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Chapter Appendix E - Endnotes

 Section Chapter Four: A Week of Crisis — August 29 – September 5

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Chapter Four: A Week of Crisis — August 29 – September 5

1 The White House, “President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation,” news release, September 15, 2005, .

2 These wind gusts were reported in Poplarville, Mississippi, at the Pearl River County Emergency Operations Center.  See Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 3, 8.

3 Hurricane Katrina was downgraded to Category 1 on the Saffir-Simpson scale at 6:00 pm utc on August 29.  Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 4.

4 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 4.

5 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005).  A National Data Buoy Center (NDBC) buoy located 64 nautical miles south of Dauphin Island, Alabama, measured a peak significant wave height of 55 feet on August 28, matching the record for “the largest significant wave height ever measured by a NDBC buoy.”

6 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 8-9.

7 As of the time of this writing, Louisiana had counted 1,103 deaths, twenty-three of which were not storm related, for 1,080 storm related deaths.  See Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, “Reports of Missing and Deceased,” February 17, 2006,  (accessed February 17, 2006).  There were 231 deaths in Mississippi, fifteen in Florida, two in Alabama, and two in Georgia.  See Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 10.  Since there are still 2,096 people from the Gulf Coast area missing, it is likely that the death toll numbers will increase.  See also U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Satellite and Information Service and National Climatic Data Center, 2005 Annual Climate Review: U.S. Summary (Asheville, NC, January 2006), ; and Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session.

8 The White House, “President Outlines Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts,” news release, August 31, 2005.

9 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 11.

10 Brett Martel, “'What Hiroshima looked like' - Katrina's full wrath still being felt, death toll soars past 100,” Associated Press, August 31, 2005.

11 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #8,” August 30, 2005.  See also American Red Cross, “Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessments,”  (accessed February 13, 2006).

12 Guy Gugliotta and Peter Whoriskey, “Floods Ravage New Orleans; Two Levees Give Way; in Mississippi, Death Toll Estimated at 110,” Washington Post, August 31, 2005.

13 “The eastbound lanes of Interstate 10 between Gulfport and Biloxi were impassable because of storm debris.”  “Katrina kills 50 in one Mississippi county,” CNN.com, August 30, 2005, .

14 “Katrina kills 50 in one Mississippi county,” CNN.com, August 30, 2005, .  See also U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #8,” August 30, 2005, 3 (“Widespread flooding has also been reported across coastal Mississippi and Alabama”).

15 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Satellite and Information Service and National Climatic Data Center, “Hazards/Climate Extremes,” ; and Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 8-9, 10.

16 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #14,” September 2, 2005.

17 Norman Mineta, Secretary of the Department of Transportation, written statement for a hearing on the Department of Transportation (Hurricane Katrina), on October 6, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies,109th Congress, 1st session.

18 Tommy Longo, Mayor of Waveland, Mississippi, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 51.

19 Tommy Longo, Mayor of Waveland, Mississippi, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.  See also U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, Coastal & Marine Geology Program, “Before and After Photo Comparisons: Mainland Mississippi,” Hurricane Katrina Impact Studies, August 31, 2005, .

20 Haley Barbour, Governor of Mississippi, testimony via video teleconference before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recovering from Hurricane Katrina, on September 7, 2005, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 109th Congress, 1st session.

21 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “Hurricane Katrina Update,” August 30, 2005, 12.

22 U.S. Department of Energy, “Department of Energy's Hurricane Response Chronology, as Referred to by Secretary Bodman at Today's Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Hearing,” news release, October 27, 2005, .

23 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, “Hurricane Katrina Situation Report #10,” August 30, 2005, 1; and U.S. Department of Energy, “Department of Energy's Hurricane Response Chronology, as Referred to by Secretary Bodman at Today's Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Hearing,” news release, October 27, 2005, .

24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #36,” September 13, 2005, 7.  “The wireline telecommunications network sustained enormous damage both to the switching centers that route calls and to the lines used to connect buildings and customers to the network.”  Kenneth Moran, Director of the Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina and Communications Interoperability, on September 29, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 109th Congress, 1st session.

25 Nearly one hundred radio and television stations remained off the air a month after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall.   Kenneth Moran, Director of the Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina and Communications Interoperability, on September 29, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Congress, 1st session.

26 Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, on October 27, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 74.

27 “The public health and health care delivery infrastructures have been either completely destroyed or have sustained significant damage across the affected Gulf Coast.  Existing facilities that are operational are under extreme stress as they assume even greater responsibilities to fill the gaps created by the loss of so many facilities. Physician offices, cancer, imaging, dialysis and rehabilitation centers, hospitals, clinics, long-term care facilities, pharmacies, laboratories, etc., need to be rebuilt or repaired, not to mention re-supplied, with information technology systems, equipment and inventory.”  Ardis D. Hoven, Member of the American Medical Association Board of Trustees, written statement for a hearing on Assessing Public Health and the Delivery of Care in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, on September 22, 2005, submitted to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittees on Health and Oversight and Investigations, 109th Congress, 1st session.

28 “Nursing homes and hospitals were not a priority during the rescue process. For the first two days, the Louisiana Nursing Home Association  was on its own to improvise and find ways to rescue the elderly in nursing homes.”  Joseph A. Donchess, Executive Director of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association, written statement for a hearing on Challenges in a Catastrophe:  Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, on January 31, 2006, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session.  “Only a third of nursing homes in the New Orleans area evacuated before Katrina, according to state and industry officials. In hard-hit Orleans and Jefferson parishes, eight of forty-one nursing homes removed residents before the storm.”  Roma Khanna, “Katrina’s toll on the sick, elderly emerges,” Houston Chronicle, November 28, 2005.  Fatality statistics illustrate Hurricane Katrina’s heavy toll on older Louisiana residents.  For example, 71% of the dead at St. Gabriel Morgue whose age could be determined were more than sixty years old.  See Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, “Vital Statistics of All Bodies at St. Gabriel Morgue,” January 4, 2006, .

29 For example, Dr. Mark Peters of East Jefferson General Hospital in Metairie, Louisiana, stated that, “A day or two after the storm, we ran low on food. We always were able to feed our patients, and there were only two days when the staff had to eat once a day, and in small amounts. After that, we were able to contact various businesses and vendors to replenish our supplies and food.”  Dr. Mark Peters, President and Chief Executive Officer of East Jefferson General Hospital, written statement for a hearing on Assessing Public Health and Delivery of Care in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, on September 22, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Health and Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 109th Congress, 1st session.  Also see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary's Operations Center Flash Report #8--Hurricane Katrina,” August 31, 2005, 1-2; and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary's Operations Center Flash Report #9--Hurricane Katrina,” August 31, 2005, 1.

30 For example, six or seven patients at the Bethany Home, a nursing facility in New Orleans, succumbed to the conditions as they awaited evacuation.  See Joseph A. Donchess, Executive Director of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association, testimony before a hearing on Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, on January 31, 2006, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session.  See also Roma Khanna, “Katrina’s Aftermath,” Houston Chronicle, November 27, 2005.

31 The Louisiana State Attorney General subsequently charged the nursing home’s owners with thirty-four counts of negligent homicide.  Louisiana Office of the Attorney General, “Nursing Home Owners Surrender to Medicaid Fraud Control Unit Investigators,” news release, September 14, 2005, .

32 Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 3.

33 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 9.

34 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina SITREP #6,” August 29, 2005.

35 R.B. Seed, P.G. Nicholson, R.A. Dalrymple, et al., Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005, November 17, 2005.

36 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Urban Search and Rescue Operations Completed: Hurricane Katrina Urban Search and Rescue Teams Are Due to Return Home,” news release, September 30, 2005,  

37 Governor Kathleen Blanco, Michael Brown, Senator Mary Landrieu, Bill Lokey, and Senator David Vitter, “Governor Kathleen Blanco (D-LA) Hold a News Conference Regarding Hurricane Katrina,” Congressional Quarterly Transcription, August 30, 2005.

38 FEMA Urban Search and Rescue teams “helped 6,582 people reach safety in the hours and days immediately following Hurricane Katrina.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Urban Search and Rescue Operations Completed: Hurricane Katrina Urban Search and Rescue Teams Are Due to Return Home,” September 30, 2005, . National Guard forces were engaged in search and rescue operations within four hours after landfall.  Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, written statement for a hearing on Responding to Catastrophic Events: The Role of the Military and National Guard in Disaster Response, on October 20, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Government Reform, 109th Congress, 1st session. Early search and rescue actions of local first responders: Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, written statement submitted for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, to the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 1.

39 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, Flash Flood Warning for Louisiana, August 29, 2005 (New Orleans, LA, August 2005).

40 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #7,” August 29, 2005.

41 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “FEMA National Sitrep 2005 Aug 29,” August 29, 2005.

42 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “HSOC#4317-05: HC Katrina Update- 11:30hrs,” August 29, 2005.

43 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “HSOC#4317-05: VTC NOTES 29 AUG 05.”

44 It was not until 7:30 PM that the HSOC developed a spot report that described the USACE report, but it is unclear if this spot report was distributed outside of the HSOC.

45 Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director for External Affairs, Region One, Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, A Flooded City, A Chaotic Response, on October 20, 2005, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session.

46 Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director for External Affairs, Region One, Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, A Flooded City, A Chaotic Response, on October 20, 2005, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session.

47 Michael Brown, former Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Hurricane Preparedness, on February 10, 2006, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session.

48 Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director for External Affairs, Region One, Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, A Flooded City, A Chaotic Response, on October 20, 2005, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session.

49 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “HSOC Spot Rep #13,” August 29, 2005).

50 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS Sit Rep #8,” August 30, 2005.

51 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “HSOC #4217-05: HC Katrina—NO 200 Ft Breached Levee Update,” August 30, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “HSOC #4317-05: HC Katrina – NO 200 Ft of Levee  Breached,” August 30, 2005; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “HSOC Spot Rep FW: US Army Corps of Engineers Spot Rep,” August 30, 2005.

52 Governor Kathleen Blanco, Michael Brown, Senator Mary Landrieu, Bill Lokey, and Senator David Vitter, “Governor Kathleen Blanco (D-LA) Hold a News Conference Regarding Hurricane Katrina,” Congressional Quarterly Transcription, August 30, 2005.

53 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005); and Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session. In contrast, Raymond B. Seed, prepared statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Performance of the Flood Control System, on November 2, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session, 2, . Both sources report that eighty percent of New Orleans experienced some amount of flooding.

54 Michael Brown, former Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Hurricane Preparedness, on February 10, 2006, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session.

55 International Association of Firefighters, “Reports from the Hurricane Frontlines: Katrina (August 29-September 6),” August 30, 2005, .

56 International Association of Firefighters, “Reports from the Hurricane Frontlines: Katrina (September 7-September 13),” September 10, 2005, .

57 Warren J. Riley, Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, on February 6, 2006, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session.

In contrast, see Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session (“Pre-Katrina, we had 1,668 officers.  Post-Katrina, we're at 1,506 -- so we're down 162 officers.  We've had about 133 officers that have either been terminated, resigned, you know, are under investigation or resigned for personal reasons.”).

58 Louisiana State Police, “Hurricane Katrina Timeline of Events,” n.d.,ca. 2005.

59 Christopher Rhoads, “Cut Off: At Center of Crisis, City Officials faced struggle to keep in touch,” Wall Street Journal, September 9, 2005.

60 Willis Carter, Chief of Communications, Shreveport, Louisiana Fire Department, written statement for a hearing on Communications Interoperability, on September 29, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 109th Congress, 1st session.

61 Louisiana State Police, “Hurricane Katrina Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005.

62 Senator Robert Barham, quoted in Joby Warrick, “Crisis Communications Remain Flawed,” Washington Post, December 10, 2005.

63 Nick Felton, New Orleans Local 632 President, quoted in International Association of Firefighters, “Reports from the Hurricane Frontlines: Katrina (September 7-September 13),” September 13, 2005, .

64 Lieutenant Colonel Keith LaCaze, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, Enforcement Division, Activity Report on Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, 2005), 2; Massachusetts Urban Search and Rescue Task Force One, Hurricane Katrina: National Urban Search and Rescue Response System Issue Statements and Recommendations (Beverly, MA, 2005), 7; and Ceci Connolly, ‘“I Don’t Think I’ve Ever Had a More Surreal Experience’; Veteran Rescue Workers Surprised by Challenges in Louisiana,” Washington Post, September 12, 2005.

65 Juliet Eilperin, “Flooded Toxic Waste Sites Are Potential Health Threat,” Washington Post, September 10, 2005.  “A Superfund site is any land in the United States that has been contaminated by hazardous waste and identified by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as a candidate for cleanup because it poses a risk to human health and/or the environment.”  See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “About Superfund,”  (accessed January 28, 2005).

66 Gulf Coast Hurricane Emergency Environmental Protection Act of 2005, HR Res. 4139, section 102 (c), 109th Congress, 1st session (October 25, 2005).  See also U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina: What Government is Doing,”  (accessed February 10, 2006).

67 For first-hand accounts of these conditions, see Lieutenant Colonel Keith LaCaze, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, Enforcement Division, Activity Report on Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, 2005), 2; Massachusetts Urban Search and Rescue Task Force One, Hurricane Katrina: National Urban Search and Rescue Response System Issue Statements and Recommendations (Beverly, MA, 2005), 7; and Ceci Connolly, ‘“I Don’t Think I’ve Ever Had a More Surreal Experience’; Veteran Rescue Workers Surprised by Challenges in Louisiana,” Washington Post, September 12, 2005.  For details on the contaminants found in tested floodwaters, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Environmental Assessment Summary for Areas of Jefferson, Orleans, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines Parishes Flooded as a Result of Hurricane Katrina,” December 6, 2005, .

68 For example, see Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, letter to Governor Bill Owens, entitled “Calling Certain Elements of the Colorado National Guard to Active Duty to Assist with Emergency Response Efforts Related to Hurricane Katrina,” September 1, 2005.  Governor Blanco signed similar memoranda with fifteen other States on the same date.

EMAC was established to provide form and structure to interstate mutual aid.  Approved by Congress in 1996 (Public Law 104-321), the EMAC membership has since grown to include 49 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.  Through EMAC, a disaster-struck member State may request and receive assistance from other member States quickly and efficiently, facilitated by the Compact's legal foundation.  Once the conditions for providing assistance to a requesting State have been set, the terms constitute a legally binding contractual agreement that obligates States for reimbursement.  See Emergency Management Assistance Compact, “About EMAC,” .

69 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 2005, December 21, 2005, 57.

70 Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 1.

71 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Urban Search and Rescue Operations Completed: Hurricane Katrina Urban Search and Rescue Teams Are Due to Return Home,” news release, September 30, 2005, .  FEMA pre-positioned US&R teams to the region and eventually deployed all twenty-eight National US&R teams within the first week after Hurricane Katrina’s second landfall.  FEMA US&R Task Forces, in conjunction with USCG, DOD, other Federal agencies, and State and local first responders, rescued over 6,500 people.

72 Donna Miles, “Military Support to Katrina Relief Effort Continues to Grow,”American Forces Information Service, August 31, 2005, .

73 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard, Hurricane Katrina: The U.S. Coast Guard at its Best (Washington, D.C., 2005), 7, 47.  See also U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard, “Coast Guard Response to Hurricane Katrina,” Coast Guard Fact File,  (accessed February 10, 2006); and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina: What Government is Doing,”  (accessed February 10, 2006).

74 John Sherffius, cartoon, reproduced by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard Aviation Association, September 2005,  (accessed February 7, 2006).

75 Haley Barbour, Governor of Mississippi, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, submitted to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 2-3.

76 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Urban Search and Rescue Operations Completed: Hurricane Katrina Urban Search and Rescue Teams Are Due to Return Home,” September 30, 2005, .

77 Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, written statement for a hearing on Responding to Catastrophic Events: The Role of the Military and National Guard in Disaster Response, on October 20, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Government Reform, 109th Congress, 1st session.

78 “US&R activities include locating, extricating, and providing onsite medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures.”  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), ESF #9-1.

79 National Search and Rescue Committee, National Search and Rescue Plan (Washington, D.C., 1999), 8-9.

80 East Baton Rouge Parish, Draft After-Action Report for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Baton Rouge, 2005), 37-38.

81 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, December 2, 2005), 11; and Lieutenant Colonel Keith LaCaze, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, Enforcement Division, Activity Report on Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, 2005).

82 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), ESF #9-1.

83 Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan Supplement 1A: Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan (Baton Rouge, January 2000), Parts I, II, VI.  The City of New Orleans had drafted a hurricane annex to its emergency management plan that outlined the responsibilities of municipal organizations for executing the City’s evacuation.  See New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness, City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan: Hurricanes Annex (New Orleans, n.d.).

84 William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 93 ; Brigadier General Mark Graham, Deputy Commanding General, Fifth U.S. Army, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session; and Vince Pearce, National Response Program Manager, Department of Transportation, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session, 1-2.

85 On August 29, the population of evacuees at the facility was estimated to be between 10,000 and 12,000.  Marty J. Bahamonde, Office of Public Affairs, Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before the Senate Homeland Security Committee and Governmental Affairs, October 20, 2005, 2; Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, (Baton Rouge, December 2, 2005), 7; and Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 14.  An inaccurate estimate of 25,000 general population evacuees at the Superdome was reported by DHS on August 29.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #6," August 29, 2005, 13.

FEMA estimated the Superdome population at 20,000 people on August 29.  The Louisiana National Guard estimates that the crowd grew to 35,000 over the course of the next three days.  See Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 13, 15-17.

86 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 16, 17.

87 Major General Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General for the State of Louisiana, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, on October 27, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

88 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 17.

89 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 15-17; Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director for External Affairs, Region One, Federal Emergency Management Agency, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans: A Flooded City, a Chaotic Response, on October 20, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session.

90 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #6,”August 30, 2005.

91 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, December 2, 2005), 9.

92 FEMA requested of the Governors of a number of States that their States accept and temporarily house evacuees. See, e.g., Arizona Department of Housing, “Arizona to Accept Evacuees from Gulf Coast,” news release, n.d., ca. 2005, .; Oregon Office of the Governor, “Questions and Answers on Relief Efforts,” .  The Governor of Louisiana and her staff also made direct requests to States.  See Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, December 2, 2005), 9-10.

93 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, December 2, 2005), 10.

94 The provision of buses occurred through ESF-1, which is led by the Department of Transportation.  Vincent Pearce, National Response Program Manager for the Department of Transportation, written statement submitted for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee; and U.S. Department of  Transportation, “Actions for Hurricane Katrina: Annotated Chronology of Significant Events,” October 6, 2005, 4.

95 FEMA directly requested that several States receive and house evacuees.  For examples, see Arizona Department of Housing, “Arizona to Accept Evacuees from Gulf Coast,” news release, n.d., ca. 2005, .; and Oregon Office of the Governor, “Questions and Answers on Relief Efforts,” .  In other cases, such requests were made by one State's governor to another.  For example, see District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, “Mayor Williams Announces Airlift of Several Hundred Hurricane Evacuees to DC Armory,” news release, September 5, 2005, ; and New York Office of the Governor, “Governor: NY Stands Ready to Welcome Hurricane Katrina Evacuees, news release, September 7, 2005, .

96 I-10 is a major interstate cutting east-west through New Orleans.  Near the Superdome, I-10 features an elevated four-way interchange, called a cloverleaf due to its distinctive shape.  Evacuees gathered atop this interchange to escape Hurricane Katrina’s floodwaters.  Brigadier General Mark A. Graham, Deputy Commanding General, Fifth U.S. Army, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session, 2, 3-4; and William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 5, 7, 92.

97 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, December 2, 2005), 10.

98 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican,“Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 23, 24. Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

99 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican,“Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 23.

100 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 23; Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, written statement for a hearing on Managing the Crisis: Evacuating New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session; and Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, December 2, 2005), 10.

101 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, December 2, 2005), 11.  Also see Kathleen Blanco, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 68.

102 “The buses that the city of New Orleans controls are basically Regional Transit Authority. And those buses were always staged, or has been staged in an area that has been high and dry throughout every storm that has ever hit the city of New Orleans. And we expected the same for this event. Unfortunately, those buses flooded also because 80 percent of the city went underwater.” Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 99.

103 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, December 2, 2005), 11.

104 “About 20,000 people were in the dome when efforts began, and that number swelled as people poured in to get a ride out of town, Capt. John Pollard said.” The Associated Press, “Superdome Evacuation Completed,” September 3, 2005.  

105 Medical evacuations from the Convention Center began on September 2, as well.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #14,” September 2, 2005, 1; and Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 23-24. Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 23-24. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #16,” September 3, 2005, 1.

106 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #17,” September 3, 2005, 1.

107 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #16,” September 3, 2005, 1.

108 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #18,” September 4, 2005, 1.

109 The next three largest U.S. domestic airlifts were: Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (13,500 people), the Mariel Boatlift (12,000 people by helicopter), and Hurricane Rita (9,000 people).  U.S. Department of Transportation, “Largest Airlift in U.S. History to Get Over 10,000 People Out of New Orleans by End of Today,” news release, September 3, 2005, ; National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, “Year by Year Events: 1990-1997,” .

110 In addition, the U.S. Army provided ground support at the airport, including physically assisting in loading passengers up airplane stairs and into aircraft.  See also U.S. Department of Transportation, “Hurricane Katrina – Situation Report Fifteen,” September 3, 2005, 2; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #14,” September 2, 2005 (“Coordinated major airlift of evacuees to begin 8:00 am cdt, September 2, 2005. Evacuees will depart New Orleans Superdome by bus, and be flown at a rate of 4-5 planes per hour from New Orleans Airport to Lackland Air Force Base, TX for reception and housing at Kelly AFB”); U.S. Department of Transportation, In re: Foreign Air Carriers: Facilitation of Air Services in Support of Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts, Docket OST-2005-22395 (September 2, 2005), 3; and James C. May, President and Chief Executive Officer of Air Transport Association of America, testimony before a hearing on Review of the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on the Aviation Industry, on September 14, 2005, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation, 109th Congress, 1st session, 8.

111 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA VIP Briefing,” slide presentation, September 2, 2005.

112 U.S. Department of Defense, “Hurricane Katrina Update,” September 8, 2005, 4; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region VI Regional Response Coordinating Center, “SITREP #10,” September 4, 2005, 1; and Bryon Okada, “Screeners kept flights moving,” Dallas Fort-Worth Star Telegram, September 12, 2005, as reprinted by the Transportation Security Administration, What Others Are Saying About TSA, .

113 The Department of Transportation had arranged for Amtrak to transport evacuees from New Orleans to Lafayette on a twice-daily run. The trains had enough food and water to sustain the passengers during the two to four hour ride.  The first Amtrak train arrived at Avondale Station in New Orleans at 4:30 am on September 3.  The train could have accommodated 600 passengers, but only ninety-six were at the station because of a bus problem in New Orleans.  See U.S. Department of Transportation, “Hurricane Katrina – Situation Report Fifteen,” September 3, 2005, 10.  In contrast, however, see Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session.

114 CNN, “Rita Now a Monster Category-Five Storm,” transcript, September 22, 2005.  

115 For examples, see Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, “Hurricane Katrina Situation Report 24,” September 1, 2005, 11; For examples of media reports on the looting, see Walt Philbin, “Widespread looting hits abandoned businesses; Lack of police after storm leaves stores vulnerable,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 30, 2005;   “Katrina kills 50 in one Mississippi county,” CNN.com, August 30, 2005, .

116 In one notable example, on August 30, a New Orleans Police officer was shot in the head by looters.  See Louisiana State Police, “Hurricane Katrina Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005, 8.  Also in New Orleans, a man was arrested by Federal agents for firing at a U.S. military helicopter on a search and rescue mission.  U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Louisiana, news release, October 8, 2005.  The reported target of the gunfire was a U.S. military helicopter on a search and rescue mission.  While the gunfire did not hit the helicopter, the incident was widely reported and contributed to the perception of lawlessness in New Orleans.  See, e.g., “ATF Makes First Federal Arrest in New Orleans,” US Fed News, September 6, 2005; “US authorities arrest New Orleans man accused of firing on helicopter,”Agence France Presse,September 7, 2005; “Federal agents start post-storm arrests; Algiers man accused of shooting at copter,” New Orleans Times-Picayune,September 7, 2005.

117 For examples, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #7,” August 29, 2005, 5; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #11,” August 31, 2005, 4.  Additionally, without functioning jails in New Orleans, law enforcement officers initially had no choice but to release those that they arrested for minor crimes.

118 Reports on general lawlessness in New Orleans, were later found to be embellished or completely false.  Brian Thevenot and Gordon Russel, “Rape. Murder. Gunfights,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, September 26, 2005; Robert E. Pierre and Ann Gerhart, “News of Pandemonium May Have Slowed Aid,” Washington Post, October 5, 2005; and Michelle Roberts, “Reports of rape, murder at Katrina shelters were probably exaggerated, officials now say,” Associated Press, September 27, 2005.

119 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Hurricane Katrina Response Brief,” September 1, 2005.  The brief reported that security and lawlessness were becoming a “very critical concern” and were hindering relief efforts.  See also U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “VIP Katrina Briefing,” slide presentation, September 1, 2005.

120 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard District Eight, internal message from August 31, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Operations Center, “HSOC SPOT REP #53,” September 1, 2005; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #13,” September 1, 2005.

121 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region VI Regional Response Coordination Center, “1603-DR-LA SitRep #7,” September 1, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #13,” September 13, 2005; and U.S. Department of Defense, “CJCS Katrina Update,” draft, September 6, 2005.

122 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #10 – Hurricane Katrina,” September 1, 2005; and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #12 – Hurricane Katrina,” September 2, 2005.

123 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #15,” September 2, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #19,” September 4, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #18,” September 4, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #29,” September 9, 2005.

124 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #13,” September 1, 2005, 4, 10, 12;  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #15,” September 2, 2005, 5, 13, 14; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #16,” September 3, 2005, 10; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #18,” September 4, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #19,” September 4, 2005, 11; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #21,” September 5, 2005, 11; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #22,” September 6, 2005, 9.

125 The Department of Homeland Security’s law enforcement response began on August 29, when Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deployed officers from the Federal Protective Service to protect critical Federal facilities and to assist FEMA where needed.  From August 30 to September 1, DHS deployed additional ICE personnel to the region to perform public safety and security missions.  The U.S. Coast Guard also deployed personnel to conduct security and law enforcement missions.  By August 30, Customs & Border Protection (CBP) deployed a site survey team and Special Operations Division agents to the hurricane area; CBP air and maritime assets also joined in conducting law enforcement operations.  On August 31, the Secret Service deployed personnel to implement its Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) and Restoration of Operations, Personnel and Equipment (ROPE) mission assignments.

On September 1, the Office of the Attorney General directed ATF, DEA, FBI, and the U.S. Marshals Service to identify personnel, assets, and other resource for immediate deployment to areas impacted by Hurricane Katrina.  On September 2, having received the inventory of assets and personnel available for deployment, the Attorney General issued a memorandum to the same agencies directing the Federal Bureau of Investigation to continue to deploy agents (including SWAT agents) and tactical assets (including helicopters, boats, and technical/communications assets) to the affected area; the Drug Enforcement Administration to prepare to deploy Mobile Enforcement Teams, special agents, and tactical assets (including helicopters and other aircraft) to the affected area; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to establish a Violent Crime Impact Team (VCIT) in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, with related VCIT personnel and assets, to address any rise in criminal activity in that city; and the United States Marshals Service to continue to deploy Deputy U.S. Marshals and Court Security Officers to conduct prisoner transport operations and provide additional court security and to prepare to utilize the Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation (JPATS) to deploy law enforcement personnel to airports around the country as needed.

126 In the first week following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, DHS and DOJ deployed the following numbers of law enforcement personnel to New Orleans to assist in restoring order.  Other departments contributed significant numbers of law enforcement personnel as well.

Date                       DHS                        DOJ

Aug 29                    66                             268

Aug 30                    74                             292

Aug 31                    196                           326

Sep 1                      162                           443

Sep 2                      381                           547

Sep 3                      1033                         645

Sep 4                      1230                         690

127 42 U.S.C. § 10501 et seq.  See also letter from Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, dated September 3, 2005 letter is dated September 3, 2005, but was received via facsimile on the following day ; letter from Attorney General Gonzales to Governor Blanco, dated September 4, 2005 (approving request); letter from Governor Blanco to Attorney General Gonzales and Secretary Chertoff, dated September 6, 2005 (requesting additional support); letter from Attorney General Gonzales to Governor Blanco, dated September 7, 2005 (approving request); letter from Secretary Chertoff to Governor Blanco, dated September 7, 2005 (approving request).  Governor Barbour of Mississippi made a similar request on September 3, which was granted pursuant to an order by the Attorney General on that date.

128 DHS deployed law enforcement officers from Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Air Marshals Service, the Federal Protective Service, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  DOJ deployed officers from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Marshals Service.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #21,” September 5, 2005.

129 By September 8, the Department of Interior deployed 175 law enforcement officers from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Tribal Police.  The Department of the Treasury and the Department of Veteran Affairs deployed thirty-four and thirty-three law enforcement officers, respectively.  The Environmental Protection Agency sent seventeen officers to the region, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service deployed a total of 117 law enforcement personnel.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Federal Law Enforcement Deployed to Region,” September 8, 2005. In addition, USDA’s Forest Service deployed approximately 300-350 law enforcement officers to the affected area as members of ESF-4 Incident Management Teams. Eventually, over 3,500 Federal law enforcement officers were deployed to the region.

130 In Louisiana, for example, a State Police attorney had to physically be present to swear in Federal agents.  Additionally, law enforcement personnel from the Department of the Interior (DOI) had to be sworn in as Deputy U.S. Marshals to give them Federal law enforcement authority beyond their statutory DOI jurisdiction.

131 For additional information on the disarray of the New Orleans criminal justice system in Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath, see Melinda Deslatte, “Prisons in New Orleans empty as temporary booking facility up and running,” Associated Press, September 3, 2005; Ann Woolner, “A Legal System in Chaos: New Orleans Struggles,” Fulton County Daily Report, October 4, 2005; and Chuck Crumbo, “Evacuation leaves Louisiana prison system in chaos,” The State (Columbia, SC), October 5, 2005.

132 On September 3, the Associated Press reported that “computer logs still hadn’t been retrieved from the criminal district court in New Orleans… and  tracking down witnesses, finding court records and trial transcripts and organizing a temporary court” would remain challenges to the reestablishment of the city’s criminal justice system.  Melinda Deslatte, “Prisons in New Orleans empty as temporary booking facility up and running,” Associated Press, September 3, 2005; Ann Woolner, “A Legal System in Chaos: New Orleans Struggles,” Fulton County Daily Report, October 4, 2005; and Chuck Crumbo, “Evacuation leaves Louisiana prison system in chaos,” The State (Columbia, SC), October 5, 2005. Both State and Federal courts closed their doors.  Supreme Court of Louisiana, Order by Justice Catherine D. Kimball, September 2, 2005, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Supreme Court of Mississippi, Order by Justice James W. Smith, Jr., September 7, 2005; U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Order by Chief Judge Helen G. Berrigan, September 4, 2005, accessed from  on February 17, 2006; U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, September 2, 2005, accessed from  on February 17, 2006; Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, State of Louisiana, Order by Justice Max N. Tobias, Jr., September 2, 2005, accessed from  on February 17, 2006; Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, State of Louisiana, Order by Justice Walter J. Rothschild, September 2, 2005, accessed from: , accessed on February 17, 2006; Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, Order by Chief Justice Robin M. Giarrusso, September 2, 2005, accessed from , accessed on February 17, 2006.

133 The DOJ’s Bureau of Prisons moved or facilitated movement of a large number of prisoners incarcerated in Louisiana facilities during the first week of the disaster.  The Bureau noted that no major difficulties or issues were encountered during the actual transport of the prisoners, though both the Bureau and the U.S. Marshals Service noted flaws in the decision making process and a general failure on the part of State and local prison authorities to be proactive in evacuating their incarcerated populations.

134 Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals, on December 8, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session.

135 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, memorandum for distribution entitled “Designation of Principal Federal Official for Hurricane Katrina,” August 30, 2005, 1.

An INS was arguably in effect since President Bush earlier issued his Emergency Declarations and Major Disaster Declarations.  See the National Preparedness—A Primer chapter for a detailed discussion of this issue, as well as U.S. Government Accountability Office, Preliminary Observations on Hurricane Response (Washington, DC, February 2006, 4).

136 Though Secretary Chertoff subsequently testified that Director Brown had the authority to manage the incident even prior to his formal designation as PFO, “…when he went down on Sunday it was with the understanding that he was going to manage this thing as the battlefield commander, you know, with the authority he had as the director of FEMA, which put him in supervisory authority over the federal coordinating officers.”  Secretary Chertoff added, “When I actually formally designated him the PFO, it was essentially formalizing something that had occurred in practice.” Michael Chertoff, testimony before a hearing on “Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Department of Homeland Security,” on October 19, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

137 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 33.

138 According to the NRP, the FCO is “The Federal officer who is appointed to manage Federal resource support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies. The FCO is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of Federal disaster assistance resources and programs to the affected State and local governments, individual victims, and the private sector.” National Response Plan, p. 65.

139 “ Director Brown  was going to manage this thing as the battlefield commander, you know, with the authority he had as the director of FEMA, which put him in supervisory authority over the federal coordinating officers.”  Michael Chertoff, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Department of Homeland Security, on October 19, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.  See also Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act “Stafford Act” , as amended by Public Law 106-390 (October 30, 2000).

140 Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

141 A virtual National JIC “links all participants through technological means (secure or nonsecure) when geographical restrictions, incident management requirements, and other limitations preclude physical attendance by public affairs leadership at a central location.”  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), PUB-3.

142 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 28.

143 Some of this lack of planning can be attributed to the failure to finalize the JFO Standing Operating Procedures prior to Katrina, as required by the National Response Plan.

144 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS Sitrep #20,” September 5, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS Sitrep #23,” September 6, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Daily Conference Call on Hurricane Katrina, September 7, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS Sitrep #27,” September 8, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Region VI Regional Response Coordinating Center Sitrep #15,” September 9, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS Sitrep #20,” September 5, 2005, 1; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #32—Hurricane Katrina,” September 12, 2005, 2, 3; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #32—Hurricane Katrina,” September 12, 2005, 2; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Emergency Response Issues,” September 11, 2005, 10; Robert B. Stephan, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement for a hearing on “Hurricane Katrina: The Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership,” on February 10, 2006, submitted to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 2nd session, pgs. 7-8.

145 Federal officials recognized the need for a presence in New Orleans to effectively coordinate the efforts to stabilize the City, so a “forward PFO” in New Orleans was eventually established. The JFO remained in Baton Rouge.

146 Although the JFO in Baton Rouge was located in close proximity to the Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center, the vast majority of the response operations in the early stages of the incident occurred in the greater New Orleans area.  It quickly became apparent that the JFO was too far away to coordinate operational activities in New Orleans.  For this reason, the Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC) was initially established in Baton Rouge and then moved to New Orleans to coordinate law enforcement activities.   The Department of Defense (DOD) set up its Katrina Task Force HQ in Mississippi.  New Orleans officials established the New Orleans Emergency Operations Center downtown, with no connectivity to the JFO.

147 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, Office of Legislative Liaison, “National Guard Status Comparison Chart,” n.d., .  State active duty and Title 32 forces are not subject to posse comitatus restrictions, see 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (Military forces generally may not perform domestic law enforcement), which bar Federal military forces from enforcing civil law. Thus, while serving in State active duty status or Title 32 status (which allows for Federal pay while under state command and control), the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard can directly assist civil authorities in maintaining peace and order.  Lieutenant General Steven H. Blum, “A Vision for the National Guard,” Joint Force Quarterly, December 2004, 36.

148 U.S. Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Manual 3025.1-M, Manual for Civil Emergencies (Washington, D.C., June 1994), para. C2.2.  Active duty forces are authorized to perform critical functions such as rescue, evacuation, and emergency treatment of casualties; emergency restoration of power; debris removal; food distribution; roadway control, and emergency communications.

149 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Execution Order, August 30, 2005.

150 JTF-Katrina was established at Camp Shelby on August 28 and activated three days later on August 31.  It served as U.S. Northern Command’s forward joint command element for integrating the military component of the Federal response.

151 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of the Department of Defense, and General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Defense Department Operational Update Briefing,” Tuesday, September 6, 2005.  

152 Department of Defense, DOD Support to Hurricane Katrina, Executive Summary OASD(HD), September 5, 2005.

153 “DOD aircraft have flown mosquito abatement aerial spraying missions covering more than two million acres.” Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, written statement for a hearing on Responding to Catastrophic Events: The Role of the Military and National Guard in Disaster Response, on November 9, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities jointly with the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, 109th Congress, 1st session.

154 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 2005,” December 21, 2005, 6.

155 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 2005,” December 21, 2005, 14.

156 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 2005,” December 21, 2005.

157 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 2005,” December 21, 2005, 57.

158 President George W. Bush, “President Discusses Progress in War on Terror to National Guard,” February 9, 2006.

159 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 2005,” December 21, 2005, 57.

160 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 2005,” December 21, 2005, 20; Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, written statement submitted for a hearing on Responding to Catastrophic Events: The Role of the Military and National Guard in Disaster Response, on October 20, 2005, for the House Committee on Government Reform, 109th Congress, 1st session.

161 16,599 National Guard forces were deployed in 1989-90 following the San Francisco Loma Prieta earthquake.  U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 2005,” December 21, 2005.

162 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, “DoD Support to Hurricane Katrina, OASD(HD) Executive Summary,”September 5, 2005; U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 2005,” NGB J7, December 21, 2005; Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, testimony on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, before the House Bipartisan Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina, United States House of Representatives, 109th Congress,1st Session, October 27, 2005.

163 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 2005,” NGB J7, December 21, 2005, 146.

164 U.S. Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, “After Action Review: Hurricane Response September 2005,” NGB J7, December 21, 2005, 6.

165 Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, testimony before a hearing on Responding to Catastrophic Events: The Role of the Military and National Guard in Disaster Response, on November 9, 2005, Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology Subcommittee, House Homeland Security Committee, 109th Congress, 1st session, 14.  According to Assistant Secretary McHale, a police officer is likely to be carrying a handheld Motorola while an active duty military officer is likely to use a secure SINCGARS radio; these two radios cannot easily talk to one another.

166 The two deployed MERS detachments were the Region IV detachment from Thomasville, Georgia and the Region VI detachment from Denton, Texas. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA National Situation Report,” August 29, 2005, 3; and Michael Brown, former Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, on September 27, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

Each MERS detachment has a suite of assets that were also deployed to Florida, Georgia, and Texas.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA National Situation Report,” August 29, 2005, 3.

167 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), ESF #15-5.

168 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Response and Recovery: Available Support,” October 23, 2004, .

169 Rear Admiral Joe Kilkenny, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander and Commander of Carrier Strike Group Ten, U.S. Fleet Forces, Joint Task Force Katrina, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Providing Rescue and Civil Support Relief from the Sea, Air, and Land, (November 1, 2005).  The DJC2 is a standardized, integrated, rapidly deployable, modular, scaleable, command and control (C2) capability that provides a military commander with a planning, operating, and collaborating capability.  Lt. Col. Roarke Anderson, JS J6, Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2): DJC2 Program Overview, (n.d.), 2.

170 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, “Defense Department Briefing on DoD Response to Hurricane Katrina,” news release on briefing by Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, August 31, 2005.

171 The National Coordinating Center (NCC) for Telecommunications is defined in the NRP as “A joint telecommunications industry–Federal Government operation established to assist in the initiation, coordination, restoration, and reconstitution of National Security/Emergency Preparedness  telecommunications services and facilities.”  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 69.  For a discussion on NCC, see Dr. Peter M. Fonash, Deputy Manager of the National Communications System, Preparedness Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on Ensuring Operability during Catastrophic Events, on October 26, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, 109th Congress, 1st session, 2.

172 Dr. Peter M. Fonash, Deputy Manager of the National Communications System, Preparedness Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on Ensuring Operability during Catastrophic Events, on October 26, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, 109th Congress, 1st session.

173 Dr. Peter M. Fonash, Deputy Manager of the National Communications System, Preparedness Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on Ensuring Operability during Catastrophic Events, on October 26, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, 109th Congress, 1st session; and Chad Hart, A Research Note On: Land Mobile Radio and Public Safety Communications, prepared for the Venture Development Corporation, Datacom and Telecom Practice (Natick, MA, November 2005), .

174 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #13,” September 1, 2005.

175 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #21,” September 5, 2005.

176 For examples, see Ardis D. Hoven, Member of the American Medical Association Board of Trustees, testimony before a hearing on Assessing Public Health and the Delivery of Care in the Wake of Katrina, on September 22, 2005, House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittees on Health and Oversight and Investigations, 109th Congress, 1st session, 3; and Robert Latham, Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

177 William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 51.

178 In an interview with CNN, FEMA Director Michael Brown stated “we’ve got enough people and commodities in place right now for a three to five day surge capacity.  But what I’ve ordered my folks to do is to jam that supply line as far back as Fort Worth and as far back as Atlanta so as those supplies begin to run out, we can continue to feed those in here as long as it takes.”  “Hurricane Katrina,” CNN Breaking News, August 29, 2005.

179 Michael Brown, former Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, on September 27, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 49-50.

180 Congressman Tom Davis (R-VA), written opening statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session; and William Carwile, Federal Coordinating Officer for Mississippi, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

181 William Carwile, Federal Coordinating Officer for Mississippi, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 45.

182 Tommy Longo, Mayor of Waveland, Mississippi, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 51; and Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, on February 1, 2006, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security, 109th Congress, 2nd session, 3-5.

183 Congressman William Jefferson (D-LA), during a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, on September 27, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 93.

184 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Gutierrez Announces Hurricane Contracting Information Center: One-Stop Shop to Help U.S. Businesses Participate in Hurricane Rebuilding Efforts,” news release, October 11, 2005.  Also see U.S. Department of Commerce, “Hurricane Contracting Information Center,” .

185 “Under Title I of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (DPA), the President is authorized to require preferential acceptance and performance of contracts or orders supporting certain approved national defense and energy programs, and to allocate materials, services, and facilities in such a manner as to promote these approved programs.  Additional priorities authority is found in Section 18 of the Selective Service Act of 1948, in 10 U.S.C. § 2538, and in 50 U.S.C. § 82. The DPA priorities and allocations authority has also been extended to support emergency preparedness activities under Title VI of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act).”  …  “The Department of Commerce is delegated authority to implement these priorities and allocations provisions for industrial resources. The Bureau of Industry and Security’s Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security (SIES) administers this authority through the Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS) regulation (15 CFR Part 700).  The purpose of the DPAS is to (1) assure the timely availability of industrial resources to meet current national defense and emergency preparedness program requirements; and (2) provide an operating system to support rapid industrial response in a national emergency.”  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Defense Priorities and Allocations System Program (DPAS),” . As an example of how this authority was used in the response to Hurricane Katrina, Norfolk Southern Railway used a DPAS rated contract to procure switch equipment and generators so that it could repair railway automated signals.

186 FEMA issued a mission assignment on the morning of September 3 that stated “FEMA requests that DOD provide planning and execution for transportation and distribution of ice, water, food and medical supplies in support of the Katrina disaster in Louisiana and Mississippi.”  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “1604DR-MS-DOD-19, Amendment 1,” September 3, 2005.

187 Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, on October 27, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, 70-71.

188 In developing the NRP, it was envisioned that additional and specific planning would be needed for logistics, international coordination, private sector coordination and donations management.  In fact, each issue has its own support annex in the NRP. The annexes, however, provide little detail or operational direction and do not provide clear responsibility for the various roles and tasks referred to in the annexes.

189 The Swiss offer was received September 5, 2005 and not fully vetted by FEMA until September 14.  As another example, a C-130 aircraft traveling from Sweden with a water purification system and a cellular network waited four days for flight clearance from the U.S.

190 An estimated $854.5 million in donations have been pledged to the U.S.

191 USAID Liaisons were sent throughout the region: FEMA RRCCs – Atlanta, GA, Denton, TX, Tucker, AL; JFOs – Baton Rouge, LA, Montgomery, AL, Jackson, MS, New Orleans, LA;  JTF – Shreveport, LA, JTF Camp Shelby – Hattiesburg, MS; JTF Forward – USS Iwo Jima,  National Guard Forward Deployment – New Orleans, LA, Dobbins AFB – GA; FEMA Disaster Recovery Center – Mobile, AL; NORTHCOM – Colorado Springs, CO; Dobbins AFB – Little Rock, AK.  The first four were deployed on September 2 – two went to FEMA HQ and two went to the State Task Force.  On September 3, the State Department started sending people to the FEMA call-center, and on September 4 to the RRCC in Atlanta, the JTF at Camp Shelby, and Dobbins AFB in Georgia.  On September 5, personnel were deployed to Shreveport, Little Rock, and Denton.

192 U.S Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #21,”September 5, 2005; and United States Agency for International Development, "Agency Channels Foreign Aid for Hurricane Katrina Victims," Front Lines, October 2005.

193 It applied to Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi since August 29 and to Florida since August 24—after Hurricane Katrina’s first landfall.  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “HHS Designates First Medical Shelters and Provides Vital Medical Supplies and Medical Assistance,” news release, September 2, 2005, .

194 Sarah A. Lister, Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL33096 (Washington, D.C., September 2005), summary and CRS-11.

195 “19 NDMS DMATs and other NDMS teams were pre-staged for Katrina, and as the storm passed, they along with the US&R Task Forces, began moving, into the impact areas. By the day after the storm, teams were providing medical care and continue to do so today. The mission is still ongoing, with personnel staffing hospitals and clinics destroyed or rendered inoperable by the storms as we speak.”  Dr. Roy L. Alson, Associate Professor of Emergency Medicine at Wake Forest University School of Medicine and Commander of Disaster Medical Assistance Team NC-1, written statement for a hearing on Mitigating Catastrophic Events Through Effective Medical Response, on October 20, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, 109th Congress, 1st session.  According to an attachment Dr. Alson provided with his testimony, 16,477 patients were treated by NDMS personnel in FEMA region IV through 13 October 2005, and 40,995 patients were treated and 59,917 individuals immunized by NDMS personnel in FEMA region VI through 13 October 2005.

196 Hilarie H. Cranmer, “Hurricane Katrina: Volunteer Work – Logistics First,” New England Journal of Medicine 353(15), no. 13, October, 2005.  Dr. Cranmer was a member of the American Red Cross team that had been deployed “to perform the critical-needs assessments that would help define the public health response to Hurricane Katrina.”  Dr. Thomas Kirsch, Medical Director for Disaster Health Services for the American Red Cross, written statement for a hearing on Assessing Public Health and the Delivery of Care in the Wake of Katrina, on September 22, 2005, submitted to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittees on Health and Oversight and Investigations, 109th Congress, 1st session.  See Ardis D. Hoven, Member of the American Medical Association Board of Trustees, written statement for a hearing on Assessing Public Health and the Delivery of Care in the Wake of Katrina, on September 22, 2005, submitted to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittees on Health and Oversight and Investigations, 109th Congress, 1st session.  Dr. Kirsch said he took a team to Louisiana to assess nineteen Red Cross shelters and three very large state shelters: “Every shelter had good access to medical care either through local physicians providing care in the shelter, visiting medical teams, DMAT teams or relationships with local hospitals.”  Moreover, “ w ith flooding widespread across the region and power and communications networks out, physicians and other health care professionals in hospitals desperately tried to keep patients alive, and appear to have mostly succeeded, even when their back-up generators failed.”

197 Louisiana Nursing Home Association staff lacked means to communicate with key decision makers early in the crisis.  The Association “set up our own rescue missions.”  Joseph A. Donchess, Executive Director of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association, written statement for a hearing on Challenges in a Catastrophe:  Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, on January 31, 2006, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session.  Dr. Clyde Martin told Government Executive magazine that he joined a private relief effort in Louisiana after waiting for several days for Federal or State agencies to deploy him in their medical response.  Justin Rood, “Medical Catastrophe,” GOVEXEC.com, November 1, 2005,  (accessed February 6, 2006).

198 Louisiana State University, Office of University Relations, “LSU is Site of Largest Acute-Care Field Hospital in U.S. History,” news release, September 6, 2005; and Elizabeth M. Duke, Health Resources Services Administrator, Department of Health and Human Services, "Remarks to the National Association of Community Health Centers' 2005 Annual Convention and Community Health Institute," September 19, 2005,  (accessed February 10, 2006).

199 Separate JFOs were set up and became fully operational in: Mobile, Alabama on September 1; Denver, Colorado on September 6; Montgomery, Alabama (supplanting the Mobile facility) and Oklahoma (State) on September 10; Austin, Texas on September 11; Baton Rouge and New Orleans, Louisiana on September 12; Little Rock, Arkansas on September 13;  and Jackson, Mississippi on September 16. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Federal Concept of Operations Matrix,” September 18, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV Regional Response Coordinating Center, “Situation Report 9,” September 11, 2005; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #32 – Hurricane Katrina,” September 12, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency/Arkansas Joint Field Office, “Situation Report 11,” September 13, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Executive Briefing,” slide presentation, September 17, 2005.

200 Preliminary steps were taken toward establishing the JTF-Forward on September 6, but the facility was not fully established until later on the 7th.  U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, “Hurricane Katrina Timeline,” October 16, 2005, 13; and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #23—Hurricane Katrina,” September 7, 2005.  This temporary site was supplanted by the physical facility established on September 12, as referenced above.

201 Regarding the timing of the appointment of VADM Allen, Secretary Chertoff testified that on “Saturday September 3  I identified Admiral Allen as a person that I wanted to consider putting into place. I spoke to the Commandant over the weekend, made sure that Admiral Allen was free to come down, had him come down with the intention of having him take over at least the Louisiana piece of this in order to make sure we had that under control. And then ultimately on Friday September 9  I made the determination that I would put Admiral Allen in control of the entire operation.” Michael Chertoff, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Department of Homeland Security, on October 19, 2005, House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

202 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff,” news release, September 9, 2005.

203 The FCO “is appointed to manage Federal resource support activities … and  is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of Federal disaster assistance resources and programs to the affected State and local governments, individual victims, and the private sector.”  Whereas the PFO is an invention of HSPD-5 and the NRP, the FCO position was created by the Stafford Act, and empowered with statutory authority to perform assigned responsibilities.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 65.  VADM Allen’s appointments:  70 Fed. Reg. 56929 (Sep. 29, 2005) (Louisiana); 70 Fed. Reg. 57308 (Sep. 30, 2005) (Alabama); 70 Fed. Reg. 57309 (Sep. 30, 2005) (Mississippi).

204 When Secretary Chertoff designated VADM Allen as the FCO (in addition to his earlier appointment as PFO), Allen gained statutory authority that enabled him to more efficiently coordinate Federal disaster assistance.

205 “The SFLEO is the senior law enforcement official from the agency with primary jurisdictional responsibility as directed by statute, Presidential directive, existing Federal policies, and/or the Attorney General.  The SFLEO directs intelligence/investigative law enforcement operations related to the incident and supports the law enforcement component of the Unified Command on-scene. In the event of a terrorist incident, this official will normally be the FBI SAC.”  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 35.

206 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Hurricane Timeline,” October 21, 2005, 3.  The LECC is a construct familiar to law enforcement personnel, integrating the Federal, State, and local law enforcement communities, but is not a term currently incorporated into the NRP.

207 The LECC was built on a modified FBI Joint Operations Center construct.  It coordinated a plan to answer thousands of 911 calls in New Orleans that had gone unresolved and provided the conduit for coordination between civilian law enforcement and the National Guard and Title 10 U.S. Army forces operating in New Orleans.  The LECC not only provided a facility for all Federal law enforcement, but built a separate headquarters for the New Orleans Police adjacent to it since the NOPD’s headquarters had been destroyed.

208 U.S. Department of Defense, “CJCS Hurricane Katrina Update,” September 12, 2005.

209 New Orleans Mayor’s Office of Communications, “Updated Situation Report for New Orleans,” September 13, 2005.

210 Search and rescue teams in New Orleans carried out primary and secondary searches.  Primary searches were visual, with hailing calls as searchers moved through a certain area.  Forced entry into a building was not conducted without probable cause.  Secondary searches were conducted door to door in areas where flooding had occurred higher than 5.5 feet above the floor.  Damage incurred by access into a building was kept to a minimum and the building was re-secured after the search.  New Orleans Police Department officers were on site for all the searches conducted.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Urban Search and Rescue Operations Completed: Hurricane Katrina Urban Search and Rescue Teams are due to Return Home,” news release, September 30, 2005.

211 Mike Tamillow, Section Chief, Federal Emergency Management Agency Urban Search and Rescue, to Ed Buikema, Director, Region V, Federal Emergency Management Agency, memorandum on “US&R Section – Hurricane Katrina Update,” September 10, 2005.  Also see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Urban Search and Rescue Operations Completed: Hurricane Katrina Urban Search and Rescue Teams Are Due to Return Home,” news release, September 30, 2005, .

212 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #23,” September 6, 2005; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #29,” September 9, 2005.

213 HHS serves as the coordinator of NRP Emergency Support Function #8 (“Public Health and Medical Services”), which includes mortuary affairs.  However, FEMA’s NDMS has responsibilities for victim identification and mortuary services through its DMORTs.  Consequently, HHS must request assistance from FEMA NDMS to deploy Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams to an incident site.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), ESF #8-6.

214 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #18,” September 4, 2005; and U.S. Department of Defense, “Hurricane Katrina Update,” September 8, 2005, 20.

215 Louisiana requested DMORT and DPMU support on August 29.  Mississippi requested a DMORT assessment team on August 30.  The first DMORT team was reported as engaged in Louisiana on August 31.  By September 4, DMORT 1, DMORT 2, DMORT 4, DMORT 5, and DMORT Family Assistance Center (east), along with one DPMU, were deployed to Gulfport-Biloxi Municipal Airport.  DMORT 6, DMORT 7, DMORT 8, DMORT WMD, and DMORT Family Assistance Center (west), along with one DPMU, were deployed to St. Gabriel, Louisiana.  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #5—Hurricane Katrina,” August 29, 2005, 2; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center: Flash Report # 6—Hurricane Katrina,” August 30, 2005, 2; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center: Flash Report #8—Hurricane Katrina,” August 31, 2005, 5-7; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary’s Operations Center Flash Report #17—Hurricane Katrina,” September 4, 2005, 7-9.

216 Kenyon International Management Services, “Hurricane Katrina Update: Kenyon International Activates Emergency Team for Hurricane Katrina Response,” news release, ; Thomas Fitzgerald and Joyce Tsai, “Louisiana Governor Blasts FEMA Over Recovery of Bodies,” Knight Ridder News Service, September 14, 2005; and Mark Hosenball and Keith Naughton, “Cash and ‘Cat 5’ Chaos,” Newsweek, September 26, 2005.

217 As Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco described it, “While Kenyon International of Houston has been and still is on the ground, working each day along with DMORT teams, they have not added enough personnel to do the work because of the lack of proper support or a contract.” Louisiana Office of the Governor, “Statement by Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco on Body Removal Process in Southeast Louisiana,” news release, September 13, 2005, .

218 On September 9, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reported: “It is unclear as to the future resources for this mission as we heard the contractor Kenyon International may be in default of their verbal contract.”  U.S. Department of Defense, “Hurricane Katrina Update,” slide presentation, September 8, 2005, 20; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #37,” September 13, 2005, 18.

219 On September 9, White House spokesman Scott McClellan stated: “Mortuary affairs efforts on the ground – the State has the responsibility for overseeing the plan, implementing the plan and the federal government through the military and other ways, we’re supporting those efforts with teams in the region, as well.”  The White House, “Press Briefing by Scott McClellan,” news release, September 9, 2005, .  FEMA spokeswoman Nicol Andrews made the same point in October, arguing that “Body retrieval is a state responsibility.”  Renae Merle and Griff Witte, “Lack of Contracts Hampered FEMA: Dealing With Disaster on the Fly Proved Costly,” Washington Post, October 10, 2005.

220 Louisiana Office of the Governor, “Statement by Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco on Body Removal Process in Southeast Louisiana” news release, September 13, 2005, .

221 Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund, “Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund Announces Allocations for Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama,” news release, January 19, 2006, .

222 The National Book Festival is an annual event organized and sponsored by the Library of Congress and hosted by First Lady Laura Bush. White House website, “Mrs. Bush’s Remarks at the National Book Festival Author’s Breakfast,” September 24, 2005, .

223 “Despite the massive migration of evacuees and their subsequent placement in evacuation centers, only one known outbreak of communicable disease (norovirus) requiring unusual mobilization of public health resources had been reported as of September 23.”  U.S. Centers for Disease Control, “Infectious Disease and Dermatologic Conditions in Evacuees and Rescue Workers After Hurricane Katrina – Multiple States, August-September, 2005,” as reprinted in the Journal of the American Medical Association 294, no. 17, November 2, 2005, 2159.

224 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Estimates Show More Than 40% of Hurricane Evacuees Now Receiving HHS Benefits or Services,” news release, September 29, 2005.

225 Expedited Assistance is FEMA’s program to provide $2,000 in “an initial emergency first installment” of assistance, prior to a completed inspection of a victim’s home, to help pay for food, shelter, clothing, personal necessities and medical needs.  Eligible evacuees could also get additional FEMA assistance for a total up to $26,500 per household.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Emergency Assistance Flowing to Gulf Coast,” news release, September 9, 2005; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Disaster Assistance Frequently Asked Questions,”  (accessed February 3, 2006).

226 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #21,” September 5, 2005; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #41,” September 15, 2005.

227 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA VIP Briefing,” slide presentation, September 12, 2005, 6:00 pm; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #44,” September 17, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Nearly $690 Million in Assistance Helping More Than 330,000 Families Displaced by Katrina,” news release, September 10, 2005.

228 However, the NRP inconsistently describes the role and purpose of DRCs. The NRP states a DRC “is a central facility where individuals affected by a disaster can obtain information on disaster recovery assistance programs from various Federal, State, local, tribal, private-sector, and voluntary organizations.”   However, the NRP also states the DRC is “ a  facility established in a centralized location within or near the disaster area at which disaster victims (individuals, families, or businesses) apply for disaster aid.” NRP, p.64.  (Emphasis added).

229 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Disaster Assistance Frequently Asked Questions,” news release, September 13, 2005.  FEMA’s “Disaster Assistance Frequently Asked Questions” stated, “You cannot register for assistance at a DRC, you must register by calling 1-800-621-FEMA … or apply on line at .”

230 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #34,” September 12, 2005, 3. Approximately one-third of Louisiana households were without power or telephone service as of September 12.

231 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency/State of Alabama Joint Field Office, “FEMA-1605-DR-AL-SITREP #08,” September 4, 2005.  On September 4, the FEMA/State of Alabama JFO reported, “The Helpline number is currently unavailable. Due to the large number of teleregistration calls, all lines are being made available for registration.” This is an indication that the FEMA phone system lacked the capacity to sustain the demand for service on both the teleregistration line and Helpline, at least at that time for some customers.

232 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Getting Assistance to Individuals,” news release, September 7, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA VIP Briefing,” slide presentation, September 7, 2005, 6:00 pm, 7; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA VIP Briefing,” slide presentation, September 9, 2005, 6:00 pm, 2; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA VIP Briefing,” slide presentation, September 10, 2005, 6:00 am, 3. “Currently, the amount of money being distributed through the expedited assistance program is $2,000 per household. … This emergency assistance is provided to help with disaster needs such as transportation, clothing, rental housing, other housing accommodations, and food, and is included in the calculation of total benefits for which victims are eligible.”

233 Government Accountability Office, Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: FEMA's Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and Abuse, GAO-06-403T, February 13, 2006, 18-19, .

234 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA VIP Briefing,” slide presentation, September 8, 2005; and Lisa Rein and Christopher Lee, “Debit Card Giveaway Goes Awry in Houston,” Washington Post, September 9, 2005.  FEMA individual assistance programs suffered from other problems.  Accounting and verification problems prompted an investigation by the DHS Office of the Inspector General.  “In a November 1, 2005, report on expedited assistance overpayment, DHS OIG attempted to identify the events that resulted in a married couple receiving duplicate payments for expedited assistance and determine why internal controls did not prevent the duplicate payment from being issued and why the applicants were not provided adequate information to return the excess funds. It was found that for a short time, the National Emergency Management Information System was not configured with system controls to prevent more than one payment per household.  FEMA officials ... have identified more than 5,000 potentially duplicated payments.”  Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency, Oversight of Gulf Coast Hurricane Recovery: A 90-Day Progress Report to Congress (Washington, D.C., December 2005), 33.

235 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Good Story: Harris County, Texas Citizen Corps’ Response to Hurricane Katrina,” Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) database, November 17, 2005, ; Harris County Joint Information Center, “Mission Fulfilled, Command stands Down,” news release, September 20, 2005, .

236 Harris County Joint Information Center, “Mission Fulfilled, Command stands Down,” news release, September 20, 2005, .

237 T. Yarbrough, “’Baptists’ 10.5 Million Meals shatters Prior Disaster Relief Record,” North American Mission Board,  (accessed January 13, 2006).  For other examples, see Liz Szabo, “Grass-roots groups pitch in to find shelter for evacuees,” USA Today, September 8, 2005.

238 This despite the NRP Volunteer and Donations Management Support Annex, which describes this process.

239 The NRP Volunteer and Donations Management Support Annex focuses on managing unaffiliated volunteers and unsolicited donated goods.  It does not provide guidelines for coordinating private sector and NGO relief efforts.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), VOL-1.

240 Major Todd Hawks, Public Affairs Secretary for the Salvation Army of America, testimony before a hearing on the Response of Charities to Hurricane Katrina, on December 13, 2005, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Oversight, 109th Congress, 1st session.

241 David Roberson, President and CEO of Cavalier Homes, Inc., testimony before a hearing on Emergency Housing Needs in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, on September 15, 2005, House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, 109th Congress, 1st session.  Also see Laura Maggi, “Hotel Rooms Sought For Shelter Occupants; Other Housing Options Appear Slow To Arrive,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, September 21, 2005; and Shankar Vedantam and Dean Starkman, “Lack of Cohesion Bedevils Recovery,” Washington Post, September 18, 2005.

242 James N. Russo, Federal Coordinating Officer for Mississippi Recovery Operations, Federal Emergency Management Agency, testimony before a hearing on Housing Options in the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, on January 14, 2006, House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, 109th Congress, 2nd session; David Roberson, representing the Manufactured Housing Institute and the Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform, testimony before a hearing on Emergency Housing Needs Following Hurricane Katrina, on September 15, 2005, House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, 109th Congress, 1st session.

243 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #20,” September 5, 2005; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #31,” September 10, 2005.

244 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Executive Briefing,” slide presentation, September 14, 2005, 6:00 am.

245 A complicating factor was that as Hurricane Rita approached the Gulf Coast, individuals in shelters from Hurricane Katrina had to be evacuated from their original shelter sites and moved to new ones.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Gulf Coast Hurricane Katrina (85) and Rita (37) Response and Recovery DHS SITREP,” October 14, 2005.

246 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “U.S. Government Announces a Comprehensive Transitional Housing Assistance Program for Katrina Evacuees,” news release, September 23, 2005; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: Transitional Housing Assistance for Hurricane Katrina Evacuees,” September 23, 2005; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security,  “Press Briefing by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Alphonso Jackson,” news release, September 24, 2005.

247 Mr. Powell serves as the primary Federal contact for Congress, State, local and private leaders in supporting “mid and long term recovery and rebuilding plans.”  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Coordinator Named to Lead Federal Recovery and Rebuilding Activities in the Gulf Coast Region,” news release, November 1, 2005.

248 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Federally Declared Disasters By Calendar Year,” .  Forty emergency declarations were issued in the period from January 20, 2001 to Hurricane Katrina.

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