Title Artz v. Barnhardt
Date 2003
By Alito
Subject Misc
Contents
Page 1
LEXSEE 330 F3D 170
JAY ARTZ, Appellant v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
No. 02-3882
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
330 F.3d 170; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10704; 88 Soc. Sec. Rep. Service 1; Unemployment Ins. Rep. (CCH) P17,025B
April 7, 2003, Argued
May 29, 2003, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: **1 ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY. (D.C. No. 01-cv--02004). District Judge: Hon. Joseph E. Irenas.
Artz v. Barnhart, 214 F. Supp. 2d 459, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14843 (D.N.J., 2002)
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes
COUNSEL: Brian G. Smith, Esq. (Argued), Collingswood, New Jersey, Counsel for Appellant.
Anthony J. LaBruna (Argued), Assistant U.S. Attorney, Christopher J. Christie, United States Attorney, District of New Jersey, Newark, New Jersey, Counsel for Appellee.
JUDGES: Before: ALITO, FUENTES and
GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. OPINIONBY: ALITO OPINION:
*171 OPINION OF THE COURT
ALITO, Circuit Judge:
This appeal requires us to interpret and apply a provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
402(x)(1)(A)(ii), that provides that disability insurance benefits and certain other benefits are not to be paid to a person who "is confined by court order in an institu- tion at public expense in connection with . . . a verdict or finding that the individual is not guilty of a criminal offense by reason of insanity." Relying on this provision, the Commissioner suspended Jay Artz's claim for disabil-
ity benefits for a 14-month period during which he was involuntarily confined in psychiatric institutions at public expense. The District Court **2 affirmed the decision of the Commissioner, Artz v. Barnhart, 214 F. Supp. 2d
459 (D.N.J. 2002), and we now affirm the order of the
District Court. I.
Before turning to the facts of Artz's case, we will briefly discuss the provision of the Social Security Act that is at issue in this appeal, and we will summarize New Jersey's treatment of persons who are found not guilty by reason of insanity ("NGRI").
A. Before 1994, a provision of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 402(x)(1) (amended 1994) provided that bene- fits were not to be paid to felons while incarcerated unless they were actively and satisfactorily participating in an approved rehabilitation program and were expected to be able to engage in substantial gainful activity upon release and within a reasonable time. In 1994, Congress broad- ened this prohibition to apply to several other categories of persons who are institutionalized at public expense fol- lowing criminal proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 402(x)(1)(A). Specifically, as amended in 1994 and as it now stands, the statute applies to any person who
(i) is confined in a jail, prison, or other pe- nal institution **3 or correctional facility
*172 pursuant to his conviction of a crim- inal offense,
(ii) is confined by court order in an institution at public expense in connection with --
(I) a verdict or finding that the individual is guilty but in- sane, with respect to a criminal offense,
330 F.3d 170, *172; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10704, **3;
88 Soc. Sec. Rep. Service 1; Unemployment Ins. Rep. (CCH) P17,025B
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(II) a verdict or finding that the individual is not guilty of such an offense by reason of in- sanity,
(III) a finding that such in- dividual is incompetent to stand trial under an allegation of such an offense, or
(IV) a similar verdict or find- ing with respect to such an of- fense based on similar factors
(such as a mental disease, a mental defect, or mental incom- petence), or
(iii) immediately upon completion of con- finement as described in clause (i) pursuant to conviction of a criminal offense an ele- ment of which is sexual activity, is confined by court order in an institution at public ex- pense pursuant to a finding that the individ- ual is a sexually dangerous person or a sexual predator or a similar finding.
The House Committee Report provided the follow- ing explanation for including persons found not guilty by reason of insanity within this prohibition:
Social Security is intended to replace **4 earnings and provide basic income for food, clothing and shelter to workers who retire or become disabled. Individuals who have been committed to an institution pursuant to committing a crime are already relying on public funds to cover the costs of their basic living expenses. It is particularly inequitable that, in some instances, criminally insane in- dividuals so institutionalized receive higher benefits than their victims or their victims' survivors . . . .
In making these changes, the Committee is seeking to establish greater consistency in the policy that Congress enacted in 1980 banning Social Security benefit payments to incarcer- ated felons. That limitation recognizes that prisoners receive full support from public re- sources in the form of food, clothing, lodg- ing, and basic health care. In the Committee's view, the same situation exists in the case of criminally insane individuals who are con- fined to institutions at public expense.
H.R. Rep. No. 103-491 (1994), 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3266,
3268, 3273.
B. In State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (N.J.
1975), the New Jersey Supreme Court endorsed the broad principle that the standard for the involuntary **5 com- mitment of persons found NGRI should be substantially the same as that applied to others who are civilly commit- ted. Id. at 297-99. The Court then prescribed procedures to implement this principle. Under Krol, when a defen- dant is found NGRI, the criminal court may order that the defendant "be confined in a suitable mental institution for a period of 60 days for observation and examination." Id. at 300. The Krol Court continued:
Within this period, the State may move for indefinite commitment on the ground that defendant is mentally ill and, if permitted to remain at large in the general population without some restraints, is likely to pose a danger to himself or to society. If, following a hearing, the court finds that the State has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant is mentally ill and is likely to pose such a danger, it should order suitable restraints placed upon defendant's liberty so as to protect the public and provide defendant with appropriate treatment.
*173 Id. (footnotes omitted). The Court added that or- ders requiring institutionalization or lesser restraints may be modified upon proper proof **6 by a preponder- ance of the evidence by the party seeking modification. Id. at 303-04. "Once, however, a commitment order is unconditionally terminated the defendant must be treated thereafter like any other person for purposes of involun- tary commitment." Id.
In State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 390 A.2d 574 (N.J.
1978), the state supreme court imposed additional re- quirements. The Fields Court held that persons who are civilly committed after a verdict of NGRI are entitled to periodic review of the continued validity of the restraints on their liberty and that the state must bear the same bur- den of proof at these proceedings as it bore when the person was first committed. Id. at 580. The Krol and Fields procedures are now codified by statute and court rule. See N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8; N.J. Court Rules 3:19-2 and
4:74-7.
Under the New Jersey procedures, NGRI acquit- tees are generally treated the same as others when civil commitment is initially sought and when a periodic re- view proceeding is held, but there are some differences.
" W hat is required is not absolute equality, but 'substan-
330 F.3d 170, *173; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10704, **6;
88 Soc. Sec. Rep. Service 1; Unemployment Ins. Rep. (CCH) P17,025B
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tial equality.'" In the Matter of the Commitment of Edward
S., 118 N.J. 118, 570 A.2d 917, 922 (N.J. 1990). **7
"Indeed, the cases note that there are differences." Id. at 923 (emphasis in original). Perhaps most importantly, the burden of proof differs. In most civil commitment proceedings, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that "mental illness causes the person to be dan- gerous to self or dangerous to others or property." N.J. Court Rule 4:74-7(f)(1). In the case of a person who has been found NGRI, however, "during the maximum period of imprisonment that could have been imposed, as an ordinary term of imprisonment, for any charge on which the defendant has been acquitted by reason of in- sanity," a preponderance of the evidence burden applies. N.J.S.A. 2C: 4-8. See also Krol, 344 A.2d at 300 & n.9. Furthermore, "the fact that an NGRI acquittee has actually engaged in dangerous conduct otherwise crimi- nal should weigh heavily in a court's assessment of the need for the continued imposition of restraints upon his liberty." Fields, 390 A.2d at 587. In addition the pros- ecutor has a statutory right to appear in any proceeding regarding the commitment or discharge of an acquittee following an NGRI verdict and in any subsequent peri- odic review. **8 N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8b(3). And when an NGRI murder acquittee seeks release into the community, the proceeding must generally be open to the public. In the Matter of Commitment of Edward S., supra.
C. Artz has a long history of mental illness. See Artz,
214 F. Supp. 2d at 461. In 1981, Artz was arrested for the murder of his mother, but he was found NGRI, and his case was then handled in accordance with the procedures summarized above. He was confined by the criminal court for 60 days for observation and evaluation. After that eval- uation, it was determined that he was a danger to himself or others. He was therefore involuntarily committed to the Ancora Psychiatric Hospital, and his status was re- viewed as required by Fields. In June of 1989, following such a review, a New Jersey Superior Court Judge ordered that Artz be released from the Ancora facility on certain conditions, including the following: that he refrain from drinking alcohol and using illegal controlled substances; that he take prescribed psychoactive medications; that he attend regular counseling sessions; and that he remain available for monitoring and evaluation. App. at 144-46.
*174 As a result of this **9 continued monitoring and evaluation, Artz was readmitted to the Ancora facility from July 7 to 20, 1993, and from February 23 to March
30, 1994. Id. at 149. On July 22, 1994, he was committed to another psychiatric hospital after a judicial determina- tion that he posed a danger to himself and others because he was no longer taking his medication. On March 14,
1995, Artz was transferred to the Ancora facility. He was conditionally released on April 10, 1996.
In January 1982, while confined in the Ancora facil- ity, Artz applied to the Social Security Administration
("SSA") for disability benefits. Id. at 47-50. His claim was initially denied, but he filed a request for reconsider- ation. Id. at 51-57. This too was denied. Id. at 58-59. Artz then requested a hearing before an ALJ. Id. at 51-53. In January of 1983, the ALJ issued a favorable decision and order. The ALJ found that Artz suffered from "a severe impairment, and was unable to perform his prior work activity, or any other relevant work-related activity in the local and national economy." Id. at 135. The ALJ decided that Artz was entitled to disability benefits and to a pe- riod of disability commencing **10 on December 31,
1980. Id. at 136. Because of Artz's mental condition and his confinement in Ancora Psychiatric Hospital, the ALJ recommended that a representative payee be appointed. Id.
In March 1995, Artz was informed by the SSA that his benefits were being suspended while he was confined in an institution at public expense. Id. at 138-39. Artz filed a request for reconsideration, but the SSA denied the request citing the previously noted amendment to 42
U.S.C. § 402(x) that had taken effect on February 1, 1995. App. at 142-43. Artz requested a hearing and, in March
1998, he appeared before an ALJ. Id. at 29-46. In June
1999, the ALJ decided that, pursuant to the amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 402(x), Artz's benefits had been properly suspended by the Commissioner because Artz's involun- tarily confinement between February 1, 1995, and April
10, 1996, was "in connection with" his 1981 NGRI ver- dict. App. at 19-20. The Appeals Council of the SSA denied Artz's request for review of the ALJ's decision. Id. at 4-5. Artz sought review in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, but the District Court affirmed **11 the decision denying Artz's claim. Artz,
214 F. Supp. 2d at 468. The District Court based its de- cision on the language of Section 402(x) and also noted the congressional intent to avoid double payment of pub- lic funds in the form of benefits to individuals who are institutionalized at the public expense following a verdict of NGRI. Artz then took the present appeal.
II.
Artz argues that his benefits were improperly sus- pended because during the time in question he was not confined "in connection with" the verdict of NGRI but was instead confined as a result of a normal civil commit- ment proceeding. Artz argues that the only connections between the NGRI verdict and the order under which he was committed during the time in question are that "they both happened to Mr. Artz and they both had the same case number." Appellant's Br. at 14. "These connections," he adds, "are not what is contemplated in the statute." Id.
330 F.3d 170, *174; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10704, **11;
88 Soc. Sec. Rep. Service 1; Unemployment Ins. Rep. (CCH) P17,025B
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A. In analyzing Artz's argument, we begin with the key statutory phrase "in connection with" the NGRI ver- dict. In United States v. Loney, 219 F.3d 281, 284-85
(3d Cir. 2000), we considered the meaning of the phrase
"in connection with, **12 " and although the context was different -- in Loney, we were interpreting a provi- sion of *175 the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. §
2K2.1(b)(5) -- our discussion there is instructive. Stating that we should interpret the phrase in accordance with
"ordinary usage," we concluded that the phrase should be interpreted "'broadly,'" "'expansively,'" and "as cover- ing a wide range of relationships." Loney, 219 F.3d at
284 (citations omitted). We observed that the phrase "ex- presses some relationship or association, one that can be satisfied in a number of ways such as a causal or logical relationship." Id. We added:
We do not attempt to provide an exhaustive list of relationships that will resolve every case. As other courts have observed, 'no sim- ple judicial formula can adequately capture the precise contours of the 'in connection with' requirement, particularly in light of the myriad factual contexts in which the phrase might come into play.
Id. (citation omitted).
In light of this discussion of the ordinary meaning of the phrase "in connection with," we hold that the phrase is more than broad enough to apply in the present case. Artz was confined **13 during the months at issue
(February 1995 to April 1996) pursuant to a court order that was issued on July 22, 1994, and that formed a link in a tight chain of events stretching back to the NGRI verdict. As previously noted, that verdict led immediately and directly to a period of confinement for evaluation, and as a result of that evaluation, Artz was civilly commit- ted in August 1981. He was conditionally released from this confinement in June 1989, and one of the conditions of his release was that he take the medication that was prescribed for him. After several shorter periods of re- confinement for failure to abide by conditions of release, the July 22, 1994, commitment order was issued based on the conclusion that he posed a danger to himself and oth- ers because he was no longer taking his medication. This sequence establishes a nexus that is sufficient to satisfy the Loney Court's understanding of the ordinary meaning of the phrase "in connection with."
Moreover, when Artz was committed in July 22, 1994, his prior NGRI verdict had a significant effect on the test that the judge was required to apply. Due to the prior verdict, the judge was required to find only that a prepon-
derance **14 of the evidence, not clear and convincing evidence, established that he presented the requisite dan- ger. This link too is ample to satisfy Loney.
B. Artz asks us to read the statutory language more narrowly. According to Artz, a civil commitment meets the "in connection with" requirement only if "the hos- pitalization . . . immediately follows the NGRI verdict." Appellant's Br. at 14. In his case, he argues, the cov- ered period was "from August of 1981 when he was civilly committed following his criminal trial to June of
1989 when the Superior Court ordered his conditional release ." Id. We find this argument unconvincing.
First, we see no basis for interpreting the broad phrase
"in connection with" to mean "immediately follow ing ." That is not what the phrase connotes in ordinary usage, and we see no basis for giving the phrase that special meaning here. Second, Artz's concession that his confine- ment from August 1981 to June 1989 was "in connection with" the NGRI verdict undermines his central argument that he was confined during the period at issue in this case pursuant to what was in essence an ordinary civil com- mitment. Artz's commitment was ordered in August 1981
**15 pursuant to the same standard -- proof of dan- gerousness by a preponderance of the evidence -- as his re-confinement in 1994. Moreover, the 1981 order, like the 1994 *176 order, was based on Artz's condition at the time in question. Thus, if the 1981 commitment was
"in connection with" the NGRI verdict, we think that the same is true of the 1994 re-commitment.
C. This interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 402(x) is sup- ported by the Social Security Administration's Program Operations Manual System "POMS" , "the publicly available operating instructions for processing Social Security claims." Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371,
154 L. Ed. 2d 972, 123 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2003). "While these administrative interpretations are not products of formal rulemaking, they nevertheless warrant respect." Id. at 1026. POMS GN 02607.310 provides as follows:
NOTE: Some jurisdictions have special pro- cedures for re-confining NGRI individuals
(i.e., insanity acquittees) on conditional re- lease which differ from usual civil commit- ment procedures. If a court orders the indi- vidual re-confined under these special pro- cedures, consider the NGRI individual con- fined "in **16 connection with" the NGRI verdict or finding.
Because the procedures applicable when Artz was re- confined in 1994 differed from normal civil commitment
330 F.3d 170, *176; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10704, **16;
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Page 5
procedures in the ways already explained, this provision supports the suspension of Artz's benefits.
In sum, we hold that Artz was confined at public
expense "in connection with" his prior NGRI verdict and that his benefits were therefore correctly suspended for the period in question. Accordingly, the order of the District Court is affirmed.
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