Title Gade v. Csomos
Date 1993
By Alito
Subject Misc
Contents
Page 1
LEXSEE 8 F3D 137
DONNA K. GADE; ELIZABETH W. GADE v. ISTVAN (STEVEN) J. CSOMOS; ABELOFF PONTIAC, INC.; GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION DONNA K. GADE, Appellant
No. 93-7101
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
8 F.3d 137; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 25563
August 30, 1993, Argued
October 6, 1993, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: **1 ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA. (D.C. Civil No. 91-00403).
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff automobile pas- sengers appealed from the decision of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which rendered summary judgment in favor of defendant lessors in the automobile passenger's action against the lessors and defendant lessee to recover damages for in- juries sustained in a collision with an automobile driven by the lessee.
OVERVIEW: The automobile passengers filed a com- plaint against the lessors and lessee, which sought dam- ages incurred as the result of a collision with an auto- mobile driven by the lessee. The district court rendered summary judgment in favor of the automobile passengers as against the lessee, but granted summary judgment to the lessors on the issue of their liability under 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1574. They did not know, or have reason to know, that the lessee's license had been revoked. On appeal, the court affirmed and held that civil liability under § 1574 required proof of some degree of culpability on the part of the lessors with respect to the question whether the lessee had a valid license. State case law construing the predecessors to § 1574 did not impose civil liability on the owner of a vehicle for injuries caused by a driver to whom the owner had entrusted his car unless the owner knew, or had reason to know, that the entrustee did not have the legal right to drive the car. Because the general assembly did not significantly alter the language of § 1574 from that of the predecessor statutes, the court concluded that the general assembly intended the same construction to apply.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the lessors. The lessors' civil liability required proof of some degree of culpability on the part of the lessors with respect to the question whether the lessee had a valid driver's license. Because there was no such proof, the lessors could not be held liable for injuries suf- fered by the automobile passengers in a collision with the leased vehicle driven by the lessee.
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes
Torts > Negligence > Duty > Control of Third Parties
HN1 See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1574.
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
HN2 Under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 302(c), when a statute does not prescribe the culpability needed for conviction of a particular offense, a minimum of recklessness is generally required. However, under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 305(a)(1), this general rule does not apply to summary offenses, unless the requirement involved is included in the definition of the offense or the court determines that its application is consistent with effective enforcement of the law defining the offense.
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
HN3 Under 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1922(4), when a court of last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the general assembly in subsequent statutes on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
HN4 Where the legislature, in a later statute, uses the same language as used in a prior statute which has been construed by the courts, there is a presumption that the language thus repeated is to be interpreted in the same manner such language had been previously interpreted when the court passed on the earlier statute.
8 F.3d 137, *; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 25563, **1
Page 2
COUNSEL: GERARD J. GEIGER, ESQ. (Argued), Newman, Williams, Mishkin, Corveleyn, Wolfe & Fareri,
712 Monroe Street, Stroudsburg, PA 18360, Attorney for
Appellee.
Abeloff Pontiac, Inc. JOHN B. DAY, ESQ. (Argued), DAVID L. ROHDE, ESQ. The Curtis Center - Suite
620, 7th and Walnut Streets, Philadelphia, PA 19106, Attorneys for Appellee.
General Motors Acceptance Corp. JAMES V. PYRAH, III, ESQ. (Argued), JOSEPH A. QUINN, JR. ESQ. HOURIGAN, KLUGER, SPOHRER, & QUINN, P.C.
700 Mellon Bank Center, 8 West Market Street, Wilkes- Barre, PA 18701-1867, Attorneys for Appellant.
Donna K. Gade, MARGUERITE C. GUALTIERI, ESQ. CHERRY, FERRARA, MUTZEL, BELEFONTE,, McFADDEN & WESNER, 220 North Jackson Street, Post Office Box 1670, Media, PA 19063, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association.
JUDGES: Before: BECKER, NYGAARD, and ALITO, Circuit Judges.
OPINIONBY: ALITO
OPINION: *138 OPINION OF THE COURT
ALITO, Circuit Judge:
Donna K. Gade and her mother filed a three-count complaint in federal court based on diversity of citi- zenship, seeking to recover damages resulting from an automobile accident with **2 a vehicle operated by defendant Istvan (Steven) J. Csomos. The complaint al- leged that Csomos was careless, negligent, and reckless. The complaint also alleged that Abeloff Pontiac, Inc. and General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) had leased Csomos the vehicle he was driving, and that they had retained ownership interests in the vehicle. Count I as- serted a claim against Csomos. Count II asserted a claim against Abeloff and GMAC under 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
1574. Count III asserted a claim against the same two defendants for negligent entrustment.
The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on count I, but the court granted summary judg- ment for the defendants on counts II and III. With respect to count II, the court held that Abeloff and GMAC were not liable under 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1574 because they neither knew, nor had reason to know, that Csomos's li- cense had been suspended. n1 With respect to count III, the court held that the summary judgment record could not support a finding of negligent entrustment on the part of
Abeloff or GMAC. Donna K. Gade then took this appeal, contesting the district court's decision on count II.
n1 The district court noted that Abeloff had asked for and received Csomos's driver's license number, that Abeloff had verified Csomos's insur- ance coverage, and that all of this information had been passed on to GMAC. The appellant has not ar- gued on appeal that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether Abeloff knew or should have known that Csomos's license had been suspended, and our opinion should not be interpreted as expressing any view on this question.
**3
The statute upon which count II was based, HN1 75
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1574, states the following:
(a) General Rule. - No person shall authorize or permit a motor vehicle owned by him or under his control to be driven upon any high- way by any person who is not authorized under this chapter or who is not licensed for the type or class of vehicle to be driven.
(b) Penalty. - Any person violating the provi- sions of subsection (a) is guilty of a summary offense and shall be jointly and severally li- able with the driver for any damages caused by the negligence of such driver in operating the vehicle.
As we noted earlier, the district court held that a vehicle owner cannot be subject to civil liability under subsection
(b) unless the owner knew, or had reason to know, that the person whom the owner authorized or permitted to use the vehicle did not hold a valid license. By contrast, the appel- lant contends that civil liability under subsection (b) does not require proof of knowledge, reason to know, or any other level of culpability. n2 Since this is a diversity case, our role is to attempt to predict how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would decide this question of statutory
**4 interpretation. While acknowledging that the ques- tion is a close one, we predict that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would hold that civil liability under subsec- tion (b) requires proof of some degree of culpability on the part of the vehicle owner with respect to the question whether the person whom the owner allows to use the vehicle possesses a valid license.
n2 We use the term "culpability" in the same sense as 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 302(b) to mean mens rea or intent.
8 F.3d 137, *138; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 25563, **4
Page 3
Subsection (a) of the statute sets out a "general rule,"
and subsection (b) provides that any one who violates this
"general rule" is subject to two consequences: conviction for a summary offense and civil liability for damages caused by the negligence of the driver. Thus, one obvi- ous feature of the statute is that the elements needed for conviction of the summary offense are the same as those needed for the imposition of civil liability. We therefore turn to the question whether knowledge, reason to know, or any other type of culpability is needed **5 for the summary offense.
HN2 Under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 302(c), when a statute does not prescribe the culpability needed for con- viction of a particular offense, *139 a minimum of recklessness is generally required. However, under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 305(a)(1), this general rule does not apply to "summary offenses, unless the requirement involved is included in the definition of the offense or the court
**7
n3 The full text of § 622 was as follows: No person shall authorize or permit a motor vehicle owned by him, or un- der his control, to be operated by any person who has no legal right to do so, or in violation of any of the provisions
of this act.
Penalty - Any person violating any of the provisions of this section, shall, upon summary conviction before a magistrate, be sentenced to pay a fine of twenty-five ($ 25) dollars and costs of prosecution, and, in default of the payment thereof, shall undergo im- prisonment for not more than ten (10) days.
determines that its application is consistent with effective enforcement of the law defining the offense." Since the statute at issue in this case, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1574, does not expressly prescribe a culpability requirement for the summary offense it creates, it follows under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 305(a)(1) that such a requirement would be recognized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court only if that court concluded that such a requirement was "con- sistent with the effective enforcement of the law defining the offense."
With respect to this question, two decisions interpret- ing the statutory predecessors of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1574 provide the most helpful guidance. At the time of the first of these decisions, Moyer Automobile License Case, 359
Pa. 536, 59 A.2d 927 (1948), **6 the relevant statutory provision was Section 622 of Art. VI of the Vehicle Code of May 1, 1929. Using language notably similar to that now contained in 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1574, this provision made it unlawful for any person to "authorize or permit a motor vehicle owned by him, or under his control, to be operated by any person who has no legal right to do so." n3 The Secretary of Revenue had suspended Moyer's driver's license for violating this provision by permitting his vehicle to be operated by a driver whose license had been revoked. The Court of Common Pleas revoked the suspension, finding that Moyer "had no knowledge or reason to believe that the license . . . had been revoked."
359 Pa. at 538, 59 A.2d at 927. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. In a brief opinion, the court noted that the decision of the lower court could be reversed only for abuse of discretion, that the lower court's finding was
"amply" supported by the record, and that there had been
"no error of law." Id.
One reasonable interpretation -- and perhaps the best interpretation -- of Moyer is that knowledge or reason to know was needed under Section 622 of the Vehicle Code. As the appellant suggests, however, it is possible to read Moyer more narrowly. Specifically, it is possible that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that even though
(or even if) Moyer had violated Section 622 and was sub- ject to the penalty prescribed therein, the additional sanc- tion of suspending his license was inappropriate because he lacked knowledge or reason to know.
While this latter interpretation is not ruled out by the Moyer opinion, the Commw. Court did not adopt it in Jenks v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. Commw. 546, 296 A.2d
526 (1972). There, Jenks' license had been suspended for violating Section 626 of the Motor Vehicle Code, Act of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, which contained the same essen- tial wording as the provision involved in Moyer. n4 On appeal, the Commonwealth Court interpreted Moyer to mean that "knowledge plays some role in a § 626 case."
6 Pa. Commw. at 549, 296 A.2d at 528. The court went
**8 on to hold that in such a case lack of knowledge or reason to know was an affirmative defense with respect to which the motor vehicle operator had the burden of proof.
296 A.2d at 550-51, 296 A.2d at 529.
n4 Section 626 stated the following:
No person shall authorize or per- mit a motor vehicle or tractor owned by him or under his control to be op- erated by any person who has no legal right to do so, or in violation of any of the provisions of this act.
8 F.3d 137, *139; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 25563, **8
Page 4
Penalty - Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall, upon summary conviction before a magistrate, be sentenced to pay a fine of twenty-five dollars ($ 25.00) and costs of prosecution, and, in default of the payment thereof, shall undergo im- prisonment for not more than ten (10) days.
In light of Moyer and Jenks, we predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold that the sum- mary offense and the civil *140 liability created by 75
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1574 includes a culpability requirement.
HN3 **9 Under 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1922(4), "when a court of last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the General Assembly in subsequent statutes on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language." Thus, if Moyer meant that knowledge or reason to know was needed under the pre- decessor of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1574, we must presume that the Pennsylvania legislature intended 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1574 to include a similar requirement.
Admittedly, the presumption contained in 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 922(4) does not apply to Jenks because the statute does not cover decisions of the lower courts. However, Pennsylvania case law appears to recognize a broader rule of construction that does apply to lower court decisions. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated, HN4
"where the legislature, in a later statute, uses the same language as used in a prior statute which has been con- strued by the courts, there is a presumption that the lan- guage thus repeated is to be interpreted in the same man- ner such language had been previously interpreted when the court passed on the earlier statute. Commonwealth v. Sitkin's Junk Co., 412 Pa. 132, 137-38, 194 A.2d 199,
202 (1963). **10 See also Jones and Laughlin Tax
Assessment Case, 405 Pa. 421, 432-33, 175 A.2d 856,
862 (1961); Commonwealth v. Crum, 362 Pa. Super. 110,
114, 523 A.2d 799, 801 ( 1987); Commonwealth v. Miller,
469 Pa. 24, 27-28, 364 A.2d 886, 887 (1976). n5
n5 The appellant's argument is not supported by the decisions in Commonwealth v. Hickey, 136 Pa. Commw. 223, 582 A.2d 734 (1990), and Burkholder v. Scanlon, 80 Del. County Rep. 1 (1993), appeal docketed, No. 01925PHL93 (Pa. Super. 1993). In Hickey, the majority did not decide whether civil liability under 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1574 required culpability. Instead, the majority relied on other grounds in holding that there was no civil liability. Only the concurring judge addressed the question of culpability, and he held that knowledge or rea-
son to know was necessary. 136 Pa. Commw. at
231-32, 582 A.2d at 738 (Doyle, J., concurring). In Burkholder, the court quoted Jenks' holding with apparent approval. 80 Del. County Rep. at 4. While the court held that the company that owned the mo- tor vehicle was civilly liable, the court noted that the company had "made no effort to assure itself that the operator was a licensed driver." Id.
The appellant's position is supported by
Dickerson v. Maione, 73 Westmoreland L.J. 135, 13
Pa. D. & C.4th 195 (1991), but we do not think the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would follow this de- cision. The Dickerson court concluded that knowl- edge is needed for conviction for the summary of- fense but not for civil liability, id. at 136, 13 Pa. D.
& C.4th at 196-97, and as we have explained we do not believe that this interpretation can be reconciled with the structure of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1574.
**11
The appellant contends that an amendment made when 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1574(a) was under consid- eration by the legislature shows that neither knowledge nor reason to know was meant to be an element of the statute. The appellant points out that an earlier version of this provision read as follows:
(a) General rule -- No person shall authorize or knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned by him or under his control to be driven in violation of any of the provisions of this title.
H. Bill 1817, 1975 Sess. (as referred to the Committee on Transportation, Oct. 1, 1975) (emphasis added). The ap- pellant then notes that the word "knowingly" was stricken prior to enactment. This history, however, at most sug- gests that the legislature did not want to require actual knowledge, which was more than was demanded under the existing statute as construed by Jenks. The striking of "knowingly" does not show that the legislature did not want to continue to require at least reason to know or some other lesser degree of culpability.
In conclusion, we predict that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would hold that civil liability under 75
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1574 requires proof of some degree of
**12 culpability on the part of the owner. n6 Since the district court granted summary judgment for Abeloff and GMAC on the question of negligence, and since the appel- lant has not challenged that aspect of the district court's decision on appeal, it follows that Abeloff and GMAC
*141 bore no degree of culpability. n7 Accordingly, the district's decision to grant summary judgment to the
8 F.3d 137, *141; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 25563, **12
Page 5
defendants on count II must be affirmed.
n6 It is not necessary for us to predict whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would require knowledge or reason to know (the terminology em- ployed in Moyer and Jenks), or whether it would require one of the degrees of culpability set out in
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 302(b). For present purposes
it is enough for us to predict that some type of culpability requirement would be recognized.
n7 Because we affirm on this ground, we need not reach the alternative bases for affirmance ad- vanced by the appellees.
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