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            Title Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

 

            Date 1991

            By

            Subject Other\Concurring & Dissenting

                

 Contents

 

 

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Not Reported in F.2d, 1991 WL 41909 (3rd Cir.(Pa.)), 59 USLW 2614, 6 IER Cases 481, 6 IER Cases 639, 1991

O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 29,295

(Cite as: 1991 WL 41909 (3rd Cir.(Pa.)))

United States Court of Appeals

Third Circuit.

BOLDEN, Russell Appellant in 90-1478

v. SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA

TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Appellant in 90-1435

v.

TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF PHILADELPHIA, LOCAL 234, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA/AFL-CIO.

Nos. 90-1435 and 90-1478. Argued Jan. 8, 1991. Decided April 1, 1991.

Order Granting Rehearing En Banc and Vacating Opinion and Judgment April 23,

1991.

On  Appeal  from  the  United  States  District  Court  for  the

District of Eastern Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 88-09156).

H.   Francis   deLone,   Jr.   (argued),   Neff   &   Associates, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant-cross-appellee.

John  F.  Smith,  III  (argued),  Richard  S.  Meyer,  Dilworth, Paxson,   Kalish     &             Kauffman,              Philadelphia,          Pa.,          for appellee-Cross- appellant.

Before  COWEN,  ALITO  and  ROSENN   FN* ,  Circuit

Judges.

FN* Hon. Max Rosenn, Senior Circuit Judge, as to the panel rehearing only.

COWEN, Circuit Judge.

*1 This civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 involves the constitutionality of the return-to-work drug and alcohol testing policy of employees in non "safety sensitive" positions  at  the  Southeastern  Pennsylvania  Transportation Authority   ("SEPTA"),   a   regional   mass   transportation authority, organized under the authority of the Pennsylvania Urban  Mass  Transportation  Act  of  January  22,  1968,  P.L.

42, No. 8, as amended, 55 Pa.Stat.Ann. §§ 600.101-600.407

(Purdon Supp. 1990). FN1 Plaintiff Russell Bolden won a

jury award of $285,000.00 in compensatory damages for the injury he suffered when SEPTA forced him to submit to an allegedly                unconstitutional   drug        test          as             part          of             a return-to-work   medical   examination.   Both   SEPTA   and Bolden have appealed on various grounds. Judge Alito and I agree with Bolden that SEPTA's return-to-work body fluids testing  is  unconstitutional.  This  Court  will  nevertheless vacate the entry of judgment in Bolden's favor and remand to  the  district  court  with  instructions  to  dismiss.  We  will vacate  the  judgment  of  the  district  court  because  Judge Rosenn believes that SEPTA is immune from suit under the Eleventh   Amendment   and   I   believe   that   Bolden,   both personally and through his union, consented to the two drug tests which give rise to this suit.

FN1   We   have   previously   considered   whether SEPTA's  return-to-work  drug  and  alcohol  testing policy   of   employees   in   non   "safety   sensitive" positions is constitutional. See Transport Workers'

Union,  Local  234  v.  Southeastern  Pennsylvania

Transp. Auth., 863 F.2d 1110, 1122 (3d Cir. 1988)

(SEPTA I) (upholding the district court's injunction prohibiting  return-to-work  testing).  In  SEPTA  I, we wrote:

Return-to-work  testing  must  be  justified  either  as part of a truly random testing program which does not single out a specified group or on the basis of particularized  suspicion.  Since  the  random  testing we are sustaining will include employees returning to  work,  SEPTA  must  justify  its  return-towork testing    on    the    basis    of    some    particularized suspicion.  It  has,  however,  failed  to  present  any evidence  that  the  employees  returning  to  work present someunique risk related to drug or alcohol use. Thus, SEPTA has not shown that this aspect of its program is initially justified or that testing of all employees returning after an absence for whatever cause  has  any  relationship  to  the  articulated  need for the program. We will therefore not disturb the court's injunction against return-to-work testing.

Id.   at   1122.   The   Supreme   Court   vacated   our decision in SEPTA I on other grounds in Transport

Workers'                Union,    Local      234          v.              Southeastern

Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 109 S.Ct. 3208 (1989)

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(SEPTA   II).   On   remand,   we   reaffirmed   our decision  in  SEPTA  I  with  respect  to  the  central issue  (the  constitutionality  of  random  drug  and alcohol  testing  for  SEPTA's  operating  employees who worked in "safety sensitive" positions), but we did not address the issue of return-to-work testing on  remand.  Transport  Workers'  Union,  Local  234

v.  Southeastern  Pennsylvania  Transp.  Auth.,  884

F.2d 709, 711 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989) (SEPTA III). As a result,               we            must        now         reexamine               SEPTA's return-to-work  drug  and  alcohol  testing  policy  to determine if it passes constitutional muster.

I.

Bolden,  a  member  of  the  Transport  Workers  Union,  Local

234  ("TWU"),  was  a  maintenance  custodian  in  SEPTA's Fern Rock Depot from 1981 to 1986. On August 26, 1986, SEPTA   discharged             Bolden    for            off-duty  conduct unbecoming  of  a  SEPTA  employee  after  he  provoked  an altercation  with  a  SEPTA  bus  driver.  After  going  through the three levels of grievance proceedings provided for by the collective bargaining agreement, he was reinstated when an arbitration panel found that Bolden had not been discharged for "just cause." The panel ordered SEPTA to reinstate him with onehalf back pay.

Before  his  scheduled  return  to  work,  SEPTA  subjected Bolden to a routine medical examination on June 16, 1987. The  examination  included  a  drug  and  alcohol  test  of  his bodily  fluids  in  accordance  with  SEPTA's  return-to-work drug  and  alcohol  testing  program.   FN2  While  there  is some dispute as to the scientific significance of the results of the tests performed on Bolden, the tests did reveal trace amounts  of  the  active  ingredient  of  marijuana  as  well  as marijuana metabolites in his blood and urine. On August 3,

1987,  SEPTA  discharged  Bolden  again,  this  time  for  his failure to pass the return-to-work drug screening.

FN2 SEPTA Order 87-2 provided in relevant part: Any   employee   returning   to   work   under   the following   circumstances   may   be   subject   to   a medical examination, including body fluids testing:

1.  Absences  due  to  physical  problems  such  as injury  occurring  on  or  off  duty,  and  illness;  2.  A rehabilitation  program  for  substance  abuse  which

lasted  for  any  length  of  time;  3.  a  disciplinary suspension;  4.  Any  other  approved  absence  from duty  in  excess  of  30  days.  (excluding  a  fiveweek vacation period).

Refusal  to  submit  to  the  aforementioned  medical examination               will           subject    employees              to             the disciplinary measures outlined under policy 85-1. App. at 980.

Once  again,  Bolden  followed  the  grievance  procedure  in accordance  with  the  collective  bargaining  agreement  to contest   his   discharge.   At   each   step   of   the   three-tier procedure, he was represented by the TWU. After the third step  of  his  grievance  procedure,  the  TWU  and  SEPTA settled  the  grievance.  The  TWU  and  SEPTA  agreed  that Bolden could be reinstated, with one-half back pay, if he did one   of   two   things.   Bolden   could   either   enter   into   an employee               assistance              program  for            substance              abuse rehabilitation or he could take another body fluids drug test, the result of which would determine his employment status. He  was  required  to  appear  for  the  second  body  fluids  test and the return-to-work physical on or before May 31, 1988.

*2 Bolden neither entered an employee assistance program nor  took  a  second  body  fluids  test.  The  time  in  which  he could report was extended to June 10, 1988. After he failed to   appear   at   the   rescheduled   return-to-work   physical, SEPTA terminated his employment.

Bolden   filed   this   action   under   42   U.S.C.   §   1983   in November,  1988,  alleging  that  SEPTA  had  violated  his Fourth  and  Fourteenth  Amendment  rights.  He  demanded compensatory   and   punitive   damages.   In   March,   1989, before  discovery  commenced,  the  district  court  dismissed his  claim  for  punitive  damages.  With  respect  to  the  claim for  compensatory  damages,  SEPTA  impleaded  Bolden's union, the TWU. The claim against the union asserted that if SEPTA  were  found  liable,  the  TWU  would  be  liable  to SEPTA for contribution and indemnity, since the TWU had falsely represented that it was authorized to settle Bolden's claim, when in fact the union lacked that authority. Bolden then amended his complaint, adding a claim directly against the  TWU.  The  amended  complaint  alleged  that  the  union had conspired with SEPTA to deprive him of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process by settling Bolden's claim

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before  he  had  an  opportunity  to  have  it  reviewed  in  an arbitration hearing.

The  trial  court  granted  the  TWU's  unopposed  motion  for summary judgment with respect to SEPTA's claim. The jury found  in  favor  of  the  TWU  at  trial  on  Bolden's  claim.  No appeal has been taken on the judgments entered in favor of the  TWU  with  respect  to  SEPTA's  and  Bolden's  claims against TWU.

Bolden's claim against SEPTA was tried to a jury in March

1990 in an eight day trial. In response to interrogatories, the jury  found  that  SEPTA's  testing  of  Bolden's  bodily  fluids violated   his   constitutional   rights,   and   that   he   suffered

$285,000.00   of   damage   as   a   result.   The   court   entered judgment                in             favor       of             Bolden    for            $285,000.00             in compensatory damages.

On  appeal,  Bolden  challenges  the  district  court's  dismissal of  his  claim  for  punitive  damages.  He  argues  that  the  trial court erred in its conclusion that SEPTA was immune from a  punitive  damages  award  under  the  rule  announced  in

Newport   v.   Fact   Concerts,   Inc.,   453   U.S.   247   (1981)

(municipalities are immune from punitive damages awards). SEPTA  cross-appeals  the  jury  verdict  in  favor  of  Bolden. SEPTA argues that the drug and alcohol test it performed on Bolden  did  not,  as  a  matter  of  law,  violate  his  Fourth  and Fourteenth Amendment rights, contrary to the jury's verdict. In addition, SEPTA claims that it had reasonable suspicion on  which  to  base  the  second  scheduled  drug  screen  of Bolden,   since   he   failed   the   first   one.   Finally,   SEPTA contends   that   the   jury   verdict   in   Bolden's   favor   was excessive  and  unconscionable,  especially  in  light  of  his failure to mitigate his damages when he refused to take the second drug test.

Judge      Alito        and          I               agree       that          SEPTA's policy      of returnto-work drug and alcohol testing of employees in non

"safety  sensitive"  positions  is  unconstitutional.  This  Court will  nevertheless  vacate  the  entry  of  judgment  in  Bolden's favor  and  remand  to  the  district  court  with  instructions  to dismiss.  We  will  vacate  the  judgment  of  the  district  court because Judge Rosenn believes that SEPTA is immune from suit  under  the  Eleventh  Amendment  and  I  believe  that

Bolden, both personally and through his union, consented to the two drug tests which give rise to this suit.

II.

*3   As   a   threshold   matter,   we   examine   this   Court's jurisdiction  to  hear  this  section  1983  suit.  See  Bender  v.

Williamsport  Area  School  Dist.,  475  U.S.  534,  541  (1986)

(A court of appeals must " 'satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction,  but  also  that  of  the  lower  courts  in  a  cause under  review,'  even  though  the  parties  are  prepared  to concede  it.")  (quoting  Mitchell  v.  Maurer,  293  U.S.  237,

244  (1934)).  Concern  over  this  Court's  jurisdiction  stems from the possibility that under current doctrine, SEPTA, as a  state  agency,  might  not  be  a  "person"  amenable  to  suit under  section  1983.  See  Will  v.  Michigan  Dep't  of  State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989).

A.

Bolden   sued   SEPTA   under   section   1983   which   makes

" e very person who, under color of state law , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution

...." liable to the party injured. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). Federal jurisdiction over section 1983 suits is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which confers jurisdiction on federal courts to hear any civil rights action authorized by law. See

28 U.S.C. § 1343. If SEPTA is not a "person" covered by

section 1983, it is possible to conclude that the section 1983 claim  is  not  authorized  by  law.  Hence,  there  would  be  no federal jurisdiction to hear Bolden's suit.

The problem in this appeal is that SEPTA has failed to raise this  argument  as  a  defense  to  Bolden's  claim.  This  Court must  determine  whether  SEPTA  could  waive  this  defense because  it  is  non-jurisdictional,  or  whether  it  is  a  question this Court must consider sua sponte. Judge Alito and I agree that the question whether SEPTA is a "person" amenable to suit  under  section  1983  is  a  non-jurisdictional  waivable defense which SEPTA has waived in this case.

B.

A  complaint  which  is  "drawn  so  as  to  claim  a  right  to recover  under  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United States" states a cause of action. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,

681 (1946). To state a cause of action under section 1983, a

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plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Bolden's complaint states a cause of action in that it alleges that SEPTA, a state actor, deprived him of rights secured by the    United    States    Constitution.    A    facially    sufficient allegation  of  a  right  to  recover  under  section  1983  is  all  a district court needs to assume jurisdiction over the case and to determine whether it is "well founded in law and in fact." See  Lauritzen  v.  Larsen,  345  U.S.  571,  575  (1953)  ("As frequently happens, a contention that there is some barrier to granting plaintiff's claim is cast in terms of an exception to jurisdiction  of  subject  matter.  A  cause  of  action  under  our law  was  asserted  here,  and  the  court  had  the  power  to determine  whether  it  was  or  was  not  well  founded  in  law and in fact.").

*4 The failure to state a claim under section 1983 is not the same as failing to establish subject matter jurisdiction. "It is well established that failure to state a proper claim calls for a  judgment  on  the  merits  and  not  a  dismissal  for  want  of jurisdiction. Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law, and just as issues of fact, it must be decided after and not before the  court  has  assumed  jurisdiction  over  the  controversy."

Bell   v.   Hood,   327   U.S.   at   682.   A   facially   sufficient complaint states a cause of action, even if it turns out that the  section  1983  defendant  is  not  a  "person"  amenable  to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Moreover,  the  court  of  appeals  for  the  Second  Circuit  has specifically  held  that  a  claim  made  under  section  1983 should   not   be   dismissed   for   lack   of   subject   matter jurisdiction  unless  "the  right  claimed  is  'so  insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of the Supreme  Court,  or  otherwise  completely  devoid  of  merit  as  not  to involve  a  federal  controversy.'  "  New  York  Dist.  Attorney

Investigators Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Richards, 711 F.2d

8, 10 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina

Envtl.   Study   Group,   Inc.,   438   U.S.   59,   70-71   (1978),

(quoting  Hagans  v.  Lavine,  415  U.S.  528,  542-43  (1974)

and  Oneida  Indian  Nation  v.  Oneida,  414  U.S.  661,  666

(1974)). Because the question whether SEPTA is a "person"

under   section   1983   is   not   'insubstantial,   implausible,

foreclosed  by  prior  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  nor otherwise   completely   devoid   of   merit,'   this   Court   has jurisdiction  to  hear  the  merits  of  Bolden's  section  1983 claim,  even  if  SEPTA  is  not  a  "person"  under  Will  v.

Michigan  Dep't  of  State  Police,  491  U.S.  58,  109  S.  Ct.

2304 (1989). FN3

FN3  We,  of  course,  express  no  opinion  as  to whether  SEPTA  is  a  "person"  amenable  to  suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The conclusion that this Court has jurisdiction is bolstered by   the   fact   that   the   Supreme   Court   has   consistently dismissed section 1983 suits for failure to state a claim, and not for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, when the section

1983 claim is found to be asserted against an entity which is not a "person." In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), for instance, jurisdiction over plaintiff's section 1983 claim was asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Id. at 169. Yet, when the Court  found  that  the  City  of  Chicago  was  not  a  "person" amenable to suit under section 1983, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim-it said nothing about failure to  meet  a  jurisdictional  prerequisite  of  asserting  a  claim against  a  section  1983  "person."  See  also  Ngiraingas  v.

Sanchez, 110 S. Ct. 1737 (1990) (affirming the dismissal of plaintiff's 1983 claim because the Court concluded that the Territory  of  Guam  was  not  a  "person"  amenable  to  suit under section 1983).

Our   decision   in   Fitchik   v.   New   Jersey   Transit   Rail

Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110

S. Ct. 148 (1989) is not to the contrary. In Fitchik, we stated that although the plaintiff had failed to argue that the state authority  was  not  an  "alter  ego"  of  the  state,  we  could nonetheless  consider  the  argument,  since  it  implicated  our jurisdiction.  Id.  at  658  n.  1.Fitchik  is  distinguishable  in several ways. First, the district court decision rested on the alter ego issue, so it was within our discretion to rely on that holding as a ground for reversal. Id. ("The district dismissed Fitchik's complaint on the grounds that NJTRO was the alter ego of the state ... ") That is not the situation here where no immunity   issue   was   even   argued   in   the   district   court. Second, we said only that our jurisdiction was "implicated." We did not say that if we concluded that the state authority was immune from suit, we would have to dismiss for lack of

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jurisdiction. In fact, the district court had dismissed because it  concluded  that  the  state  authority  was  immune,  and  not because it lacked jurisdiction over the suit.

*5  In  Will  v.  Michigan,  the  Supreme  Court  acknowledged the possibility that section 1983's requirement of a "person" as defendant might be jurisdictional. See 491 U.S. at, 109 S.

Ct. at 2306 n.4 ("Petitioners argument evidently rests on the proposition that whether a State is a person under § 1983 is

'jurisdictional' and 'thus could be raised by the Court on its own   motion'   in   those   cases.").   But,   the   Court   neither adopted nor rejected that view. Accordingly, the question is open whether a court must satisfy itself that a section 1983 defendant is a "person" within the meaning of that section in order  to  assure  itself  of  subject  matter  jurisdiction.  Where plaintiff's  claim  that  the  defendant  is  a  "person"  is  not foreclosed by prior decisions of the Supreme Court, and no party  has  argued  that  the  defendant  is  not  a  person,  this Court will reach the merits of the law suit. Accordingly, we hold that SEPTA's failure to raise immunity as a defense to Bolden's  suit  should  be  treated  as  any  other  affirmative defense  that  a  party  fails  to  raise  at  trial.  Because  SEPTA failed  to  raise  this  issue  at  trial,  and  indeed,  has  not  even raised  it  on  appeal,  the  defense  is  waived.  This  Court therefore has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III.

We  must  first  determine  whether  SEPTA's  return-to-work drug  and  alcohol  testing  policy  is  constitutional  under  the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, a question over which we  have  plenary  review.  United  States  v.  Frank,  864  F.2d

992 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989); see also United States v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir.

1990) (The ultimate determination of reasonableness under the  Fourth  Amendment  is  a  conclusion  of  law  over  which appellate court has plenary review.)

Our  consideration  of  the  SEPTA  return-to-work  drug  and alcohol   testing   program   is   guided   by   settled   Fourth Amendment law. The Fourth Amendment guarantees " t he right  of  the  people  to  be  secure  in  their  persons,  houses, papers,   and   effects,   against   unreasonable   searches   and seizures...." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment prohibition  against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures  is binding  on  the  states  through  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). SEPTA, as an agency of  the  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania,  is  bound  by  the strictures  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.  Transport  Workers'

Union,  Local  234  v.  Southeastern  Pennsylvania  Transp.

Auth., 863 F.2d 1110, 1115 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated, 109 S.

Ct. 3208 (1989), reaffirmed, 884 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1989). The  touchstone  of  a  search's  constitutionality  is  whether  it was  "reasonable."  Skinner  v.  Railway  Labor  Executives'

Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989). What is reasonable " 'depends on all the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself.'   "   Id.   (quoting   United   States   v.   Montoya   De

Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)).

*6 Normally, a search is only considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by a warrant issued on probable cause. Skinner, 489 U.S. at, 109 S. Ct. at 1414;

Hartness  v.  Bush,  919  F.2d  170,  176-77,  (D.C.  Cir.  1990)

(Edwards, J., dissenting) (setting forth the framework of the administrative   search   exception   to   the   probable   cause requirement)  (citing  Katz  v.  United  States,  389  U.S.  347,

356-57  (1967)).  Even  where  the  warrant  requirement  is relaxed, the existence of probable cause is required to make a full-scale search constitutional. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469

U.S. 325, 340 (1985); Hartness, 919 F.2d at 177 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).

To  this  general  rule  requiring  a  search  warrant  issued  on probable   cause,   or   exigent   circumstances   that   justify   a probable cause based warrantless search, the Supreme Court has  recognized  a  "special  needs"  exception.  Skinner,  489

U.S. at

, 109 S. Ct. at 1414; National Treasury Employees Union v.

Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1989). No warrant  or  even  probable  cause  is  required  by  the  Fourth Amendment when " 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement  impracticable.'  "  Skinner,  489  U.S.  at,  109  S.

Ct. at 1414 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873

(1987),  quoting  New  Jersey  v.  T.L.O.,  469  U.S.  at  351

(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in the judgment)).

One   category   of   the   "special   needs"   exception   is   the

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administrative       search.    A             non-probable         cause      based administrative   search   will   be   upheld   if   it   serves   some non-law  enforcement  need.  See  Griffin  v.  Wisconsin,  483

U.S.  868,  873-74  (1987)  (search  of  probationer's  home  by probation   officer);   O'Connor   v.   Ortega,   480   U.S.   709,

725-26  (1987)  (work-related  search  of  employee's  desk  by government  employer);  New  Jersey  v.  T.L.O.,  469  U.S.  at

341 (search of student's purse by school official).

Even before the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements in the administrative search area in Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, and

Von  Raab,  489  U.S.  656,  we  applied  the  administrative search   exception   to   the   Fourth   Amendment   warrant requirement  to  uphold  drug  tests  without  individualized suspicion   in   highly   regulated   industries.   See   Transport

Workers'  Union,  Local  234  v.  Southeastern  Pennsylvania

Transp. Auth., 863 F.2d 1110, 1116 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated,

109 S. Ct. 3208 (1989), reaffirmed, 884 F.2d 709 (3d Cir.

1989)  (citing  cases).  In  Shoemaker  v.  Handel,  795  F.2d

1136, 1142-43 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986), we upheld random urine testing of jockeys required by the New Jersey Racing Commission under its statutory power to regulate   horse   racing   in   New   Jersey.   Subsequently,   in

Policeman's  Benevolent  Ass'n,  Local  318  v.  Washington,

850  F.2d  133,  135  (3d  Cir.  1988),  cert.  denied,  490  U.S.

1004  (1989),  we  upheld  a  township's  random  drug  testing program for police officers.

*7  In  Policeman's  Benevolent  Ass'n,  we  explained  that  "a drug  testing  program  will  come  within  the  administrative search exception if it is (1) based on a strong state interest in determining whether employees are using illegal substances; and (2) directed at an industry that is pervasively regulated in   such   a   manner   that   employees'   justifiable   privacy expectations are diminished." Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n,

850 F.2d at 136.

Skinner  and  Von  Raab  do  not  undermine  the  continuing vitality  of  our  precedents  with  respect  to  administrative searches.  In  Skinner,  489  U.S.  602,  109  S.  Ct.  1402,  the Supreme Court upheld suspicionless drug testing of railroad employees  if  certain  triggering  events  occurred.  Under  the regulations       promulgated          by            the           Federal    Railroad Administration,  railroad  employees  were  subject  to  drug testing  under  two  circumstances.  First,  covered  employees

were  subject  to  drug  testing  after  major  train  accidents, other  "impact  accidents"  resulting  in  a  "reportable  injury," or  any  train  accident  involving  a  fatality  to  an  on-duty railroad  employee.  See  Id.  489  U.S.  at  ,  109  S.  Ct.  at

1408-09.  Second,  covered  employees  were  subject  to  a breath or body fluids test after a "reportable accident" where the   supervisor   had   a   "reasonable   suspicion"   that   the employee's acts or omissions contributed to the occurrence or  severity  of  the  accident,  or  where  a  covered  employee violated          certain     safety      regulations,            including non-compliance  with  signals  and  excessive  speeding.  Id.

489 U.S. at, 109 S. Ct. at 1409.

The  Skinner  Court  noted  that  employees  covered  by  the railroad's regulations had a reduced expectation of privacy. The   Court   reasoned   that   because   covered   employees participate  in  an  industry  that  is  "regulated  pervasively  to ensure safety," their expectation of privacy was diminished. Id. 489 U.S. at, 109 S. Ct. at 1418. See also Shoemaker v.

Handel, 795 F.2d 1136; Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, 850

F.2d 133. After balancing the strong governmental interest in  protecting  the  traveling  public  from  impaired  railroad employees   holding   "safety   sensitive"   jobs   against   the diminished  expectation  of  privacy  of  the  railroad  workers, the           Court       concluded              that          the           non-probable         cause administrative   search   of   the   railroad   employees   was constitutional.

In   Von   Raab,   the   Supreme   Court   reached   a   similar conclusion.   There,   the   Court   upheld   suspicionless   drug testing of certain United States Customs Agents, even where there  was  no  triggering  event.  The  Court  approved  drug testing  of  Customs  Service  employees  seeking  transfer  or promotion to positions having a direct involvement in drug interdiction  or  requiring  the  incumbent  to  carry  firearms,

Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384, but remanded for a determination whether the Customs Service program was over-inclusive                by            covering employees              who         handle

"classified" materials. Id. 489 U.S. at, 109 S. Ct. at 1396-97

(" I t  is  not  evident  that  those  occupying  these  positions

"Accounting  Technician,"  "Animal  Caretaker,"  "Attorney

(All)," "Baggage Clerk," "Co-op Student (All)," "Electrical

Equipment             Repairer,"               "Mail       Clerk/Assistant,"  and

"Messenger"    are   likely   to   gain   access   to   sensitive

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information,  and  this  apparent  discrepancy  raises  in  our minds  the  question  whether  the  Service  has  defined  this category of employees more broadly than necessary to meet the purposes of the Commissioner's directive.").

*8  In  Von  Raab,  the  Court  noted  that  customs  employees working in the covered areas had a reduced expectation of privacy.  Id.  489  U.S.  at,  109  S.  Ct.  at  1394  ("We  think Customs   employees   who   are   directly   involved   in   the interdiction  of  illegal  drugs  or  who  are  required  to  carry firearms  in  the  line  of  duty  likewise  have  a  diminished expectation            of             privacy   in             respect    to             the           intrusions occasioned   by   a   urine   test.").   The   Court   weighed   the government's interest on the one hand, against the Customs Service  employees'  expectations  of  privacy  (which  were diminished) on the other, and struck the balance in favor of the government.

The  balancing  test  articulated  in  Skinner  and  Von  Raab  is that  the  government's  interest  as  an  employer  is  balanced against the privacy rights of the employees being tested. See Von  Raab,  489  U.S.  at,  109  S.  Ct.  at  1390  (" O ur  cases establish  that  where  a  Fourth  Amendment  intrusion  serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,  it  is  necessary  to  balance  the  individual's privacy  expectations  against  the  Government's  interests  to determine  whether  it  is  impractical  to  require  a  warrant  or some  level  of  individualized  suspicion  in  the  particular context.")   (citing   Skinner,   489   U.S.   at,   109   S.   Ct.   at

1413-14).   Whether   SEPTA's   return-to-work   drug   and alcohol testing policy passes constitutional muster depends on how the balance is struck.

IV.

SEPTA  argues  that  as  a  public  mass-transportation  agency responsible  for  the  safety  of  the  traveling  public,  it  has  a strong  governmental  interest  in  detecting  and  preventing drug use by its employees. SEPTA points out that we have recognized that interest and upheld random drug testing of operating  employees  in  "safety  sensitive"  positions.  See

Transport   Workers'   Union,   Local   234   v.   Southeastern

Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 863 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1988),

vacated, 109 S. Ct. 3208 (1989), reaffirmed, 884 F.2d 709

(3d Cir. 1989).

SEPTA notes that the program of random drug testing that we   previously   approved   involves   a   significantly   more invasive   search   than   the   search   to   which   employees returning  to  work  are  subject  here.  The  random  drug  test that  we  have  already  approved  requires  collection  of  body fluids outside the context of a regular medical examination. In  the  case  at  bar,  body  fluids  are  collected  as  part  of  a routine  return-to-work  medical  examination.  Accordingly, the  expectation  of  privacy  of  workers  returning  to  work  is significantly lower since body fluids will be collected from them  whether  or  not  we  uphold  the  constitutionality  of examining those body fluids for traces of drugs and alcohol.

SEPTA   contends   that   its   interest   in   testing   employees returning to work is almost as great as its interest in testing employees in "safety sensitive" positions. While Bolden did not technically work in a "safety sensitive" position, FN4 SEPTA   argues   that   he   worked   under   conditions   that exposed him to great risk, although we note that Bolden was responsible only for cleaning, not maintaining, repairing, or driving  equipment  and  that  he  was  not  responsible  in  any way  for  the  safety  of  the  traveling  public.  Nevertheless, SEPTA  insists  that  Bolden's  history  of  job  related  injuries underscores  the  risks  inherent  in  the  job  of  cleaning  trains and train depots. FN5 SEPTA's conclusion is that it has a strong  governmental  interest  in  preventing  its  employees from injuring themselves when those employees work under circumstances  where  the  risk  of  injury  increases  if  the worker's senses are impaired from drugs or alcohol. SEPTA also notes that it would be impractical to require managers to  obtain  search  warrants  before  testing  employees  in  non safety sensitive positions.

FN4   Although   SEPTA   has   pointed   to   many dangers  that  surrounded  Bolden  at  work  (e.g.,  the third  rail,  suspended  power  cables,  the  "transfer table," open pits, and overhead cranes), it is clear to us that Bolden's job as a maintenance custodian is not  a  "safety  sensitive"  position  as  the  Supreme Court   has   used   that   term.   The   term   "safety sensitive" has been reserved to describe jobs where an   employee   is   in   a   position   where   he   could endanger  the  public.  In  Skinner  v.  Railway  Labor

Executives'  Ass'n,  489  U.S.  602,  109  S.Ct.  1402

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(1989), the Supreme Court noted that " e mployees subject  to  the  tests  discharge  duties  fraught  with such   risks   of   injury   to   others   that   even   a momentary  lapse  of  attention  can  have  disastrous consequences.     ...     E mployees  who  are  subject to testing under the    regulations can cause great human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable  tosupervisors  or  others."  Id.,  489  U.S. at, 109 S.Ct. at 1419. It would be absurd to place a maintenance  custodian  in  the  same  category  as employees  who  are  directly  responsible  for  the safety   of   the   traveling   public,   as   the   covered employees in Skinner were.

Nor  did  SEPTA  place  Bolden's  job  on  the  list  of positions covered by random drug testing because those      jobs         were        "safety    sensitive."              Bolden's supervisor even admitted that the facility in which Bolden  worked  was  safe.  To  the  extent  that  the track yard at the Fern Rock Depot contained some hazards, those hazards posed little threat to Bolden since  SEPTA  acknowledged  at  oral  argument  that Bolden's  work  station  was  largely  around  buses, not trains.

FN5 SEPTA does not, however, suggest that there is  any  connection  between  Bolden's  work  related injuries in the past and Bolden's alleged substance abuse.

*9  On  the  other  side  of  the  balance,  SEPTA  argues  that workers  in  the  return-to-work  context  have  a  diminished expectation  of  privacy.  Since  the  workers  are  subject  to body   fluids   collection   as   part   of   a   routine   medical examination,          SEPTA    contends                that          their         reasonable expectation of privacy is lower. While there is some surface appeal  to  this  argument,  we  cannot  accept  that  SEPTA employees have a diminished expectation of privacy merely because  their  bodily  fluids  are  collected  for  a  medical examination whether or not those fluids are then tested for the presence of drugs or alcohol.

SEPTA next contends that Bolden's expectation of privacy was reduced because he knew in advance that he would be tested  for  drugs.  This  argument  rests  on  a  tautology.  A person's   reasonable   expectation   of   privacy   depends,   of

course,  on  what  he  can  reasonably  expect  to  keep  private. The fact that a person is told in advance that his privacy will be  invaded  effectively  lowers  that  person's  expectation  of privacy; but it does so wrongfully. The fact that SEPTA told Bolden in advance that he would be tested does not mitigate the invasion. Accordingly, Bolden's reasonable expectation of privacy could not legitimately have been lowered by the fact  that  he  was  warned  in  advance  that  his  body  fluids would be tested for drugs and alcohol.

In  sum,  SEPTA's  strong  governmental  interest  amounts  to the  need  to  prevent  an  impaired  worker  from  injuring himself.  SEPTA  cites  no  authority  which  recognizes  the constitutionality  of  an  administrative  search  on  the  ground that  the  governmental  employer  has  a  right  to  protect  the worker  from  himself.  Again,  Bolden  did  not  work  in  a

"safety   sensitive"   position   where   onthe-job   impairment could place members of the public at risk.

Accordingly,  we  note  that  SEPTA  has  only  a  minimal interest  in  protecting  Bolden  from  himself.  This  minimal interest  must  be  weighed  against  Bolden's  expectation  of privacy.  In  Bolden's  case,  since  he  did  not  work  in  a profession  which  is  pervasively  regulated  for  safety  (i.e. there is no history of government regulation of maintenance custodians),   we   conclude   that   he   had   no   diminished expectation of privacy when he went to the return-to-work medical   examination.   Moreover,   the   Supreme   Court's remand in Von Raab with respect to employees who would have  access  to  "classified"  information  indicates  that  the category   of   employees   to   be   tested   under   a   particular program  should    be            narrowly tailored   to             meet        the government's stated interest. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at, 109 S.

Ct.   at   1397.   Because   a   particular   program   should   be narrowly  tailored,  we  conclude  that  testing  every  worker returning  to  work  is  overbroad  in  that  it  obviously  covers employees who pose no threat to the public.

While it is true that the extent of the intrusion into Bolden's privacy  was  minimal,  Bolden  nevertheless  had  a  right  to expect   his   bodily   fluids   to   be   tested   only   for   strictly diagnostic purposes. When Bolden walked into the doctor's office  to  take  the  return-to-work  medical  examination,  he was  protected  by  the  full  panoply  of  Fourth  Amendment rights. Accordingly, Judge Alito and I agree in holding that

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the  return-to-work  drug  and  alcohol  test  which  SEPTA scheduled  for  Bolden  (and  which  he  actually  took)  was unconstitutional   as             a               violation of             Bolden's Fourth Amendment rights, and he could have successfully refused to submit to that examination.

V.

*10  Although  SEPTA's  return-to-work  drug  and  alcohol testing   is   unconstitutional,   I   have   voted   to   vacate   the judgment   in   Bolden's   favor   because   I   believe   that   he consented, both personally and through his union, to the two drug tests which give rise to this suit. It is well established that an otherwise unconstitutional search is constitutionally permissible    if    it    is    conducted    pursuant    to    consent.

Schneckloth  v.  Bustamonte,  412  U.S.  218,  219  (1973). Consent  to  the  search  must  be  "freely"  and  "voluntarily" given. Id. at 222-23.

In Bustamonte, the Supreme Court examined what it meant that  consent  be  "free"  and  "voluntary."  There,  the  Court expressly  rejected  the  proposition  that  consent  to  a  search could only be "voluntary" where the consent is given with knowledge  that  it  could  be  withheld.  Id.  at  232-33  (" W e cannot accept the proposition of the Court of Appeals in this case that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a   necessary   prerequisite   to   demonstrating   a   'voluntary' consent."). Accordingly, in the case at bar, Bolden need not have been aware that he had a right to refuse to comply with SEPTA's  return-towork  drug  and  alcohol  testing  policy  in order for him to have given valid consent to a body fluids test.

SEPTA  argues  that  the  standard  for  finding  consent  to  an administrative  search  is  less  stringent  than  standards  for consent  in  a  criminal  search.  It  cites  as  support  E.Z.  v.

Coler,  603  F.  Supp.  1546  (N.D.  Ill.  1985),  aff'd,  sub  nom,

Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986). In E.Z. v. Coler, the district court held that the parents of minors being investigated  for  child  abuse  consented  to  home  visits  and body inspections of their children by representatives of the Illinois  Department  of  Children  and  Family  Services.  The court  of  appeals  affirmed,  but  not  on  the  ground  that  the parents had consented.

E.Z.  v.  Coler  does  indeed  state  that  "the  standards  for

consent  to  an  administrative  search  are  less  stringent  than the  standards  for  consent  to  a  criminal  search."  E.Z.  v.

Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1556. The cases cited by the district court in Coler in support of that proposition were, however, decided before Bustamonte. In addition, they do not, strictly speaking, say what the district court in Coler says they say. At  best,  they  stand  only  for  the  proposition  that  a  person need not be aware of the right to withhold consent in order to  give  valid  consent  to  a  warrantless  non-probable  cause based  administrative  search.  The  cases  do  not  support  the conclusion             that          the           standards               for            consent  in             an administrative   search   are   lower   than   the   standards   of consent for a criminal search.

I  have  uncovered  only  one  additional  case  that  repeats  the assertion   that   the   standard   of   consent   is   lower   in   an administrative context than in a criminal context. The case is Ross v. Hinton, 740 F. Supp. 451, 459 (S.D. Ohio 1990). Ross essentially relies on E.Z. v. Coler for this proposition. Its  analysis  adds  nothing  to  the  question.  I  am  unable  to locate   any   other   federal   case   which   supports   SEPTA's contention that the standard of consent in an administrative search  is  less  stringent  than  in  a  criminal  search.  I  would decline to follow E.Z. v. Coler. Accordingly, I would apply only  the  standard  of  consent  discussed  in  Bustamonte,  as developed by subsequent case history.

*11  In  this  case,  I  find  that  Bolden  consented  to  the  drug test.  Bolden  knew  very  well  that  he  would  be  asked  by SEPTA  to  take  a  drug  test  as  part  of  his  return-to-work medical   examination.   He   went   to   his   return-to-work physical  voluntarily  and  allowed  his  bodily  fluids  to  be collected as part of that examination. This examination was openly    and          knowingly              conducted              on            the           highest professional  level  without  any  hint  or  even  any  accusation that Bolden was forced or inveigled to take the test, or that a drug  test  was  surreptitiously  administered  to  him.  Bolden even testified at trial that he had "no qualms" about taking the drug test. App. at 228-232. At no time before, during, or immediately   after   his   medical   examination   did   Bolden object to taking the drug test.

In             addition, Bolden    was          represented            by            the           TWU throughout the settlement of his grievances. The TWU was aware  of  SEPTA's  drug  testing  policy,  because  it  was

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seeking an injunction in another case to enjoin SEPTA from following  it  at  the  very  time  that  Bolden  was  tested.  Yet, Bolden's union voiced no objection to Bolden being tested and made no effort to stop Bolden from taking the test on the grounds that the test was unconstitutional.

In short, neither Bolden nor his union ever objected to the administration  of  a  drug  test  on  Bolden.  Nor  can  Bolden's erroneous  but  good  faith  belief  that  he  was  not  entitled  to withhold consent to the drug test provide sufficient grounds to find that he did not consent to the invasion of privacy that resulted.   I   feel   constrained   to   conclude   that   under   the standard  for  determining  the  voluntariness  of  consent,  by which  a  person  need  not  be  aware  of  his  right  lawfully  to refuse  consent,  Bolden  consented  to  the  drug  test  SEPTA administered on his return to work.

VI.

One   issue   remains;   namely   whether   Bolden   suffered   a constitutional deprivation when he was discharged after he refused  to  submit  to  the  second  drug  test.  There  is  no question  that  the  attempt  to  test  Bolden  a  second  time cannot    be            justified  under      the           administrative        search framework, since we have already concluded that SEPTA's return-to-work   drug   testing   policy   is   unconstitutional. SEPTA argues, however, that it had "reasonable suspicion" on which to base the second scheduled drug test of Bolden. I agree.

Normally,  information  gained  from  an  illegal  search  could not form the basis of probable cause justifying a subsequent legal search. See, e.g., United States v. Dicesare, 765 F.2d

890, 899 (9th Cir.), amended, 777 F.2d 543 (1985); see also

International Molders' & Allied Workers' Local Union No.

164  v.  Nelson,  674  F.  Supp.  294,  298-99  (N.D.Cal.  1987). But  here,  the  initial  return-to-work  drug  screen  of  Bolden did   not   violate   his   Fourth   Amendment   rights   because Bolden consented to it. SEPTA was therefore entitled to use the  results  of  that  drug  test  as  the  basis  for  asserting  a

"reasonable suspicion" of drug use against Bolden.

Even  if  SEPTA  did  not  have  a  "reasonable  suspicion"  on which  to  base  a  second  drug  test,  the  union  and  SEPTA negotiated  a  settlement  of  Bolden's  grievance  pursuant  to which  Bolden  would  be  reinstated.  It  was  squarely  within

the  power  of  the  TWU  to  negotiate  such  a  settlement.  As Bolden's exclusive                bargaining              representative       under Pennsylvania   law,   see   Pennsylvania   Public   Employee Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 1101.606 (Purdon Supp. 1990), the TWU had broad discretion in negotiating and administering the   collective   bargaining   agreement   with   SEPTA.   The TWU's authority extended to the processing and settlement of grievances on behalf of members of the bargaining unit, subject to its duty of fair representation.

*12 The broad power of a union as the exclusive collective bargaining  representative  to  settle  grievances  even  where constitutional issues are implicated has been recognized by two courts of appeal. In American Postal Workers Union v.

United States Postal Serv., 871 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1989), the court  recognized  the  power  of  a  labor  union  to  consent  to searches of union members' lockers, pursuant to a provision in  the  employees'  collective  bargaining  agreement.  The court  reasoned  that  the  collective  bargaining  agreement operated as a waiver of the employees' Fourth Amendment rights. FN6

FN6 In American Postal Workers Union, the court held   that   postal   employees   had   executed   two effective   waivers   of   their   Fourth   Amendment rights.               The                           waivers   effectively              reduced  the employees'  justifiable  expectations  of  privacy  in their   work   lockers.   The   first   waiver   explicitly allowed  unannounced  searches  of  their  lockers. The   second   waiver   was   a   provision   of   the employees' collective bargaining agreement which purported               to                              allow          unannounced     searches employee   lockers,   even   where   there   was   no suspicion  of  illegal  activity,  as  long  as  a  union steward  was  present  during  the  search.  American

Postal Workers Union, 871 F.2d 556.

In  Stikes  v.  Chevron  USA,  Inc.,  914  F.2d  1265  (9th  Cir.

1990), the court recognized that "an employer's decision to institute  a  drug  testing  program  is  a  proper  subject  for collective bargaining." Id. at 1268 (quoting Utility Workers

of  America,  Local  No.  246  v.  Southern  California  Edison

Co., 852 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489

U.S. 1078 (1989)). Although these statements were made in the context of rights guaranteed by the state constitution, I

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see no difference where the right at issue is protected by the United States Constitution. I agree that the power of a union under a collective bargaining agreement includes the power to             waive                       certain     constitutional        rights      on            behalf                       of represented  employees.  Therefore,  the  TWU,  as  Bolden's certified   exclusive                                 bargaining                representative,    was empowered  to  consent  to  a  drug  and  alcohol  screen  as  an integral part of settling Bolden's grievance with SEPTA.

Under  the  settlement  of  Bolden's  grievance  negotiated  by the  TWU,  the  union  agreed  that  Bolden  would  do  one  of two  things.  Either  he  would  enroll  in  a  drug  rehabilitation program, or he would submit to a second drug test. Bolden refused to do either. Given that the TWU had the power to consent  on  his  behalf  to  the  test,  even  though  Bolden objected, Bolden had no choice but submit to the test. He is therefore not entitled to claim damages stemming from his discharge.  Since  all  other  claims  in  this  appeal  fail  in  the absence of a violation of Bolden's civil rights, I see no need to reach the other issues raised by the parties.

VII.

In conclusion, Judge Alito and I agree that SEPTA's failure to  raise  immunity  as  a  defense  to  Bolden's  suit  should  be treated  as  an  affirmative  defense  that  SEPTA  waived  by failing  to  argue  at  trial.  Judge  Alito  and  I  also  agree  that SEPTA's   return-to-work   drug   and   alcohol   testing   is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the Court will enter an order vacating  the  judgment  in  Bolden's  favor.  Judge  Rosenn supports  the  vacatur  of  the  judgment  because  he  believes that   SEPTA   is   immune   from   suit   under   the   Eleventh Amendment.  I  believe  the  judgment  should  be  vacated because Bolden suffered no cognizable injury as a result of the  drug  test  he  took,  since  he  consented  to  the  drug  test actually administered to him. I also believe that Bolden was properly  discharged  when  he  refused  to  comply  with  his union's settlement of his grievance. The union was Bolden's exclusive  bargaining  representative  and  had  the  power  to waive certain of Bolden's constitutional rights, including his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights implicated in this case. I believe that when Bolden refused to comply with the settlement  reached  by  his  union,  SEPTA  was  justified  in terminating his employment.

*13 Because Judge Rosenn concurs in the order of vacatur,

we will vacate the judgment in Bolden's favor and remand to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for SEPTA. Each party to bear its own costs.

ROSENN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.

I concur in the vacatur of the judgment in favor of Bolden. I write        separately,             however,                                 because  Bolden    has          not demonstrated        that          the           Southeastern         Pennsylvania Transportation   Authority   ("SEPTA"),   an   agency   of   the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is amenable to suit under

42  U.S.C.  §  1983.  I  thus  do  not  reach  the  underlying constitutional questions addressed by the court and express no opinion as to these issues.

I.

The United States Supreme Court in Will v. Michigan Dep't

of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), recently held that States and  "arms  of  the  States"  are  not  "persons"  within  the meaning  of  42  U.S.C.  §  1983  and  cannot  be  sued  for damages  under  that  statute  because  the  42d  Congress  did not intend to abrogate traditional State sovereign immunity.

FN1  Thus,  if  SEPTA  is  entitled  to  sovereign  immunity from a suit for damages in federal court, it is not a "person" amenable  to  suit  under  §  1983.  SEPTA  did  not  raise  the issue of its amenability to suit under § 1983. At this court's instruction,  the  parties  provided  supplemental  briefing  on this question.

FN1 The ban on federal courts' exercising judicial power  over  unconsenting  States  is  found  in  the Eleventh  Amendment,  which  states,  "The  Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted  against  one  of  the  United  States  by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens of another State,  or  by  Citizens  or  Subjects  of  any  Foreign State."

Judge  Cowen  argues,  and  Judge  Alito  agrees,  that  the question of SEPTA's amenability to suit is not jurisdictional but  merely  an  affirmative  defense;  that  SEPTA's  failure  to raise  it  constitutes  waiver  of  the  defense,  and,  thus,  this court  is  not  required  to  address  the  issue.  They,  therefore, choose not to decide this issue. This court in banc, however,

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recently declared that the question of a party's amenability to  suit  under  the  Eleventh  Amendment  "implicates  our jurisdiction." Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations,

Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 658 n. 1 (3rd Cir.) (in banc) cert. denied

110  S.Ct.  148  (1989).  Furthermore,  the  Supreme  Court, weighing                the           jurisdictional          implications           of             Eleventh Amendment  immunity,  held  that  the  issue  of  immunity could be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. In Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S.

459, 467 (1945), the Court declared,

The  objection  to  petitioner's  suit  as  a  violation  of  the Eleventh   Amendment   was   first   made   and   argued   by Indiana  in  this  Court.  This  was  in  time,  however.  The Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit   limitation   of   federal   judicial   power   of   such compelling  force  that  this  Court  will  consider  the  issue arising  under  this  Amendment  in  this  case  even  though urged for the first time in this Court.

Id. (emphasis added).

More  recently,  in  Pennhurst  State  School  &  Hospital  v.

Halderman,  465  U.S.  89  (1984),  the  Court  referred  to  the

"jurisdictional bar" of the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 100. Because  SEPTA's  amenability  to  suit  under  §  1983  is controlled by the Eleventh Amendment, under Ford Motor and Pennhurst we are not required to deem the issue waived by SEPTA's failure to previously raise it.

*14 Even if the issue were not jurisdictional or at most only implicated our jurisdiction as we said in Fitchik, important prudential              and          institutional           considerations      favor       our deciding this issue. Judge Cowen does not contend that we are without power to decide the issue and offers no reason why  the  court  should  not  utilize  its  discretion  to  raise  and address  this  issue,  which  is  concededly  antecedent  to  the merits  of  this  lawsuit.  Courts  routinely  raise  issues  sua sponte  when  doing  so  serves  important  judicial  objectives. Indeed, in this very appeal, we instructed the parties to brief a separate issue not previously raised concerning the power of  a  union  to  consent  to  one  of  its  members'  waiver  of  a constitutional right, enabling Judge Cowen to include in his opinion  the  conclusion  that  the  union  "had  the  power  to waive certain of Bolden's constitutional rights." Typescript at 31. SEPTA's immunity from § 1983 liability may also be

properly  raised  by  this  court  on  our  own  motion.  In  the wake of the Court's decision in Will, other courts in recent months   have   raised   sua   sponte   this   very   issue.   See

Smallwood v. Jefferson County, 753 F.Supp. 657 (W.D.Ky.

1991) (holding counties not immune under § 1983); Frazier v. SEPTA, Nos. 84-2950, 84-3004 (E.D.Pa. June 11, 1990)

(holding SEPTA amenable to suit under § 1983).

Several   substantial             judicial    considerations      support   a decision  to  address  and  decide  this  question.  First,  the longstanding    judicial    policy    of    avoiding    unnecessary constitutional holdings will be served if we can dispose of this   appeal   without   reaching   the   merits   of   Bolden's constitutional claims. Judge Cowen's opinion treats two very delicate issues of constitutional law, the legality of SEPTA's return-to-work  drug  testing  and  the  efficacy  of  Bolden's

"consent"  to  an  unconstitutional  search.  These  holdings, particularly  Judge  Cowen's  expansive  construction  of  the constitutional  meaning  of  voluntary,  uncoerced  consent, would no doubt serve as precedent in cases ranging beyond the domain of government employer drug testing. If SEPTA indeed is not amenable to a suit for damages under section

1983, as I argue below, then the court is in effect reaching two unnecessary constitutional holdings.

Second, deciding this issue now will further the consistent and  efficient  administration  of  justice  in  the  district  courts within  our  jurisdiction.  Presently,  there  are  other  §  1983 suits  for  damages  pending  against  SEPTA  in  the  district courts. See, e.g., Frazier v. SEPTA, Nos. 84-2950, 843004

(E.D. Pa. June 11, 1990). Inconsistent district court rulings regarding SEPTA's amenability to suit can be avoided if we definitively  decide  this  issue  now.  In  addition,  valuable judicial resources may be spared should this court conclude that  SEPTA  is  not  a  "person."  This  important  issue  is squarely  before  us  in  the  present  case;  there  is  no  good reason not to decide it.

Finally, SEPTA's failure to raise the issue at the proper time is excusable because the Court did not decide the Will case until after Bolden filed his complaint and after SEPTA filed its  answer.   FN2  Will  was  the  first  case  binding  in  this jurisdiction to hold definitively that States and "arms of the States"  are  not  "persons"  under  §  1983.  Prior  to  Will,  the law   in   this   court   remained   unsettled   as   to   a   States'

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amenability to suit under § 1983. FN3 Thus, for SEPTA to have raised this issue as an affirmative defense in its answer, it would have had to anticipate the Court's holding in Will. Normally, courts will not require such prescient foresight on the  part  of  litigants.  Deeming  the  issue  waived  because SEPTA failed to foresee it is a harsh penalty and prudential considerations caution against it.

FN2 Bolden filed his complaint on November 30,

1988;  SEPTA  answered  on  April  9,  1989.  The Supreme   Court   issued   its   decision   in   Will   v. Michigan Dep't of State Police on June 15, 1989.

FN3  Prior  to  the  Court's  decision  in  Will,  the majority of other courts deciding the question had concluded that states were not "persons" within the meaning of section 1983. At least two circuit courts and  three  state  courts,  however,  had  reached  the opposite conclusion. See Will, 491 U.S. at 61, n.3.

II.

*15  In  Will  v.  Michigan  Dep't  of  State  Police,  the  Court considered the immunity from a § 1983 suit for damages in State  court  of  a  State  entity.  Will  placed  the  question whether a State is a person under § 1983 squarely before the Court  "since  the  Eleventh  Amendment  does  not  apply  in

State courts." Will, 491 U.S. at 63-64. Stating, however, that Eleventh  Amendment  immunity  is  a  "consideration"  when interpreting  Congressional  intent  under  §  1983,  Id.,  at  67, the Court held that a State and its "arms" were not intended to be considered "persons" within the meaning of the civil rights  statute.  Id.  In  support  of  its  conclusion,  the  Court stated that "in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses under the common  law."  Id.  Although  asserting  that  the  scope  of Eleventh Amendment immunity and the scope of § 1983 are

"separate  issues,"  the  Court  limited  its  holding  to  those governmental entities that are considered 'arms of the State' for Eleventh Amendment purposes." Id. at 70.

The  Court  further  clarified  that  its  holding  in  Will  did  not conflict  with  its  earlier  decision  in  Monell  v.  New  York

Dept.  of  Social  Services,  436  U.S.  658  (1978),  that  a municipality  is  a  person  within  the  meaning  of  §  1983, because    at    the    time    of    the    enactment    of    §    1983

municipalities        were        not           entitled   to             State        sovereign

immunity. Will, 491 U.S. at 67, n. 7. Thus, for purposes of the  case  at  hand,  we  must  determine  whether  SEPTA  is more  similar  to  a  municipality  or  to  an  "arm"  of  the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

SEPTA   is              a               Pennsylvania         agency    created    by            the Pennsylvania  legislature  to  provide  public  transportation services   in   the   region   of   Southeastern   Pennsylvania, including   greater   Philadelphia.   It   operates   under   the Pennsylvania  Urban  Mass  Transportation  Law,  55  P.S.  §

600.101  et  seq.  It  is  governed  by  a  Board  of  Directors composed   of   an   ex   officio   member   appointed   by   the Governor  of  Pennsylvania  and  two  members  appointed  by the  county  commissioners  of  each  of  the  four  counties  in Southeastern  Pennsylvania  and  the  mayor  of  Philadelphia. In   1988,   SEPTA's   revenues   from   passenger   fares   and government   subsidies                totaled    $554,852,000,          with Pennsylvania   providing   $147,360,000   in   subsidies.   See Frazier v. SEPTA, Nos. 84-2950, 84-3004 (E.D. Pa June 11,

1990).  Pennsylvania  law  requires  the  Commonwealth  to annually   provide   a   level   of   subsidy   to   SEPTA   which sufficiently enables it to fully provide necessary service to the  public.  55  P.S.  §§  600.204(a),  600.203(2)(iii).  Thus,  a shortfall   (habitually   encountered   by   mass   urban   transit authorities)   which   might   diminish   SEPTA's   ability   to provide  transportation  services  must  be  covered  by  funds from the State treasury.

In its supplemental brief on this issue, SEPTA cites several facts  in  support  of  its  contention  that  it  is  an  arm  of  the Commonwealth  and  thus  not  a  "person"  amenable  to  suit under   §   1983.   First,   the   Pennsylvania   statute   creating SEPTA  declared  in  no  uncertain  terms  that  it  was  to  be considered a Commonwealth agency, not an instrumentality of any          municipality.         Pennsylvania's      Urban      Mass Transportation  Law,  which  established  SEPTA  and  other similar Pennsylvania transportation authorities states:

*16   A  regional  transit  authority   shall  in  no  way  be deemed to be an instrumentality of any city or county or other  municipality  or  engaged  in  the  performance  of  a municipal  function,  but  shall  exercise  the  public  powers of  the  Commonwealth  as  an  agency  and  instrumentality thereof.

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55  P.S.  600.303(a)  (emphasis  added).  This  clear  statement of                Pennsylvania's      legislative               purpose  should    carry considerable  weight  in  informing  this  court  as  to  whether SEPTA  is  more  properly  designated  as  a  municipal  or  a state entity.

Second,  the  highest  appellate  court  of  Pennsylvania  has more  than  once  confirmed  the  view  of  the  legislature, declaring  that  "SEPTA  was  intended  to  be  considered  an agency  of  the  Commonwealth."  Feingold  v.  SEPTA,  517

A.2d  1270,  1276  (1986).  In  Feingold,  the  Pennsylvania Supreme Court       held         that,         as             an            agency    of             the Commonwealth,  SEPTA  could  not  be  liable  for  punitive damages in a tort action.

On  two  other  occasions,  the  Pennsylvania  Supreme  Court reiterated   its   holding   that   Pennsylvania   transportation authorities such as SEPTA are Commonwealth agencies. In

Marshall v. Port Authority, 568 A.2d 931 (1990), the Court recently  held  that,  as  a  Commonwealth  agency,  the  Port Authority,  SEPTA's  counterpart  in  Allegheny  County,  was entitled to sovereign immunity in a tort action which did not fall           under      one          of             the           exceptions              to             immunity                in Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity statute, 42 P.S. §§ 8521,

8522. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently reaffirmed both Marshall and Feingold in Spencer v. SEPTA, 581 A.2d

565 (1990).

Third,   correctly   anticipating   the   Pennsylvania   Supreme Court's  decisions  in  Marshall  and  Spencer,  this  court  in banc   held   in   1987   that   SEPTA   is   an   agency   of   the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania qualifying it for treatment under Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity statute in federal court. Toombs v. Manning, 835 F.2d 453 (3rd Cir. 1987) (in banc). We have recently reaffirmed our holding that SEPTA is  "an  agency  of  the  Commonwealth   and   part  of  the Commonwealth  government."  In  Re  Paoli  R.R.  Yard  PCB

Litigation, 916 F.2d 829 (3rd Cir. 1990).

In Toombs, the plaintiff, who was injured when struck by a subway train, recovered a jury award of $1,000,000 against SEPTA  in  a  diversity  action  in  federal  district  court.  This court attempted to predict whether or not the Pennsylvania Supreme  Court  would  consider  SEPTA  a  Commonwealth agency for purposes of Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity

statute. Relying on the Pennsylvania legislature's description of  SEPTA,  the  Pennsylvania  Supreme  Court's  holding  in Feingold,  and  SEPTA's  conceded  tax  exempt  status  as  a State  agency,  this  court  held  that  SEPTA  was  entitled  to sovereign immunity status in federal court and thus, under Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity statute, damages should have  been  capped  at  $250,000  in  accord  with  that  statute.

FN4  Marshall  and  Spencer,  decided  three  years  later, demonstrate  the  clarity  with  which  this  court  foresaw  the subsequent holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that SEPTA is cloaked with the immunity of the sovereign.

FN4  See  42  P.S.  §  8522(b)  (waiving  the  State's sovereign immunity for certain tort actions) and 42

P.S. § 8528(b) (capping the amount of damages at

$250,000 for any one plaintiff).

*17  Our  decision  in  Toombs  is  squarely  on  point  here because  that  case  decided  that  SEPTA  was  entitled  to sovereign immunity in federal court in a diversity action for damages brought under Pennsylvania tort law. We deferred to the law of Pennsylvania in defining the contours of that immunity  and  declined  to  make  an  independent  analysis under  Eleventh  Amendment  federal  common  law.  Bolden suggests no reason why this approach does not apply with equal  force  in  a  damage  action  in  federal  court  brought under  a  federal  statute  as  to  which  the  Congress  has  not abrogated State immunity.

In light of the Pennsylvania legislative pronouncement that SEPTA   is   a   state   instrumentality,   three   decisions   of Pennsylvania's highest court, one decision of the full panel of   this   court,   and   the   United   States   Supreme   Court's conclusion in Will that Congress when enacting § 1983 "did not   intend   to   override   well-established   immunities   or defenses  under  the  common  law,"  Will  491  U.S.  at  67, Bolden  faces  an  insurmountable  task  in  his  attempt  to persuade this court that SEPTA is a "person" under § 1983. First,  Bolden  starts  on  the  wrong  foot  in  his  supplemental brief  by  erroneously  informing  this  court  that  we  have already   decided   the   question   of   whether   SEPTA   is   a

"person"  under  §  1983  in  his  favor.  To  the  contrary,  in

McKnight v. SEPTA, 583 F.2d 1229 (3rd Cir. 1978), we did not   conclude   that   SEPTA   was   a   "person"   but   merely remanded  to  the  district  court  for  further  consideration  in

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light   of   the   Supreme   Court's   holding   in   Monell   that municipalities could be sued under § 1983. The remaining cases  which  Bolden  cites  either  were  decided  before  the Court's decision in Will or were cases involving § 1983 suits for injunctive relief, which under Will can still be obtained against State entities. See Transport Workers' Local 234 v.

SEPTA,  863  F.2d  1110  (3rd  Cir.  1988),  vacated  109  S.Ct.

3208  (1989),  reaffirmed,  884  F.2d  709  (3rd  Cir.  1989);

Frazier v. SEPTA, 785 F.2d 65 (3rd Cir. 1986).

Bolden  relies  chiefly  on  our  decision  in  Fitchik  v.  New

Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655 (3rd Cir.)

(in   banc)   cert.   denied   110   S.Ct.   148   (1989),   for   his argument that SEPTA can be sued under § 1983. In Fitchik, a  case  not  involving  §  1983  but  a  tort  action  for  personal injuries  sustained  by  railroad  workers  on  the  job,  we  held that  the  New  Jersey  Transit  Rail  Operations,  Inc.,  was  not an "alter ego" of New Jersey and thus not immune from suit generally                under      the           Eleventh Amendment.          When determining an entity's "alter ego" status, we held in Fitchik that  courts  should  consider  three  factors:  1.  whether  the money that would pay the judgment would come from the State treasury; 2. the status of the agency under State law; and  3.  what  degree  of  autonomy  the  agency  possesses.

Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659. Bolden argues that each of these factors supports a finding that SEPTA is not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.

*18 Bolden's strong reliance on Fitchik is misplaced. FN5 This   is   not   a   Fitchik   case.   In   Fitchik,   there   was   no unambiguous announcement by either the New Jersey State legislature or its highest court that New Jersey Transit was entitled to sovereign immunity, as we have in Pennsylvania concerning  SEPTA.  Comparing  this  court's  approach  in Fitchik to our approach in Toombs yields the principle that, when  a  State  has  spoken  authoritatively  and  conclusively regarding   the   sovereign   immunity   status   of   one   of   its agencies, such a determination, if not wholly dispositive of the issue, will at least carry great weight in federal court. In the absence of such an authoritative pronouncement by the State's highest court, in Fitchik we were forced to rely solely upon  general  federal  common  law  principles  of  sovereign immunity.

FN5   Similarly,   the   district   court   in   Frazier   v.

SEPTA,   supra,   erred   in   rigidly   adopting   our approach in Fitchik to the exclusion of this court's other decisions.

The United States Supreme Court long ago recognized that the opinions of a State's highest court concerning the nature and authority of one of its agencies are authoritative in the federal courts. The Court declared,

It  is  undoubtedly  a  question  of  local  policy  with  each State, what shall be the extent and character of the powers which  its  various  political  and  municipal  organizations shall  possess;  and  the  settled  decisions  of  its  highest courts on this subject will be regarded as authoritative by the  courts  of  the  United  States;  for  it  is  a  question  that relates  to  the  internal  constitution  of  the  body  politic  of the State.

Claiborne  County  v.  Brooks,  111  U.S.  400,  410  (1884). Thus, courts have held that, although the application of the Eleventh   Amendment   is   a   question   of   federal   law, authoritative  State  law  which  defines  the  characteristics, powers,  and  immunities  of  a  particular  State  agency  is decisive  of  the  issue  of  that  agency's  immunity  in  federal court. See, e.g, Korgich v. Regents of New Mexico School of

Mines, 582 F.2d 549, 551 (10th Cir. 1978) ("in determining whether             an            action      brought  against    a               governmental institution  is  actually  a  suit  against  the  State  within  the meaning   of   the   Eleventh   Amendment,   State   law   is decisive").

Indeed,  we  have  previously  declared  that  a  State  court determination  that  a  State  entity  is  entitled  to  sovereign immunity  "appears  dispositive  of  the  issue"  in  a  suit  in federal court. Skehan v. Board of Bloomsburg State College,

538 F.2d 53, 62 (3rd Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S.

979 (1976) (emphasis added). Later, we again declared that for    Eleventh Amendment           purposes,               "State      decisions concerning the relationship of an agency to the State may be an important, and under certain circumstances a controlling factor  in  the  determination  of  immunity."  Blake  v.  Kline,

612 F.2d 718, 722 (3rd Cir. 1979) cert. denied 447 U.S. 921

(1980)(emphasis  added).  Although  we  declined  to  specify under what particular circumstances such a decision would be controlling, the existence of a recent holding by a State's highest court involving the identical agency would appear to

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be  the  type  of  circumstance  contemplated  by  this  court  in

Blake.   See   Blake,   612   F.2d   at   723   (emphasizing   the significance  between  a  decision  rendered  by  the  State's highest court and a decision of a State intermediate court).

*19   Respect   for   principles   of   comity   and   federalism counsels that the preferable course for the federal courts is to defer to the expert determination of a State's highest court as to the boundaries of its sovereignty in an individual case, as  we  did  in  Toombs.  The  deference  to  State  sovereignty expressed  in  the  Eleventh  Amendment  would  have  little meaning  if  the  federal  courts  are  free  to  ignore  a  State's determination  as  to  its  constituent  entities.  In  addition, consistency in judicial administration is enhanced when the federal courts defer to a State's own designation of one of its agencies,  because  contrary  determinations  of  an  agency's status by federal courts sitting in different jurisdictions are avoided.  One  such  example  involves  New  Jersey  Transit which, although not immune from suit in our jurisdiction, is immune in the United States Court for the Southern District of New York. Compare Fitchik, supra with Dykman v. New

Jersey   Transit   Rail   Operations,   Inc.,   685   F.Supp.   79

(S.D.N.Y.   1988)).   A   defendant's   immunity   or   lack   of immunity, thus, may be the product of the plaintiff's venue choice.  Such  unfortunate  inconsistencies  and  uncertainties may  be  unavoidable  when,  as  in  Fitchik,  a  State  has  not conclusively  addressed  the  sovereign  status  of  one  of  its agencies. Here, however, Pennsylvania has clearly identified SEPTA as a Commonwealth instrumentality.

Finally,  I  believe  it  is  clear  from  Will  that  Congress  in enacting  §  1983  did  not  intend  to  override  a  State's  own determination  that  one  of  its  agencies  was  immune  from suit,  as  Pennsylvania  has  determined  SEPTA  to  be.  The Court implied as much in Will where it stated,

The conclusion that States and arms of the State are not

"persons"   is  further  supported  by  our  holdings  that  in enacting  §  1983,  Congress  did  not  intend  to  override wellestablished     immunities              or             defenses                                  under      the common law. "One important assumption underlying the Court's decisions in this area is that members of the 42d Congress   were   familiar   with   common-law   principles, including defenses previously recognized in tort litigation, and     that          they           likely       intended                  these       common-law

principles  to  obtain,  absent  specific  provisions  to  the contrary." Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,

258 (1981).... The doctrine of sovereign immunity was a familiar   doctrine   at   common   law.   "The   principle   is elementary that a State cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent." Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U.S.

337,   339   (1880).   It   is   an   "established   principle   of jurisprudence"  that  the  sovereign  cannot  be  sued  in  its own  courts  without  its  consent.  Beers  v.  Arkansas,  20

How.  527,  529  (1858).  We  cannot  conclude  that  §  1983 was  intended  to  disregard  the  well-established  immunity of a State from being sued without its consent.

Will, 491 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court considered that Congress in enacting § 1983 intended to respect a State's own judgment as to the immunity of one of its own agencies in its own courts and not subject such agencies   to   suit   in   federal   court.   In   the   absence   of congressional  action  amending  §  1983,  federal  courts  are bound to recognize the immunity of a sovereign State and it instrumentalities.

*20  Under  Pennsylvania  law,  SEPTA  is  entitled  to  the immunity  of  a  sovereign,  except  in  those  cases  where  it affirmatively  waives  that  immunity  (as  with  certain  tort actions,  see  42  P.S.  §  8522)  and  except  where  Congress, with         unmistakable         clarity,     chooses  to             abrogate that immunity  for  purposes  of  a  federal  cause  of  action.  Here, SEPTA has not waived its immunity, FN6 and Will makes clear that the Congress did not abrogate that immunity in §

1983 suits for damages.

FN6 Courts may find waiver by a State only where stated  "by  the  most  express  language,"  Welch  v.

Texas  Highways  and  Public  Transp.  Dept.,  483

U.S.   468,   473   (1987),   because   " c onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the  surrender  of  constitutional  rights."  Id.  quoting

Edelman  v.  Jordan,  415  U.S.  651,  673  (1974). Thus, it would be inappropriate to hold that SEPTA constructively  consented  to  suit  and  waived  its immunity  to  §  1983  suits  by  failing  to  raise  the issue,  especially  where  it  was  unclear  whether  or not Congress had abrogated State's immunity in §

1983 suits until Will, decided after the filing of the

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present   suit.         In             deference               to             the           Eleventh Amendment's explicit limitation on federal judicial power,   the   Supreme   Court   permits   immunity claims to be raised for the first time on petition for certiorari. Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of

Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945)

III.

In   sum,   I   believe   that   the   court   should   address   the antecedent question of SEPTA's amenability to suit under §

1983,  and  hold  that  SEPTA  is  not  a  "person"  within  the meaning  of  §  1983.  For  the  foregoing  reasons,  we  are compelled to vacate the judgment in favor of Bolden and to instruct  the  district  court  to  enter  a  judgment  in  favor  of SEPTA.

ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with much of Judge Cowen's analysis, but I do not agree that the district court judgment may be reversed on the ground   that          Bolden    consented              to             the           mandatory return-to-work   drug   test   by   silently   submitting   to   that procedure.

1.  I  fully  agree  with  Judge  Cowen  that  we  need  not  -and should   not-reach   the   question   of   whether   SEPTA   is   a

"person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I also agree that, absent consent, Bolden's return-to-work testing violated the Fourth Amendment.  In  Transport  Workers'  Local  234  v.  SEPTA,

863 F.2d 1110, 1122 (3d Cir. 1988), this court struck down SEPTA's   returnto-work   drug   testing   requirement,   while upholding  SEPTA's  program  for  random  drug  and  alcohol testing  of  certain  employees.  The  Supreme  Court  vacated this court's decision, 109 S.Ct. 3208 and 3209 (1989), and remanded  for  reconsideration  in  light  of  its  subsequent decisions in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109

S.Ct. 1402 (1989), and Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway

Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S.Ct. 2477 (1989). On remand, this  court  reaffirmed  the  portion  of  its  decision  that  had upheld    SEPTA's testing    program  for            safety-sensitive positions  (Transport  Workers'  Local  234  v.  SEPTA,  884

F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1990)), but the court had no occasion to address the return-towork question because SEPTA chose to abandon that issue. Id. at 711 n.1. Because I see nothing in

the Supreme Court's decisions or in this court's decision on remand  that  is  inconsistent  with  the  earlier  decision  on return-to-work testing, I regard that as controlling.

2. As previously noted, I disagree with the conclusion that the   jury   verdict   and   district   court   judgment   may   be overturned  on  the  ground  that  Bolden  consented  to  the return-towork physical. On appeal from a judgment entered after a jury verdict, we must view the facts in the light most favorable                to             the           verdict    See          Edwards                 v.              City         of

Philadelphia, 860 F.2d 568, 571 n.2 (3d Cir. 1988), citing

Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008, reh'g denied, 456 U.S. 950 (1982). Consent  to  search  is  a  question  of  fact  to  be  determined from   the   totality   of   the   circumstances.   Schneckloth   v.

Bustamonte,   412   U.S.   218,   226   (1973).   If   the   party conducting   the   search   claimed   the   authority   to   search without  consent,  that  factor  weighs  against  a  finding  of voluntary consent. See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York,

442 U.S. 319, 329 (1979); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391

U.S.  543,  549-50  (1968);  United  States  v.  Molt,  589  F.2d

1247, 1251 (3d Cir. 1978).

*21 Viewing the facts of the present case in the light most favorable  to  the  verdict,  I  believe  the  record  is  ample  to support   a   finding   that   Bolden   did   not   consent.   It   is undisputed that Bolden was not asked to consent and did not do so verbally. It is undisputed that SEPTA would not have permitted Bolden to return to work had he not submitted to the drug test. To be sure, Bolden submitted without voicing any objection and testified at trial that he had no "qualms" about  doing  so.  But  I  cannot  endorse  the  conclusion  that silent  submission  to  an  unconstitutional  search  on  pain  of dismissal from employment constitutes consent as a matter of law.

3. After Bolden's discharge for drug use, the union pressed a grievance on his behalf and eventually reached a settlement calling     for            Bolden's reinstatement.        This         settlement, however,  required  Bolden  to  submit  to  a  drug  test  before returning to work, as well as unannounced follow-up testing for some time thereafter. FN1

FN1 Under the settlement, Bolden had two options, but  both  required  drug  testing  before  returning  to

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work  and  submission  to  unannounced  follow-up testing.       Specifically,            Bolden   could       1)             enter SEPTA's                                  Employee               Assistance             Program    and present   evidence   of   successful   substance   abuse treatment, agree to an "aftercare program," submit to a body fluids test before returning to work, and remain subject to unannounced follow-up tests, or

2)  submit  to  a  body  fluids  test  and,  if  he  passed, meet with a substance abuse counsellor and remain subject  to  unannounced  follow-up  testing  for  six months.

Bolden  correctly  argues  that  this  settlement,  which  he  did not  personally  endorse,  did  not  preclude  him  from  suing SEPTA   under      42             U.S.C.      §              1983         based      upon       the unconstitutional  return-towork  physical.  In  McDonald  v.

West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984), the Supreme Court held that  a  discharged  employee  who  obtained  an  award  in  an arbitration proceeding conducted pursuant to the terms of a collective  bargaining  agreement  was  not  precluded  from bringing  an  action  under  Section  1983  claiming  that  the discharge   was   unconstitutional.   See   also   Dean   Witter

Reynolds    Inc.    v.    Byrd,    470    U.S.    213,    223    (1985)

(recognizing                           "that                         arbitration              proceedings                            will           not necessarily            have        a                                preclusive               effect      on            subsequent federal-court  proceedings.")  Thus,  if  the  union,  rather  than settling   Bolden's   grievance,   had   obtained   an   arbitration award    embodying    precisely    the    same    terms    as    the settlement,  that  award  would  not  have  precluded  Bolden from  suing  under  Section  1983.  I  can  see  no  basis  in  this context   for   distinguishing   an   arbitration   award   from   a settlement  not  personally  endorsed  by  the  employee,  and therefore  I  am  convinced  that  the  settlement  did  not  bar Bolden   from   suing   for   the   past   Fourth   Amendment violation.

Whether  the  union  could  consent  to  future  drug  testing  of Bolden  as  part  of  the  grievance  settlement  is  a  different question.  Under  the  Pennsylvania  Employee  Relations  Act

(PERA), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1101.606, the union was the exclusive collective bargaining representative for all of the employees  in  Bolden's  unit,  and  therefore  the  union,  in entering into a collective bargaining agreement, could agree to  terms  and  conditions  of  employment  that  would  be

binding  on  all  of  the  employees  in  the  unit.  See  Cohen  v.

Temple Univ., 445 A.2d 179, 185 (1982). Not only does the concept   of   exclusive   union   representation   restrict   the freedom  of  individual  employees  to  enter  into  separate employment  contracts,  but  that  concept  may  also  result  in some other restrictions that implicate individual employees' constitutional rights. Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 301

& n.8 (1986); Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455-56

(1984);  Abood  v.  Detroit  Bd.  of  Educ.,  431  U.S.  209,  222

(1977). See also Keller v. State Bar of California, 110 S. Ct.

2228,  2233-34  (1990);  Hohe  v.  Casey,  868  F.2d  69,  73-4

(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 144 (1989); Robinson v.

State of New Jersey, 741 F.2d 598, 604-09 (3d Cir. 1984),

cert.  denied,  469  U.S.  1228  (1985)  and  481  U.S.  1070

(1987);  Galda  v.  Bloustein,  686  F.2d  159,  163-65  (3d  Cir.

1982), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065 (1986).

*22  Terms  and  conditions  of  employment  embodied  in collective   bargaining   agreements   with   public   employers commonly              restrict    rights      that          the           employees              would otherwise enjoy under the Fourth Amendment. To take the most obvious example, work rules often require employees to remain at designated work stations for all or portions of the  working  day.  Yet  under  the  Fourth  Amendment,  a government directive requiring a private citizen to remain at a certain place may constitute a "seizure." INS v. Delgado,

466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.

692,  696  (1987).  No  one  would  contend,  however,  that public   employees   covered   by   a   collective   bargaining agreement specifying the hours and location of work could sue their employer on the ground that enforcement of those work rules constituted an unreasonable seizure. Or, to take another  example  more  closely  related  to  the  present  case, collective bargaining agreements often require employees to undergo periodic medical checkups that employ procedures

(for instance, blood tests or urinalysis to detect disease) that clearly  constitute  searches  under  the  Fourth  Amendment.

Skinner,  109  S.  Ct.  at  1412.  I  do  not  doubt,  however,  that unions possess the authority to consent to such tests, which are  often  important  for  the  protection  of  co-workers,  the employer,  and  the  public,  as  well  as  the  employees  being examined.

Because  a  union  in  negotiating  a  collective  bargaining

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agreement  may  consent  to  such  work-related  searches  and seizures   on   behalf   of   covered   employees,   there   is   no apparent  reason  why  a  union  may  not  likewise  consent  to drug testing. In recent years, many employers in the private and  public  sectors  have  sought  to  implement  drug  testing programs. The National Labor Relations Board has held that drug  testing  is  a  mandatory  subject  of  bargaining.  See

Johnson-Bateman  Comp.  and  Machinists,  AFL-CIO,  Dist.

Lodge  120,  131  LRRM  1393,  1396-98  (1989).  See  also General  Counsel  Memorandum  87-5  (September  8,  1987), Guideline   Memorandum   Concerning   Drug   or   Alcohol Testing  of  Employees  (recommending  that  the  NLRB  take the  position  that  drug  and  alcohol  testing  be  a  mandatory subject   of   bargaining).   Cf.   Consolidated   Rail   Corp.   v.

Railway  Labor  Executives  Ass'n,  109  S.Ct.  2477  (1989)

(Railway   Labor   Act).   Through   collective   bargaining,   a public employer and union can reach agreement on detailed factual   questions,   such   as   whether   particular   jobs   are safety-sensitive, that may have important implications under the Fourth Amendment. If individual public employees may litigate   such   questions   despite   the   resolution   reached through   collective   bargaining,   the   utility   of   collective bargaining with respect to drug testing in the public sector would be greatly diminished.

Several courts of appeals in recent years have suggested that unions,   in   negotiating   collective   bargaining   agreements, may consent to drug testing or analogous searches on behalf of  employees.  In  Jackson  v.  Liquid  Carbonic  Corp.,  863

F.2d 111, 119 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3158

(1989),  the  court  observed,  in  discussing  an  employee's rights under the Fourth Amendment and state privacy law, that   "the   dimensions   of   the   employee's    cognizable expectation of privacy regarding drug testing  depend to a great extent upon the concessions the union made regarding working conditions during collective bargaining." In Utility

Workers  of  America  v.  Southern  California  Edison,  852

F.2d  1083,  1086  (9th  Cir.  1988)  (footnote  omitted),  cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1530 (1989), the court wrote:

*23  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  ...  no  court  has  held that  the  right  to  be  free  from  drug  testing  is  one  that cannot be negotiated away, and we decline to make such a ruling here.

See also Stikes v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 914 F.2d 1265, 1270

(9th  Cir.  1990).  Similarly,  in  American  Postal  Workers Union v. USPS, 871 F.2d 566, 567 (6th Cir. 1989), the court rejected  a  Fourth  Amendment  challenge  to  searches  of employee   lockers   in   part   because   the   searches   were authorized              by            the           collective                bargaining              agreement. Consistent  with  these  authorities,  I  conclude  that  a  union representing public employees may provide binding consent to drug testing in a collective bargaining agreement.

If   a   union   may   provide   such   consent   in   a   collective bargaining agreement, I see no reason why a union may not provide  similar  binding  consent  in  resolving  grievances under   an   appropriate   collective   bargaining   agreement. Under  the  PERA,  like  the  National  Labor  Relations  Act

(NLRA),   29   U.S.C.   §   159(a),   a   union's   authority   as exclusive bargaining agent and its duty of fair representation apply to the adjustment of grievances. Chauffers, Teamsters

and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1344

(1990) (NLRA); Fouts v. Allegheny County, 440 A.2d 698,

701  (1982)  (PERA).  Thus,  I  see  no  reason  why  a  union, within the limits imposed by the fair representation doctrine, may not consent to drug testing in adjusting grievances, just as  it  may  agree  to  drug  testing  in  negotiating  a  collective bargaining               agreement.           If,             for            example,  a                 collective bargaining   agreement   called   for   drug   testing   of   all employees  in  safetyrelated  positions  and  a  grievance  arose regarding               the           categorization        of                the        jobs                          of             certain employees, the union might enter into settlements requiring drug   testing   for   certain   employees.   Similar   settlements might  occur  under  a  collective  bargaining  agreement  in which   authorization   for   drug   testing   was   implied.   See

Consolidated Rail Corp., 109 S. Ct. at 2484. An employee dissatisfied  with  such  a  settlement  could  challenge  the union's handling of his grievance in a suit alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation. Chauffers, Teamsters and

Helpers, Local No. 391, 110 S.Ct. at 1344; Fouts, 440 A.2d

at 701.

In the present case, we are not directly faced with the issue whether  the  union,  in  settling  Bolden's  grievance  on  the terms previously noted, fulfilled its duty under the particular collective  bargaining  agreement  then  in  force.  Rather,  we are  confronted  with  the  question  whether  SEPTA  violated the           Fourth     Amendment           in             conditioning          Bolden's

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reemployment   upon   submission   to   drug   testing.   The Supreme    Court    has    recently    held    that    a    search    is constitutional if it is based upon the reasonable belief that a third  party  had  authority  to  consent.  Illinois  v.  Rodriguez,

110   S.Ct.   2793   (1990).   Here,   SEPTA   had   reasonable grounds to believe that the union possessed the authority to consent to future drug testing of Bolden. As noted, the union was Bolden's exclusive collective bargaining representative. The   union   had   represented   Bolden   regarding   another grievance   a   short   time   earlier   and   had   secured   his reinstatement.   During   the   same   period,   the   union   also represented              dozens     of               other       SEPTA                     employees               in grievances        based                       on                             drug         testing.                                     Under      these circumstances, SEPTA's reliance on the union's authority to settle  Bolden's  grievance  and  to  consent  to  future  drug testing was reasonable. Therefore, SEPTA's insistence upon compliance            with         the           settlement              as             a                                 condition               of employment  did  not  violate  Bolden's  Fourth  Amendment rights,  and  Bolden  should  not  recover  damages  for  lost wages after the settlement date. Because it is impossible to determine how much of the jury verdict was based on wages lost after settlement, I would order a new trial on the issue of damages.

*24 4. In sum, I would reverse the judgment of the district court on the issue of damages only and would remand for a new trial on that issue.

Before     SLOVITER,            Chief       Judge,     and          BECKER,

STAPLETON,       MANSMANN,      GREENBERG, HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD, ALITO and ROSENN FN* , Circuit Judges.

ORDER

A majority of the active judges having voted for rehearing in banc in the above appeal, it is

O  R  D  E  R  E  D  that  the  Clerk  of  this  Court  vacate  the panel's opinion and judgment filed April 1, 1991 and list the above  case  for  rehearing  before  the  court  in  banc  at  the convenience of the court.

Not  Reported  in  F.2d,  1991  WL  41909  (3rd  Cir.(Pa.)),  59

USLW  2614,  6  IER  Cases  481,  6  IER  Cases  639,  1991

O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 29,295

END OF DOCUMENT

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