Chapter Appendix E - Endnotes
Section Chapter Five: Lessons Learned
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Chapter Five: Lessons Learned
1 The White House, “President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation,” news release, September 15, 2005, .
2 The critical challenges described here include and go beyond those identified in other evaluations of the national response to Hurricane Katrina. See, for example, David M. Walker, Comptroller General, Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, prepared for the U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-365R, (Washington, D.C., February 1, 2006).
3 Though State and local preparedness is critical to the success of overall National preparedness and response efforts, this Report is not intended to assess State and local efforts.
4 Melvin “Kip” Holden, Mayor-President of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, written statement for a hearing on Recovering from Hurricane Katrina: Responding to the Immediate Needs of Its Victims, on September 28, 2005, submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 1st session.
5 The DHS Secretary designates a Principal Federal Official (PFO). See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 71. The Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) “is appointed to manage Federal resource support activities … and is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of Federal disaster assistance resources and programs to the affected State and local governments, individual victims, and the private sector.” Whereas the PFO derives from HSPD-5 and the NRP, the FCO position was created by the Stafford Act (Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act “Stafford Act” , as amended by Public Law 106-390, October 30, 2000). U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 65.
6 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #20,” September 5, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #23,” September 6, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Daily Conference Call on Hurricane Katrina,” September 7, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #27,” September 8, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Region VI Regional Response Coordinating Center SitRep #15,” September 9, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #32—Hurricane Katrina,” September 12, 2005, 2, 3; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Emergency Response Issues,” September 11, 2005, 10; Robert B. Stephan, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement for a hearing on “Hurricane Katrina: The Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership,” on February 10, 2006, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session, 7-8.
7 Federal officials recognized the need for a presence in New Orleans to effectively coordinate the efforts to stabilize the City, so a “forward PFO” in New Orleans was eventually established. The JFO remained in Baton Rouge. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #23,” September 7, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Executive Briefing,” slide presentation, September 17, 2005, 6 am.
8 Only eight months had elapsed between the unveiling of the NRP and its implementation for the worst natural disaster in U.S. history. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, DC: December 2004).
9 The NRP requires all of the supporting Federal Departments and Agencies to modify existing interagency incident management and emergency response plans and protocols to incorporate linkages to and be consistent with NIMS, the NRP and its coordinating mechanisms. The NRP also requires that detailed standard operational procedures be developed for the HSOC, NRCC, IIMG, the JFO and each ESF Annex. These plans are meant to clearly define the functions of each organization and describe how the organization interfaces with the rest of the emergency response effort. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), Letter of Instruction, ix.
10 Starting after the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics, money and resources that were once dedicated to training and exercising the National Emergency Response Teams (ERT-N) have been diverted from the ERT program to other programs. See William Carwile, Federal Coordinating Officer for Mississippi, Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, on December 8, 2005, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. ERT-N deploys for large-scale, high impact events, to coordinate the plans with other Federal agencies within FEMA regions. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 40. ERT-Ns also provide assistance to the smaller ERT deployed by the FEMA regions. The loss of funding has resulted in ERT-N teams that are not fully equipped nor train or exercise together. William Carwile, Federal Coordinating Officer for Mississippi, Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, on December 8, 2005, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Scott Wells, the Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, stated that FEMA lacked “the people, we did not have the expertise; we did not have the operational training folks that we needed to do our missions.” He also stated generally that the staff level in the regional office is “woefully inadequate” to set up a Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) required for a disaster, and staff an ERT to go to the scene of a disaster. Wells describes FEMA staffing in disasters as robbing “Peter to pay Paul.” Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operation Professionals, on December 8, 2005, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session.
11 A DHS request to DOD on September 2 that “DOD provide the support, planning, and execution of the full logistical support to the Katrina disaster in all declared states in coordination with FEMA” was initially denied because the request did not come from the Secretary of DHS to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of DHS immediately resubmitted the request to the Secretary of Defense which was then granted. Ultimately, DOD (OSD & Joint Staff) worked with the FEMA Response Division to meet this requirement. The Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) worked throughout the weekend of September 3-5 to meet this Mission Assignment. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Mission Assignment, Program Code/Event #: 1604DR-MS: HURRICANE KATRINA, Action Request #:1509-32760,” September 3, 2005; U.S. Department of Defense, “Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline (August – September 2005),” November 2, 2005, 1, 8, 10-11; and “Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, October 27, 2005, hearing before the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session (Congressman Tom Davis, quoting from Ken Burris, email to Mathew Broderick et al., Subject: request, September 2, 2005.)
12 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), p. 41. According to the NRP, the Local Chief Executive Officer “Requests State and, if necessary, Federal assistance through the Governor of the State when the jurisdiction’s capabilities have been exceeded or exhausted” and the Governor “Requests Federal assistance when it becomes clear that State or tribal capabilities will be insufficient or have been exceeded or exhausted.” According to the Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, “The initial actions . . . are conducted by local government. Local authorities will exhaust their resources, and then use mutual aid agreements with volunteer groups, the private sector and/or neighboring parishes.” The plan also states that “State assistance will supplement local efforts and Federal assistance will supplement State and local efforts when it is clearly demonstrated that it is beyond local and State capability to cope with the emergency/disaster.” Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan (Baton Rouge, April 2005).
13 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, “Incident Command Request Briefing,” November 1, 2005. However, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld verbally approved some requests. See also Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Defense Department’s Role in the Response, on February 9, 2006, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session.
14 Melvin “Kip” Holden, Mayor-President of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, noted that requirements for paperwork and form completions hindered immediate action and deployment of people and material to assist in rescue and recovery efforts. Melvin “Kip” Holden, written statement submitted for a hearing on Recovering from Hurricane Katrina: Responding to the Immediate Needs of Its Victims, on September 28, 2005, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 1st session.
15 As noted in U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau (NGB J7), After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 2005 (December 21, 2005), 146, 168.
16 U.S. Department of Defense, Hurricane Katrina Initial Observations and Lessons Learned (n.d., ca. 2005). These deployments occurred under the EMAC system.
17 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau (NGB J7), After Action Review: Hurricane Katrina Response September 2005 (December 21, 2005).
18 If chartered as a joint DOD activity, the NGB would become a member of the Joint Staff, rather than only having a reporting relationship with the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force. Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, “A Vision for the National Guard,” Joint Forces Quarterly, issue 36 (December 2004), 24-29.
19 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau (NGB J5), Draft Baseline Capabilities for Joint Task Force-State (JTF-State), n.d., ca. 2005. The National Guard Bureau can provide overarching situational awareness and an integrated common, relevant operating picture regarding the employment of Army and Air Guard troops in each of the 54 States, Territories and the District of Columbia. This demonstrates the essential role of the National Guard Bureau as the channel of communications between the several States and the combatant commanders, the Joint Staff and the Departments of Defense, Army and Air Force. Given the current national security environment, the necessity to continue providing this kind of data will continue to grow. Capabilities include Joint Force Joint Operations Centers (JF JOC). This is a network composed of the NGB Joint Operations Center and a Joint Operations Center in each of the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia. Each JF JOC has redundant communications connectivity to include: DOD unclassified (NIPR) and classified (SIPR) computer networks; a High Frequency network with high and low-side voice and data information; and commercial systems. The network provides DOD and interagency connectivity and situational awareness to deliberate planning and to emerging and on-going contingency operations in any State or Territory. The National Guard has successfully established a Joint CONUS Communications Support Environment (JCCSE) nationwide. Each JFHQ has established Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) linkages. The HSIN is an unsecured collection of Department of Homeland Security systems designed to facilitate information sharing and collaboration.
20 Colonel F. G. Dowden, Regional Liaison, New Orleans Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, on February 6, 2006, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session.
21 Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, written statement for a hearing on Public Safety Communications from 9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons, submitted to Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, on September 29, 2005, 109th Congress, 1st session.
22 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, “Hurricane Katrina Situation Report #20,” September 4, 2005.
23 Communications “operability” refers to whether a basic communications network is functioning at all. Operability will fail when the underlying infrastructure is destroyed or otherwise fails (e.g. through loss of power).
24 Communications “interoperability” refers to the ability to communicate across different, operable communication systems.
25 Congressman Bill Pascrell, Jr., hearing on Government Operability during Catastrophic Events, on October 26, 2005, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, 109th Congress, 1st session.
26 For example, FEMA had pre-positioned two of their five Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments in the Gulf and quickly moved them to the affected areas in Louisiana and Mississippi soon after landfall, but additional MERS support should have been deployed to the Gulf when it became apparent that those pre-positioned were insufficient for an incident of Katrina’s magnitude. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA National Situation Report,” August 29, 2005, 3; and Michael Brown, former Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, on September 27, 2005, to House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.
27 Mark Rey, Under Secretary for Natural Resources and Environment, U.S Department of Agriculture, testimony before a hearing on Ensuring Operability during Catastrophic Events, on October 26, 2005, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, 109th Congress, 1st session.
28 Dr. David G. Boyd, Director of the Office for Interoperability and Compatibility, Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on Ensuring Operability during Catastrophic Events, on October 26, 2005, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, 109th Congress, 1st session. As a first step, as required by the Fiscal Year 2005 and 2006 homeland security grant guidance, States and urban areas are to develop Tactical Interoperable Communication Plans to address means of improving communications operability and interoperability. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2006 Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance: Program Guidance and Application Kit (Washington, D.C., December 2005). Although not an issue during Hurricane Katrina, first responders still require more radio spectrum to effectively communicate during their missions. Public Law 109-171, enacted recently, provides first responders with more radio spectrum in the 700 megahertz band, starting April 7, 2009. The bill calls for auctioning off some of the radio spectrum relinquished by broadcasters. Some of that revenue would pay for upgrades to first responders’ equipment. This transition for the 700 megahertz radio spectrum is considered a critical component in improving communications between police, fire, and other emergency agencies.
29 Dr. David G. Boyd, Director of the Office for Interoperability and Compatibility, Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on Ensuring Operability during Catastrophic Events, on October 26, 2005, to House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, House Homeland Security Committee, 109th Congress, 1st session.
30 Private sector companies manage sophisticated supply and delivery chains using the most efficient means available to handle goods as few times as possible between the supplier and the customer.
31 Vincent Pearce, National Response Program Manager for the Department of Transportation, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session.
32 For example, a contractor arrived at an evacuation staging site at Zephyr Field stadium in New Orleans with 37,500 meals, as requested, only to discover that the evacuees had already left.
33 FEMA US&R Task Forces, in conjunction with USCG, DOD, other federal agencies, and State and local first responders, rescued over 6,500 people. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Urban Search and Rescue Operations Completed: Hurricane Katrina Urban Search and Rescue Teams Are Due to Return Home,” news release, September 30, 2005, .
34 Donna Miles, “Military Providing Full-Scale Response to Hurricane Relief Effort,”American Forces Press Service, August 31, 2005, .
35 “Some of the problems we encountered were low visibility at night, a lot of downed power lines, a lot of underwater obstructions, vehicles that were underwater, debris that was everywhere, and large numbers of people shouting for help from the house.” Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, “Department Timelines Chronology 3,” Activity Report on Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, 2005), 2.
36 East Baton Rouge Parish, Draft After-Action Report for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Baton Rouge, 2005), 38.
37 Scott Wells, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals, on December 8, 2005, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session.
38 Massachusetts Urban Search and Rescue Task Force-1, Hurricane Katrina After-Action Report: August 30, 2005 through September 8, 2005 (Beverly, MA, 2005), 6.
39 East Baton Rouge Parish, Draft After-Action Report for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Baton Rouge, 2005), 38.
40 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Baton Rouge, December 2005), 11. See also Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, to the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 68. Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, “Department Timelines Chronology 3,” Activity Report on Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, 2005), 7. ; Newsweek, “The Lost City”, September 12, 2005.
41 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 8, 43; and National Response Plan ESF #13 Annex, pg. 13-1.
42 On August 31, most of the New Orleans police force was redirected from search and rescue missions to respond to the looting, detracting from the priority mission of saving lives. Homeland Security Operations Center Spot Report #33, 31 Aug 05, 1123 hrs. (recording that “on August 31, CEO Akerman of Bell South contacted a DHS official and requests immediate security assistance, relating that the Bell South Main Central Office was being overrun by mob during attempted evacuation of site and that its employees may be in physical danger”); U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #15,” September 2, 2005 (reporting that security concerns were prohibiting all operations in many grain industry facilities); U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #18,” September 4, 2005 (reporting that fuel and security for deliveries are a concern); U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #19,” September 4, 2005 (reporting that security remained a major concern for agriculture, food processing, distribution, services, and retail; access to service and retail facilities for re-stocking remains restricted in many areas; security for all infrastructures remained a major concern, with employers reluctant to restart businesses; safety of their employees is a priority); U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #29,” September 9, 2005 (reporting that security remained the top priority for the industry; contract security and other security sources were being coordinated with other Emergency Support Functions).
Both the Department of the Interior and the Department of Commerce reported that their organic law enforcement assets were available for use in the Gulf Coast region and attempted to lend their assistance by contacting the Interagency Incident Management Group in Washington, D.C., but received no response. The Department of the Interior has 4,400 law enforcement officers—including hundreds of officers immediately deployable in the Gulf Coast area—trained to work in harsh environments, conduct search and rescue, emergency medical services, and evacuation, yet these assets were not called upon to assist under the NRP until late September, when DOI contacted the LECC in New Orleans. The Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Office of Law Enforcement (OLE) also attempted to lend its law enforcement assistance to the Federal response effort, but received no response through the ESF-13 process.
43 For example, the Department of Interior law enforcement personnel had to be sworn in as Deputy U.S. Marshals to give them Federal law enforcement authority beyond their statutory DOI jurisdiction.
44 While some law enforcement officers provided by States under the EMAC readily accepted direction from Louisiana and Federal law enforcement officials, others operated in New Orleans with little coordination or supervision.
45 According to the U.S. Marshals Service, this was “a critical issue” in both New Orleans and Southern Mississippi. The Marshals Service and the DOJ Office of Legal Policy have offered recommendations for more comprehensive monitoring of persons under law enforcement supervision. For additional information on the disarray of the New Orleans criminal justice system in Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath, see Melinda Deslatte, “Prisons in New Orleans empty as temporary booking facility up and running,” Associated Press, September 3, 2005; Ann Woolner, “A Legal System in Chaos: New Orleans Struggles,” Fulton County Daily Report, October 4, 2005; and Chuck Crumbo, “Evacuation leaves Louisiana prison system in chaos,” The State (Columbia, SC), October 5, 2005.
46 On September 3, the Associated Press reported that “computer logs still hadn’t been retrieved from the criminal district court in New Orleans… and tracking down witnesses, finding court records and trial transcripts and organizing a temporary court” would remain challenges to the reestablishment of the city’s criminal justice system. Melinda Deslatte, “Prisons in New Orleans empty as temporary booking facility up and running,” Associated Press, September 3, 2005; Ann Woolner, “A Legal System in Chaos: New Orleans Struggles,” Fulton County Daily Report, October 4, 2005; and Chuck Crumbo, “Evacuation leaves Louisiana prison system in chaos,” The State (Columbia, SC), October 5, 2005.
47 Both State and Federal courts closed their doors. Supreme Court of Louisiana, Order by Justice Catherine D. Kimball, September 2, 2005, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Supreme Court of Mississippi, Order by Justice James W. Smith, Jr., September 7, 2005; U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Order by Chief Judge Helen G. Berrigan, September 4, 2005, accessed from on February 17, 2006; U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, September 2, 2005, accessed from http://katrinalaw.org/dokuphp?id=louisiana_eastern_bankruptcy_court on February 17, 2006; Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, State of Louisiana, Order by Justice Max N. Tobias, Jr., September 2, 2005, accessed from http://katrinalaw.org/dokuphp?id=fourth_circuit_court_of_appeal on February 17, 2006; Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, State of Louisiana, Order by Justice Walter J. Rothschild, September 2, 2005, accessed from: , accessed on February 17, 2006; Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, Order by Chief Justice Robin M. Giarrusso, September 2, 2005, accessed from , accessed on February 17, 2006.
48 The DOJ’s Bureau of Prisons moved, or facilitated movement of, a large number of prisoners incarcerated in Louisiana facilities during the first week of the disaster. Though there were no major difficulties or issues encountered during the actual transport of the prisoners, there were flaws in the decision making process and a general failure on the part of State and local prison authorities to be proactive in evacuating their incarcerated populations.
49 United Health Foundation, America's Health Rankings--2005 Edition (St. Paul, MN: Arundel Street Consulting, Inc., 2005), (accessed January 25, 2006), 13
50 “The public health and health care delivery infrastructures have been either completely destroyed or have sustained significant damage across the affected Gulf Coast. Existing facilities that are operational are under extreme stress as they assume even greater responsibilities to fill the gaps created by the loss of so many facilities. Physician offices, cancer, imaging, dialysis and rehabilitation centers, hospitals, clinics, long-term care facilities, pharmacies, laboratories, etc., need to be rebuilt or repaired, not to mention re-supplied, with information technology systems, equipment and inventory.” Dr. Ardis D. Hoven, Member of the American Medical Association Board of Trustees, written statement for a hearing on Assessing Public Health and the Delivery of Care in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, on September 22, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittees on Health and Oversight and Investigations, 109th Congress, 1st session.
51 Sarah A. Lister, Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL33096, (Washington, D.C., September 21, 2005), Summary, CRS 1, CRS 6-7, CRS 11.
52 “Our situations are urgent. Unless we find financial relief within the next seven to ten days, we will be forced to make some very tough decisions. We are committed to our patients, our hospital staff and our community. However, we can’t continue to care for our patients and community – many of whom hopefully will return soon from the evacuation – unless we have immediate financial assistance. … The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services already has eased some of its regulations governing Medicare and Medicaid. There are, however, additional measures that can be taken. The AHA suggests immediate federal coverage for the uninsured people affected by the hurricane. So that access can be granted as quickly as possible, additional relief from Medicare and Medicaid red tape is needed. … The AHA also asks that FEMA funds be available for all types of community hospitals affected by the storm.” Dr. Mark Peters, President & CEO, East Jefferson Memorial Hospital, Metairie, Louisiana, on behalf of the American Hospital Association, written statement for a hearing on Assessing Public Health and the Delivery of Care in the Wake of Katrina, on September 22, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittees on Health and Oversight and Investigations, 109th Congress, 1st session.
53 In several instances, HHS had pre-positioned medical, public health and pharmaceutical assets in Louisiana and had them ready to deploy where needed as soon as they received a go-ahead from State decision-makers. In some cases, security and logistics may have been issues, but delays in ‘on the ground’ decision-making by local and State officials resulted in delays in the delivery of assets and services when and where they were needed.
54 One key example: “Dr. Laurence Grummer-Strawn, a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention researcher and an HHS Public Health Service member, was deployed to central Louisiana with a team of 125 medical personnel to construct a temporary 1,000-bed hospital. The plan, Grummer-Strawn understood, was for that facility to treat ‘overflow patients’ transferred from hospitals in the southern part of the state. Arriving Saturday, Sept. 3, six days after Katrina hit, his team spent two days setting up the hospital before they were told they weren't needed there. The team left Alexandria, La., Wednesday - it took a day to pack up the beds and equipment - and fanned out to conduct needs assessments at shelters across the state.” Justin Rood, “Medical Catastrophe,” Government Executive Magazine, November 1, 2005, .
55 “Almost 34,000 volunteer health professionals registered through HHS’s toll-free telephone number or through the website established for this purpose. Of these, only 1,400 were deployed, based on the tasking requirements from FEMA. By the end of the first week following Katrina’s landfall, it became clear that the majority of the volunteers would not be urgently needed in the Gulf Coast. Though HHS announced this fact, this message did not reach many volunteers, who expressed frustration that their services were not being accepted or efficiently utilized. M any well-intentioned clinicians and health care organizations simply self-deployed and traveled to Louisiana, where their arrival compounded the overall disorganization of the effort to provide health care … Lacking an assigned role within a properly planned framework, many found themselves sitting on their hands, doing nothing for which they had been trained.” Hilarie H. Cranmer, “Hurricane Katrina: Volunteer Work – Logistics First,” New England Journal of Medicine 353(15), no. (October 13, 2005).
56 Irwin Redlener, Dennis Johnson, David A. Berman and Roy Grant, “Follow-Up 2005: Where the American Public Stands on Terrorism and Preparedness after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,” (accessed January 25, 2006).
57 Sarah A. Lister, Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response, Congressional Research Service for Congress RL33096, (Washington, D.C., September 21, 2005), 22.
58 As of September 11, 2005, 14 days after Katrina made landfall, FEMA had received 699,207 Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi household registrations for assistance under the Individuals and Households Program (IHP); 393,294 had been approved for assistance; 366,370 households had been funded; and $818,939,600 in assistance had been released. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #35,” September 12, 2005, 11. By late September, “an estimated more than 20 percent of all those affected by the storms and who have filed for FEMA assistance are now receiving HHS benefits and services. Furthermore, 41 percent of the 857,000 evacuees living in a different zip code from the damaged areas are receiving help from HHS.” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Estimates Show More Than 40 Percent of Hurricane Evacuees Now Receiving HHS Benefits or Services,” news release, September 29, 2005.
59 Examples include: health insurance for elderly and disabled Americans (Medicare) and health insurance for low-income people (Medicaid); financial assistance for low-income families; pre-school education and services (Head Start); Social Security benefits; veterans benefits; and unemployment benefits.
60 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), ESF #6-1.
61 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), ESF #6-5. “Mass care” includes overall coordination of the shelter, feeding and other activities to support the emergency needs of victims.
62 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), ESF #6-3. “Human services” refer to the provision of resources, the processing of new Federal benefit claims, compensation claims and other supportive services.
63 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), ESF #6-2.
64 Based on the locations reported by those who applied for FEMA assistance as a result of the impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Reported Locations of Katrina/Rita Applicants,” January 20, 2006, (accessed January 25, 2006).
65 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response, on February 15, 2006, submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session.
Governor Kathleen Blanco estimates that 8 percent of the New Orleans population stayed behind. Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the U.S. House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.
Mayor Nagin testified to Congress that “thousands of residents” did not leave, even after he issued the mandatory evacuation order. Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.
66 Ronald D. Utt, “After Weeks of Confusion, the Right Course for Evacuee Housing Assistance,” WebMemo #866, prepared for The Heritage Foundation, September 28, 2005.
67 “Had HUD staff been more closely involved in FEMA planning, the cost and delay of relearning 50 years of lessons could have been avoided.” Ronald D. Utt, “After Weeks of Confusion, the Right Course for Evacuee Housing Assistance,” WebMemo #866, prepared for The Heritage Foundation, September 28, 2005. HUD played a key role facilitating the identification of available housing resources and placement of Katrina evacuees in housing.
68 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, “NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards,” January 31, 2006, . The Federal Communication Commission’s EAS Primary Entry Point (PEP) station in New Orleans (station WWL) was one of the few radio stations in the area to provide continuous service to the New Orleans area. The NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) is a national network of radio stations that continuously broadcast weather and hazard information from local Weather Service offices. Operating in close conjunction with EAS, NOAA Weather Radio comprises an “all hazards” radio network that acts as a “single source for comprehensive weather and emergency information.” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, “NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards,” January 31, 2006, .
69 The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is a mechanism for public officials—Federal, State, and local—to communicate disaster information and instructions rapidly and widely. The system aims to reach the broadest possible audience by disseminating emergency updates on existing radio and television stations, including via digital and satellite networks. Federal Communications Commission, FCC Consumer Facts: The Emergency Alert System (Washington, DC, 2005), 1. See also State of California, “What Is EAS?,” . The new EAS system is the direct descendant of the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS), the Nation’s alert system from 1963 until the advent of EAS. EAS was officially launched on January 1, 1997 (for radio stations) and December 31, 1998 (for television). Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Background on the Emergency Alert System,” October 23, 2004, . While EAS fulfills the same function as EBS, it differs in that it takes advantage of digital technology to permit automation of transmission. Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Background on the Emergency Alert System,” October 23, 2004, . The Emergency Broadcast System and its EAS successor were originally designed for the President to speak to the Nation during an emergency, particularly following catastrophic nuclear attacks. But the system was made available to State and local officials in 1963, and since then has been used primarily for weather emergencies. “There are two contexts in which the EAS will be used—Presidentially-initiated alerts and messages and those initiated by State and local governments in concert with the broadcast industry.” Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Background on the Emergency Alert System,” October 23, 2004, . See also, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Consumer Facts: The Emergency Alert System (Washington, DC, 2005), 2. The document states: “a state emergency manager may use the system to send out a public warning by broadcasting that warning from one or more major radio stations in a particular state.” EAS was not activated prior to landfall aside from NOAA hurricane warnings and advisories. “The Emergency Alert System was never activated by the White House or by State or local governments during Katrina.” Ken Kerschbaumer, “Broadcasters Seek Better Emergency Alert System,” Broadcasting and Cable, September 12, 2005.
70 “The Big Disconnect on New Orleans,” CNN.com, September 2, 2005, .
71 In testimony before the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Mr. Phil Parr, Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer, FEMA, and Mr. Terry Ebert, Director of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security, of the City of New Orleans, both testified that exaggerated media reports impeded rescue efforts (December 14, 2005).
72 The Nation relies on interdependent systems known as “critical infrastructure” to maintain its defense, continuity of government, economic prosperity, and quality of life. The term critical infrastructure means “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” See, e.g., USA Patriot Act of 2001, Section 1016(e), Public Law 107-56, 107th Congress, 1st session (October 26, 2001), 115 Stat. 401; Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e).
Transportation, electricity, banking, telecommunications, food supply, and clean water are examples of critical infrastructure services that have become basic aspects of our daily lives. These services are often only noticed when they are disrupted, and the American public expects speedy restoration of them. Private sector companies own and operate 85 percent of our Nation’s critical infrastructure and are responsible for protecting their facilities and restoring operations following an incident. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, DC). Response planning must also recognize the unique Federal responsibility to support private sector efforts and assist in the restoration of critical infrastructures imperative to the National economy or integral to larger cascading systems or supply chains.
73 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Hurricane Katrina’s Impact on the U.S. Oil and Natural Gas Markets, September 6, 2005.
74 Samuel Bodman, Secretary of the Department of Energy, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Recovery Efforts, on October 27, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 109th Congress, 1st session.
75 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability,“Hurricane Katrina Situation Report #10,” August 30, 2005.
76 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 12.
77 Sectors include: Agriculture and Food, Banking and Finance, Chemical, Commercial Facilities, Dams, Defense Industrial Base, Emergency Services, Energy, Government Facilities, Information Technology, National Monuments and Icons, Nuclear Reactors, Material and Waste, Postal and Shipping, Public Health and Healthcare, Telecommunications, Transportation, Water. The White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington, D.C., February 2003), 9.
78 Industries with critical infrastructure contacted various Federal departments and agencies and requested assistance to protect or to restore their facilities. These requests were inconsistently coordinated across sectors and responded to in an ad hoc fashion.
79 “The Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) initially deploys a DHS/Emergency Preparedness & Response (EPR)/FEMA-led Emergency Response Team Advance (ERT-A), including rapid needs assessment personnel and appropriate ESF representatives, to State operating facilities and incident sites to assess the impact of the situation, collect damage information, gauge immediate Federal support requirements, and make preliminary arrangements to set up Federal field facilities.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C. December 2004), 51. “Infrastructure Specialist (representing ESF #3)-assesses the status of transportation.” In addition, they did not have expertise in the critical infrastructure in the region. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Rapid Needs Assessment Form,” April 2001, (accessed on January 17, 2005).
80 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, D.C.).
81 A Superfund site is a hazardous waste site that is part of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Superfund Program. Years ago, before people became aware of the public health and environmental dangers of dumping chemical wastes, thousands of properties became uncontrolled or abandoned hazardous waste sites. Examples include abandoned warehouses or landfills. Concern about this problem led Congress to establish in 1980 the Superfund Program to locate, investigate and clean up the worst sites nationwide. The EPA administers the Superfund Program in cooperation with individual states and tribal governments. EPA, “About Superfund,” , accessed February 15, 2006.
82 Gulf Coast Hurricane Emergency Environmental Protection Act of 2005, HR 4139, 109th Congress, 1st session, (October 25, 2005), 3.
83 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Environmental Assessment Summary,” December 6, 2005, , (accessed January 18, 2006).
84 “As of Oct. 4, 22 multi-agency environmental assessment and recovery teams had: conducted shoreline and waterway assessments throughout Mississippi and Alabama; resolved 2,315 of 2,380 cases reported to the Coast Guard and EPA; assessed a total of 504 vessels grounded or deposited inland along coastal areas for potential oil discharges; collected more than 10,000 hazardous materials such as drums, tanks, cylinders, containers and batteries throughout the Mississippi counties of Hancock, Harrison and Jackson as well as the Alabama counties of Baldwin and Mobile; recovered about 43,000 gallons of fuel; and assessed more than 200 facilities.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard, “Coast Guard Response to Hurricane Katrina,” U.S. Coast Guard Fact File, September 11, 2005, .
85 The graph shown on the referenced website displays the estimated volume and surface area of the flood waters at one foot increments. Note that the volume and area estimates are only for the areas shown as inundated on the above graphic. The depths are relative to the water surface as of the afternoon of Friday, September 2, 2005. U.S. Geological Survey, “Hurricane Katrina: Science,” (accessed January 23, 2006). “The affected area was home to 2.3 million people, (0.8 percent of the U.S. population), and covers 90,000 square miles, (2.5 percent of the U.S. surface area). At the time Katrina hit, New Orleans was the 35th largest U.S. city by population.” See House Committee on Ways and Means, “Economic Update: Hurricane Katrina,” news release, September 8, 2005, .
86 Even after assessments were conducted, a number of Federal agencies reported that their personnel did not receive information or warnings concerning environmental hazards.
87 Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5173.
88 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on “Hurricane Katrina: The Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response,” on February 15, 2006, submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session.
89 Debris on private property can only be removed with the owner’s consent or with a State or local government request to the Federal government that must meet several conditions. This was a difficult process because many owners had evacuated the area and could not be located. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency; and Eric Cramer, “Waveland: A Case Study in Community Restoration,” Mississippi Valley Division News, .
90 The Department of State lists 151 countries, political entities and international organizations that offered assistance. Two additional countries offered assistance but wished no public recognition, for a total of 153. Of those, 139 were countries and the balance (14) was either political entities or international organizations. Note that of the fourteen, five different United Nations organizations are included. Pledges totaled $854 million. Of the $854 million pledged, $400 million was in commodity for cash assistance (oil to be sold and then cash value considered). Of the remaining $454 million, $126.4 million has been received so far. The other $328 million plus the $400 million in oil, has not been received, for a total of $728 million. (As of October 12, the foreign countries had pledged $854 million in financial contributions, and of this amount the USG had received $118.9 million (the latter figure had increased to $126.4 million by January 9). On October 20, 2005, after interagency consensus, $66 million of the foreign funds received by the U.S. was transferred to FEMA for a case management program. The Federal government expects the balance of the foreign funds received to be allocated shortly. This accounts for all $854 million pledged.
91 A German company offering a $3 million integrated satellite and cellular telephone system capable of handling 5,000 calls at once waited five days for a written deployment order from USNORTHCOM.
92 Joel Brinkley and Craig S. Smith, “Score of nations offer their help,” International Herald Tribune, September 8, 2005; and Sean McCormack, “Daily Press Briefing,” US Department of State, September 7, 2005.
93 The State Department made contact with all New Orleans-based consulates, facilitated visits by various consular officials, as well as monitored the arrival and distribution of in-kind assistance and held regular press briefings. There is no tracking of Green Card holders or tourists.
94 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Emergencies and Disasters,” (accessed January 13, 2006).
95 U.S. Citizen Corps, “Citizen Corps Support for Hurricane Katrina Response & Recovery Efforts,” (accessed January 13, 2006).
96 Long before Hurricane Katrina ever made landfall, the Harris County Citizen Corps laid the groundwork for success with its pre-incident organization and its partnerships with local volunteer groups and area businesses. These two factors allowed the Harris County Citizen Corps to mobilize and organize its resources quickly and efficiently to serve the thousands of evacuees sheltered in Houston-area sites. According to emergency responders on the scene, Citizen Corps members previously trained in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS) were of great value to the hurricane response. Due to their pre-incident training, many Citizen Corps volunteers were already familiar with NIMS/ICS terminology (e.g., Joint Information Center, Joint Operations Center, IC, etc.) and understood the responsibilities of emergency responders at the incident site. Information available at U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) website, .
97 Tim Yarbrough, “Baptists’ 10.5 Million Meals shatters Prior Disaster Relief Record,” North American Mission Board, (accessed January 13, 2006).
98 The White House, Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Director Walters visits Baton Rouge, LA,” September 30, 2005, (accessed January 13, 2006). See also, Set Free Indeed Ministry, “Hurricane Katrina: Set Free Indeed Offering Recovery & Relief,” (accessed February 15, 2005).
99 Melvin “Kip” Holden, Mayor of Baton Rouge, interview by Wolf Blitzer, CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, September 11, 2005, .
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