." Dist. Ct. Op. at 75-76. Though we think that the October

1992 letter was sufficiently clear to have alerted Speert that Abramson felt she was being discriminated against, n19 we need not rely on that letter alone in order to find that Abramson fulfilled the first prong. n20 This is be- cause  not  only  did  Cagnina  admit  that  she  understood Abramson's September 22, 1993 letter to her to be an "in- formal" complaint of discrimination, App. at 770, Speert

also acknowledged that the October 12, 1993 letter from Abramson to him complaining of "bias" toward her as an Orthodox Jew was quite clearly a complaint of discrimi- nation, App. at 515.

n18  The  District  Court  actually  stated  "April

1992" letter, but given that no such letter exists in the record, and that during that same discussion it had previously referred to the October 1992 letter, we assume the District Court simply misspoke and intended to say October.

**61

n19  Speert's  statements  in  his  deposition  re- garding this letter are inconsistent. First, he notes that he called Wepner after receiving this letter and asked her "about the references to challenge on the basis of religion," which imply that he realized she was alleging unfair treatment due to her religion. App. at 504. Yet, Speert also says that he did not consider the letter to be a complaint of religious dis- crimination. App. at 507. However, Seminoff did acknowledge in her deposition that she was aware that Abramson felt she was the victim of discrimi- nation during the 1991-92 academic year. App. at

604.

n20 It is unclear from the District Court opinion why it did not consider any of Abramson's com- plaints besides the October 1992 letter.

Under our precedent, the letters Abramson wrote to Cagnina and Speert fall squarely within the requirements of the first prong of a retaliation claim. We have previ- ously  noted   HN25   in  the  ADEA  context  that  "we  do not require a formal letter of complaint to an employer or the EEOC as the only acceptable indicia of the req- uisite 'protected conduct' . . . ."   **62    Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 701-02 (3d Cir. 1995) (cit- ing Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203,

209 (2d Cir. 1990) (explaining that acceptable forms of protected activity under Title VII's analogous

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*288   opposition clause include formal charges of dis- crimination "as well as informal protests of discriminatory employment  practices,  including  making  complaints  to management, writing critical letters to customers, protest- ing against discrimination by industry or society in gen- eral,  and  expressing  support  of  co-workers  who  have filed  formal  charges")).  Similarly,  here,  the  complaints to  WPC,  whether  oral  or  written,  formal  or  informal, are  sufficient  to  satisfy  the  first  prong  of  the  prima  fa- cie case, provided the complaints expressed Abramson's opposition to a protected activity under Title VII. Thus, we hold that the record contains a sufficient showing that Abramson engaged in protected activity.

2) Abramson suffered adverse employment action. With  respect  to  the  second  element --  i.e.,  adverse

employment action,  the District Court only focused on Abramson's claim that Speert treated her differently after she voiced her complaints,   **63   rather than consider- ing the more obvious adverse employment action of her termination. We hold that Abramson's termination clearly fulfills the second prong of the prima facie case for a re- taliation claim. In addition, Seminoff's recommendation not to retain Abramson would also qualify as an adverse employment action sufficient to meet this element.

3) A causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.

Given that the District Court viewed Speert's change in demeanor as the only adverse action, it dismissed the issue of causation out of hand, stating that it "would call for rank speculation on the part of the jury" to ask it to find retaliation. Dist. Ct. Op. at 76. But because the two instances  of  adverse  action  we  examine  are  Seminoff's

recommendation not to retain Abramson and Abramson's ultimate termination, the analysis changes significantly.

Based  on  our  case  law  and  the  evidence  adduced, Abramson has made a sufficient showing of the causal connection required by the third prong of the prima fa- cie case of retaliation. In Farrell, we recognized that our

HN26  case law has focused on two main factors in find- ing the causal link necessary for retaliation: timing **64  and evidence of ongoing antagonism.   206 F.3d at 281; see also Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920-

21 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Temporal proximity . . . is sufficient to establish the causal link . . . . A  plaintiff can also  establish a link between his or her protected behavior and subsequent discharge if the employer engaged in a pattern of antagonism in the intervening period."). Here, it could be argued that the proximity in time between Abramson's last letter to Speert on October 12, 1993, and her being in- formed Speert would not recommend her for retention on October 25, 1993, is not conclusive because her discharge occurred in accordance with her annual review for reten- tion. However, the timing factor is made more convincing by  Cagnina's  admission  that  she  called  Seminoff  after meeting with Abramson in September 1993 and told her that Abramson had "apprised her  that she believed she had been discriminated against." App. at 770. Seminoff wrote a very negative recommendation against Abramson soon after that phone call from Cagnina.

In any event, we need not rely on timing alone because

Abramson has presented additional evidence to prove the

**65   causal nexus. First, she has demonstrated ongo- ing antagonism from her department head and the dean, as we noted in our discussion of the facts above. Further, she introduced

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*289   other types of circumstantial evidence regarding WPC's proffered reasons for terminating her, which we have previously recognized as potentially probative of a causal connection.  Farrell, 206 F.3d at 284 ( HN27  " A  plaintiff may rely upon a broad array of evidence to il- lustrate a causal link ."). For instance, we have noted that a  plaintiff  may  show  that  her  employer  gave  inconsis- tent reasons for terminating her. See Waddell, 799 F.2d at

73 (stating that district court could "appropriately" have taken  inconsistent  explanations  into  account  in  finding causation necessary to satisfy prima facie case). Revealing discrepancies in the proffered reasons can also constitute evidence of the causal link. See Farrell, 206 F.3d at 285-

86 (listing plaintiff's attacks on validity of reasons given). Here, as we found in our discussion of the discrimination claim, Abramson has succeeded in both casting doubt on the  reasons  WPC  proferred  for  her  termination,  and  in demonstrating that those **66   reasons were vague and inconsistent. In light of this evidence, coupled with the

"ongoing antagonism" reflected in the record, including Speert's change in demeanor after Abramson complained of discrimination,  n21 we find that the record contains ample proof of a causal connection. Therefore, Abramson has presented sufficient evidence to meet all three prongs of a prima facie retaliation claim so as to withstand sum- mary judgment, and we will reverse the District Court's ruling on this claim. n22

n21  The  District  Court  did  not  find  this  al- legation persuasive,  instead crediting Speert's ex- planation that the reason he did not interact with Abramson was because it was his practice to avoid having any contact with anyone being considered for tenure. App. at 115. In doing so,  the District Court failed to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Abramson.

n22 Needless to say, our opinion should not be interpreted as expressing any view as to whether Abramson  was in  fact  subjected  to  religious  dis- crimination or retaliation. We hold only that these questions cannot properly be decided at summary

judgment and must be submitted to the trier of fact.

**67

III. Conclusion

As we stated in Farrell,

We recognize that different inferences might be drawn from the evidence presented in the record. HN28  On summary judgment, how- ever,  when  viewing  the  sufficiency  of  the prima  facie  case,  our  role  is  not  to  act  as fact finder. Instead, we must consider the ev- idence  taken  in  the  light  most  favorable  to the non-movant and determine whether the plaintiff  can show the causation required . .

. .

206 F.3d at 286. Here, there is ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could draw inferences establish- ing all three of Abramson's claims. Accordingly, we will REVERSE the District Court's order granting summary judgment in favor of WPC on Abramson's claims of hos- tile work environment, religious discrimination and retal- iation, and REMAND for further proceedings.

CONCURBY: ALITO

CONCUR:

ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I  write  separately  to  add  a  brief  explanation  of  my understanding of the basis for holding that the summary judgment record is sufficient to permit the plaintiff's reli- gious harassment claim to go to trial. Harassment is ac- tionable under Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination only if it is so severe **68   or pervasive that it alters the terms or conditions of the plaintiff's em- ployment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.

775,  786,  141  L.  Ed.  2d  662,  118  S.  Ct.  2275  (1998); Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 706 A.2d 685, 688-89

(N.J. 1998). Offensive comments and

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*290  actions that do not rise to this level are insufficient. Id.  This  is  an  exacting  standard,  and  William  Paterson College  argues  that  the  evidence  in  this  case  does  not meet  it.  The  College  relies  on  Heitzman  v.  Monmouth County, 321 N.J. Super. 133, 728 A.2d 297 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), in which certain anti-Semitic remarks were held not to have altered the conditions of employ- ment, and the College maintains that "Abramson has not demonstrated  conduct  beyond  'the  ordinary  tribulations of the workplace' which is so extreme as to amount to a  change  in  the  terms  and  conditions  of  employment." Appellee's Br. at 40 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788). The  Court  responds  to  the  College's  argument  by  say- ing that "the conduct in the instant case could be said to go beyond 'simple teasing, offhand comments, and non- serious   isolated  incidents.'  "  Maj.  Op.  at  23  (quoting

**69   Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788) (brackets in majority opinion) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted in majority opinion). I agree with the Court's statement, but I think that it is necessary to explain why the conduct alleged in this case "could be said to go beyond . . . ."

The reason is that a reasonable trier of fact could infer that  officials  of  the  College  intentionally  pressured  the plaintiff to violate the dictates of her faith in order to keep her job. As the brief of an amicus curiae observes:

When an employer deliberately reschedules important  meetings  for  Friday  afternoons, the message to an Orthodox Jewish employee is clear as a bell. Such rescheduling tells the employee  that  continued  observance  of  his or her faith will be viewed as incompatible with adequate job performance. Repeated re-

quests  that  work  be  done  on  Saturdays  or Jewish  holidays  --  or  telephone  messages left on a Jewish religious holiday demand- ing an 'immediate' response -- are aimed di- rectly at an employee's religious observance. Criticism of an employee's effort to recon- cile his or her schedule with the observance of Jewish holidays delivers the message that the religious observer **70   is not welcome at the place of employment. n1

n1  Brief  for  Amicus  Curiae  National  Jewish

Commission on Law and Public Affairs, at 4. Intentionally pressuring a person to choose between faith and career is more "severe" and has a more direct effect on the conditions of employment than the sort of offensive remarks at issue in Heitzman. While case law provides  only  limited  protection  for  employees  whose religious  obligations  conflict  with  neutral  job  require- ments, see Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of  Oregon  v.  Smith,  494  U.S.  872,  108  L.  Ed.  2d  876,

110  S.  Ct.  1595  (1990);  Trans  World  Airlines,  Inc.  v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 53 L. Ed. 2d 113, 97 S. Ct. 2264

(1977),  Title  VII  does  not  permit  an  employer  to  ma- nipulate job requirements for the purpose of putting an employee to the "cruel choice" between religion and em- ployment.  Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616, 6 L. Ed. 2d 563, 81 S. Ct. 1144 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting). It is for this reason, in **71   my view, that the summary judgment record is sufficient to support the plaintiff's re- ligious harassment claim.

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